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ABSTRACT 
N.J.RENGGER 
'REASON, SCEPTICISM AND POLITICS' 
This thesis is concerned to discuss two related 
questions in polit~cal theory. First, the relationship of 
'theory' and 'practice', concentrating specifically on the 
relationship between 'philosophy' and 'politics'; and, 
secondly, how the political theory of the Eighteenth Century 
Enlightenment is helpful in revealing an answer to the first 
problem. 
In order to encompass this dual task, the thesis is 
divided into three parts. Part One, 'Philosophy in its 
Place', delineates two trends in modern political thought 
that most explicitly bracket off the theoretical and the 
practical. 
Macintyre in 
It goes on to discuss the thesis of Alisdair 
AFTER VIRTUE, that it was the Enlightenment 
that was, in fact, the intellectual origin of these two 
trends. Chapter Two of Part One, continues this discussion 
by considering recent adaptations of the central claims 
(such as that offered by Bernard Williams), and challenges 
to them from thinkers who emphasise the methodological 
importance of the history of thought (such as Macintyre 
himself, and Richard Rorty). It concludes with an analysis 
of an issue central to the discussions of all three thinkers: 
incommensurability. 
Part Two, 'Theory and Practice in the Enlightenment's 
Politics', consists of three chapters which together offer 
an interpretation of the Enlightenment's reflections on the 
relation between theory and practice and, specifically, of 
the two thinkers most important for this question, Hume and 
Kant. The analysis also discusses rival interpretations 
and concentrates specifically on refuting Macintyre's 
arguments in AFTER VIRTUE on the nature, character and 
implications of Enlightenment thought. 
Part Three, 'Bringing Philosophy Back In', ties these 
various threads together by first discussing the 
methodological questions set out in Part One in more detail, 
and then by showing how the Enlightenment's thought on 
this topic is still of the utmost importance for modern 
political theorists and why this should be so. 
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PREFACE 
As with any piece of sustained research, in the course of 
writing this thesis I have incurred many debts, which I 
gratefully acknowledge here. 
Professor Alan Milne has been the very model of a modern 
research supervisor (as an individual of whom we are both great 
admirers might have put it). During my three years of research 
at Durham he was endlessly considerate and patient towards a 
post-graduate student often led astray by his own whims and 
fancies, and was tireless in reading and commenting on the draft 
chapters I irregularly produced. He has been no less helpful 
over the last two years, when I have been elsewhere, in keeping 
the thesis (to say nothing of its wayward author) up to the 
mark. I have benefitted immeasurably from these, and many 
other, kindnesses and am unable to fully express the amount I 
have learnt from him over the years. 
Bob Dyson discussed many aspects of this thesis with me in 
its most formative stages. Although always friendly and 
sympathetic, his criticisms were invariably formidable and 
searching and many of the solutions I proffer were first defined 
and elaborated in discussions with him. Henry Tudor and Paddy 
Fitzpatrick also both commented on various aspects of the thesis, 
as well as allowing me time in the seminars they organized to 
read parts of it to scholarly audiences, and I am very grateful 
to them both. 
I owe a special debt to that most personal of institutions, 
Durham University. Not only did it provide a marvellous setting 
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in which to embark on scholarly work but through its award of 
a research studentship it provided me with the financial means 
to pursue it. The staff of the University library were 
characteristically helpful in a multiplicity of roles, and I 
gladly acknowledge the benefit I received from this. 
Finally there are two more personal debts I wish to 
acknowledge. Vanessa Robinson read many parts of this thesis, 
and discussed others with me, and, while not surprised by the 
force and acuteness of her suggestions, I remain more grateful 
than I can say, both for these and for our continuing friendship. 
Lastly, my Mother and Father have provided, throughout my whole 
academic career to date so great a level of support - moral, emotiona 
and financial - that any words of mine would be inadequate to 
express my gratitude. During my thesis, especially, they 
have helped in innumerable ways, and I say, in all honesty, that 
I do not know what I would have done without them. Were it 
not inappropriate to dedicate a Ph.D thesis I would dedicate 
it to them. 
Doubtless there are faults in what follows. In philosophy 
and political theory there are never last words, only pauses 
for breath, but for those faults I am responsible, not those 
people who have helped my understanding, and whose help it is 
the purpose of this preface to acknowledge. 
N.J.R. 
December 1986. 
iii 
INTRODUCTION 
This Monograph is an attempt to do two things. The first is 
to offer a defence of a certain interpretation of the Enlightenment, 
against a number of critics in philosophy and the social 
sciences. The second and wider theme, is to use this defence 
to contribute to the ongoing debate over the nature of the 
relationship of philosophy and political theory to political 
practice. Although this debate went underground (along with a 
number of others) during the years in which the analytical 
movement reigned, unchallenged, in the Anglo-American philosophical 
worlds, it has lately re-emerged with a vengeance, in the work 
of (amongst others) Richard Rorty and Alisdair Macintyre - the 
two modern thinkers with whom I shall be most engaged in this 
work. 
The debate has a number of central loci and a series of 
implications for other areas - for example the nature of the 
relationship between philosophy per se and its history - and 
inevitably I shall be dealing, at least tangentally, with some of 
them in the course of this study, but its most important 
implication (or so I shall argue in chapter six) is that it 
displays the poverty of a good deal of modern political theory. 
It will be my argument that modern political theory is 
impoverished, not in the sense that is not ingenious, well thought 
out, provoking or interesting (much modern political theory 
is all these things), but that, for reasons that lie largely 
in the history of philosophy in the last three hundred years 
and especially in the last century - political theory has lost 
its true identity. Like Britain, it has lost an empire, the 
empire it had in what is now often referred to as the 'classical' 
period of political thought (1), and has not yet found an agreed 
role. It is often at war with itself, as John Dunn has said, 
philosophically feeble and politically maladroit(2). 
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It is so, in large part, because theory and practice have 
been separated in a way that does grave damage to both. This 
is the nub of the charge that Alisdair Macintyre levels at what 
he calls 'emotivism', and he is right. He is not right, however, 
in laying emotivism at the door of the Enlightenment, and more 
seriously, in tieing the Enlightenment and emotivism together 
he obscures one of the most important legacies of the 
Enlightenment - its attempt to bind together theory and practice. 
It is my interpretation of this attempt that I want to elaborate 
and defend in chapters three, four and five of the present work, 
and analyse the implications of, in chapter six. 
The sense in which this is relevant to my wider theme, 
however, can only be made clear if I look at those modern exponants 
of emotivism whom Macintyre wishes to link the Enlightenment, 
and then examine both Macintyre's own case and those of some 
others who treat of the same or similar issues. Thus the first 
chapter of this thesis examines the approaches in twentieth 
century philosophy which attempt to separate theory and practice, 
and deduces two trends in twentieth century political theory -
Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen - which carry this into effect, 
as it were, in the political realm. The second chapter examines 
the way in which one open ally of these two trends (Bernard 
Williams), one avowed enemy (Macintyre himself) and one thinker 
who in a sense is both (Richard Rorty) develop and elaborate 
their cases,and cope with the one idea which is the fundamental 
bedrock for any Humpty Dumpty, Red Queen or emotivist argument:-
the incommensurability of values. 
Thus, in part one of the thesis the modern arguments for 
the rigid separation of theory and practice are analysed and 
discussed, and the terrain of the conceptual battlefield 
described - Humpty Dumpty, the Red Queen, Emotivism, 
Incommensurability and the alleged (by Macintyre) derivation of 
all these from the Enlightenment's ideas and their failure. 
Part two offers an interpretation of the Enlightenment which 
rejects this allegation, and seeks to show how both in its 
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general tenor and often seemingly disparate approaches, and 
in the specific arguments of perhaps its two most distinctive 
and influential philosophical voices (Hume and Kant), the 
Enlightenment, far from separating theory and practice, was 
convinced of the necessity of their interdependance. 
Part three, then, is left to draw out the implications of 
all this. It suggests that, in a number of vitally important 
ways the concerns of the Enlightenment and the concerns of the 
late twentieth century are analogous, and that the solutions 
discussed are of considerable significance for the relationship 
of theory to practice, philosophy to politics, that was my 
wider concern at the beginning of the thesis. The various 
problems left unresolved at the end of part one, particularly 
that of incommensurability, are then re-examined and some 
solutions proffered. 
Finally the thesis attempts to show how the concerns 
activating it are of relevance in rectifying that 'poverty' in 
modern political theory that I referred to earlier, emphasising 
that political theory, philosophy, indeed all social enquiry 
must take history, and what has been called the 'view from 
here and now'(3), much more seriously if it is adequately to 
perform the task that the role discussed above defines for it. 
Perhaps the least appreciated legacy of the Enlightenment for 
modern political theory is what Peter Gay has called its 
'recovery of nerve'(4); political theory too needs to recover 
its nerve and to become more self aware of both itself and its 
surroundings. The final part of this thesis also attempts 
to outline just what form both the recovery and the self 
awareness should take. 
PART 1: PHILOSOPHY IN ITS PLACE. 
Chapter 
- 1 -
Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen 
A Methodological Introduction. 
"The most striking feature of contemporary moral 
utterance is that so much of it is used to express 
disagreements: and the most striking feature of the 
debates in which these disagreements are expressed 
is their interminable character". 
Alisdair Macintyre. 
"There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, 
and in which men of learning are not of contrary 
opinions". 
David Hume 
This chapter is concerned to do two things; first, to discuss the climate 
in political philosophy which has made the relationship between philosophy 
and politics a problematic one and, secondly, to suggest why looking at 
the works of Hume and Kant might be especially illuminating in analysing 
this fact. 
The most obvious cause of this problem has, of course, been the dominance 
in Britain and America, at least for most of the twentieth century, of 
conceptions of philosophy which argue that to prescribe, in the moral or 
political realm, is no part of philosophy's purpose and that if and when 
philosophers do so prescribe they cease, at that moment, to be 
philosophers at all; they become moralists, or in Moritz Schlick's 
1 
contemptuous word 'preachers'. 
Characteristically, these conceptions of philosophy have not always agreed 
among themselves. The realists, dominant in Britain in the years before 
(and just after) the first World War ,were criticised and eventually displaced. 
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by the logical positivists and their analytically minded confreres, yet 
both argued against moral or political theorizing of the 'traditional' 
sort, and many philosophers who could by no stretch of the imagination 
be called 'analytical philosophers' argued a similar case, albeit for 
2 different reasons. 
In much modern political theory these conceptions of philosophy have given 
rise to two particular ways of thinking that I shall call (with apologies 
, ~ ~ t 
to Lewis Carroll) Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen. It is an interesting 
fact, however, that even now that analytical and linguistic philosophy is 
nothing like as dominant as it once was, 'Humpty Dumpty' and the 'Red 
Queen' still exercise a powerful influence on political thought. It is this 
influence that I chiefly want to discuss in this chapter, its effects and 
its source, but I must first identify and describe my two trends of 
thought. 
I 
Before discussing these two trends in modern political philosophy, however, 
I must make a few remarks about the role, form and nature of political 
theory, in order to set them in context. At the height of the debate over 
"who killed political theory", in the 1950's and 1960's, Isaiah Berlin 
observed that it was a "strange paradox that political theory should seem 
to lead so shadowy an existence at a time when, for the first time in 
history, literally the whole of mankind is violently divided by issues 
the reality of which is, and always has been, the sole raison d'etre of 
this branch of study". 3 At least part of the reason why this paradox 
e~dsted was that the issues involved - those which, according to Berlin, it 
is the raison d 'etre of political theory to study - had cane to be seen as those that 
are in principle unsettleable by argument, and Berlin infers this later 
in his article. Previously such issues were seen as settleable in 
principle - even if they have never actually been settled in practice. 
Obviously this is a conceptual shift of great importance and is of 
especial importance in the present context because throughout the history 
of political theory, its "raison d'etre" was not simply to study the 
issues (i.e. analyse, describe and explain them), it was also expected to 
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help decide upon them in some way or another. It was, of course, this 
function that the growth of positivism and linguistic philosophy was 
supposed to have 'killed'. Unfortunately, even those philosophers who 
have, in some way or another, reverted to an older idea of political 
theory, seem to remain ambivalent about precisely what it is they are 
doing when they do political philosophy. 
This is the case in the work of a number of political philosophers, most 
interestingly perhaps, Rawls. He has argued that one can pursue 
substantive moral theory independently of views about the origin of, or 
4 
method to be used in ethical thinking per se, or at least, that 
substantive moral concerns should hold central place in our studies over and 
above debates about definition, analysis and so on. Up to a point, of 
course, he is quite right and it is easy to understand his impatience with 
thinkers who spend so much time discussing methodology that they never get 
around to actually discussing the subject, but the weakness of this 
argument is that it poses no real threat to a conception of philosophy which 
says that ethical recommendation, simply by virtue of it being ethical, 
makes such theorizing dubious philosophy or not philosophy at all. Many 
thinkers still argue this and however much they might admire Rawls' 
argumentation itself, it is such. views that lie at the back of Alan Ryan's 
description of Rawls' as "the ideologist of American Liberalism", and the 
various dismissals of Rawls' A Theory of Ju~tice as a work of Liberal 
apologetics. 5 
Now Rawls' work(and that of philosophers like Nozick, Dworkin and so on) 
liesmost assuredly in the analytical tradition, at least in the sense that 
the distinctive apparatus and impedimenta of analytical philosophy are 
deployed with impressive skill and effect. However, they go beyond the 
analytic tradition in that their arguments are supposed to have practical 
(i.e. prescriptive) import, the one thing the founders of the analytic 
tradition set themselves most sternly against in the moral or (in this 
case) political spheres. Rawls himself is explicitly arguing against a 
6 tradition of moral philosophy beginning in the mid eighteenth century 
(a point of some interest and one to which I shall return), but his 
argument is meant also to apply (at least obliquel~) to modern 'moral 
philosophy' and specifically at that school which denies, in fact, that 
moral philosophy can be done in this mode (as philosophy) at all. 
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For the proponents of this 'school' Rawls' work (and those of thinkers 
like Walzer, Nozick, Putnam and others) is necessarily not philosophy 
but 'preaching' or (more usually) ideology of some form or another. 
Unfortunately, there is no agreed use of this term either. P.H. Partridge 
regards it as a blanket term covering all appraisive moral or political 
judgements; "'the ideological' is a moral judgement about ends and ways of 
life, and about the institutional conditions of the good life."7 Others, 
like David Manning, have a more precise use of the term, restricting it 
to political action and affiliation and describing it as the "language 
of adherence". 8 Marxist theorists produce variances of Marx's use of 
ideology. 9 Unfortunately the lack of an adequate definition has 
produced the not unsurprising result, that various philosophers have used 
it in markedly different ways, and in attempts to establish a number of 
different points. 
The general view of philosophy that I have been outlining and which is 
associated chiefly with what I will call the 'hard core' analytical 
philosophers, separates out the ethical and the philosophical, at least 
as far as conduct is concerned and is the usual premiss for the two trends 
in political philosophy that I shall delineate in a moment. It holds that 
philosophy is about (any or all of) analysis, description, observation and 
explanation but not about recommendation and has been described by Peter 
Winch, borrowing a phrase from Locke, as the "under-labourer" conception 
10 
of philosophy. When a moral argument takes place,(the under-labourer 
argument runs) philosophy cannot do anything but describe and analyse the 
form the argument takes - it cannot recommend one course of action over 
another (though it can, of course, show that one line of argument is 
confused or irrelevant, an important concession to which I shall return). 
This conception of philosophy has a long history; Bacon, Locke, Hume, Moore, 
Russell, Schlick and Carnap have all, in one form or another, been trumpe~d 
as allies or fellow travellers. It has also more recently taken over many 
of the leading ideas, methods, vocabulary and apparatus of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy. 
This approach has inevitably led to a corollary; this being the assumption 
that many of the concepts of moral and political debate in which politicru 
philosophers necessarily engage are without any ''objective" criteria for 
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being judged - they are, in Gallie's words, "essentially contested 
concepts" and, therefore, display an "interminable'' and "unsettleable" 
character - which brings us back to the "paradox" that Berlin spoke of, 
and that I mentioned earlier. 
That moral philosophers have disagreed and continue to do so is scarcely 
news, but the assumption of the inherent unsettleability of moral dispute 
has been a minority view in philosophy until recently. The belief that 
moral disputants are engaged in - the words are Alisdair Macintyre's - "a 
clash of antagonistic wills, each will determined by some act of arbitrary 
11 
choices of its own" is one that was found in some ancient writers 
12 (particularly, for example, certain of the sophists and Lucretius) and 9 
at least partially, in certain very individual modern thinkers, 
such as Hobbes, but its modern version, deriving its inspiration from many 
different sources, is perhaps the most formidable of all; and leads to the 
starkest implications for students of political theory. 
II 
It is now time to turn to the two aspects of modem political philosophy that 
I have called "Humpty Dumpty" and the "Red Queen". Again, let me consider 
first, the background. As far as it has been applied to politics, the most 
uncompromisin8 and perhaps the best known examples of the "under-labourer" 
conception have been the later views of T.D. Weldon, though varieties of it 
have also been deployed by Margaret Macdonald and Rush Rees. 13 
The essential contention here, of course, is that philosophy can have no 
effect on political conduct as philosophy. There can, of course, be 
arguments offered by philosophers in support of particular views in 
politics, but by the definition of philosophy given by the "under-
labourers" this cannot be philosophy properly so called. It does not 
matter, therefore, how important the issue, or how sophisticated the 
recommendation, philosophy (as philosophy) can never advance the discussion 
of bed-rock mornl or political issues; it is stuck where it is; it is 
entirely second order and descriptive; it never "advances" or "retreats". 
In this sense political philosophy, in its "under-labourer" formulation, 
is like the "Red Queen" and those who look for any sort of practical 
guidance from it, rather like the bewildered Alice:-
"Alice never could quite make out ........ how it was they began ......... . 
the Queen kept crying "faster, faster," ..•.... just as Alice was getting 
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quite exhausted, they stopped ........ Alice looked around her in great 
surprise." 
"Why, I do believe we've been under this tree the whole time. Everything's 
just as it was!" 
''Of course it is" said the Queen, "What would you have it?" 
"Well in our country" said Alice, still panting a little, "You'd generally 
get to somewhere else - if you ran very fast for a long time as we've been 
doing." 
"A slow sort of country!" said the Queen. "Now here, you see, it takes all 
14 the running you can do to keep in the same place!!!" 
So, if the under-labourers are right, moral and political argument is 
unsettleable by reason; and given their conception of philosophy, it is 
useless, therefore, to apply philosophy to it except in a purely descriptive 
way. For them, either ethics ceases to be part of philosophy at all, or the 
normative component of ethics must be excised from it. It is this latter 
course_that most have adopted, and it is this general approach- that 
philosophy necessarily has no direct influence on politics as philosophy -
that I characterise as the "Red Queen" view of political philosophy. [It 
should be emphasized, however, that a 'Red Queen' position is not always 
allied to the 'Under-labourer' thesis. I discuss this a little. later on] 
Then there is the corollery I mentioned - the "interminable" nature of moral 
discourse. Alisdair Macintyre remarked that this is "the most striking 
f t f t l tt 11 15 and 1· n d · · b t th ea ure o con emporary mora u erance , 1scuss1ons a ou e 
status of moral and political argument, this feature has produced what I 
call the "Humpty Dumpty'' view of moral and political concepts. 
"Humpty Dumpty", you will remember, insisted that "when I use a word ...... . 
it means just what I ch.oose it. to mean - neither more nor less" . 16 My 
meaning here is simply that, according to this view, part of the reason why 
rational argument is important in moral and political discourse, is that 
ethical arguments - as arguments - can only take place within a given ethical 
framework. I shall take a closer look at two ideas that I have already 
mentioned to convey exactly what I have in mind here and to show how deeply 
this view is now embedded in our moral and philosophical consciousness. 
The first is W.B. Gallie's notion of an ''essentially contested concept". 17 
- 7 -
Though he is by no means an "under-labourer" in his general conception of 
philosophy, Gallie's account of "essentially contested concepts" gives 
considerable support to both the "Red Queen" and "Humpty Dumpty" views. 
His basic argument is that essentially contested concepts lie at the centre 
of disputes "which although not resolvable by argument of any kind, are 
nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence ..... 
There are concepts .•••..••. , the proper use of which inevitably involves 
endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users". 18 
He suggests five concepts as examples - religion, art, science, democracy 
and social justice - but says that many other examples could be found. 
Where does this contention leave moral and political enquiry? It is not 
at all obvious that Gallie wishes to subscribe to the ''Red Queen" view of 
political philosophy: indeed he tries to "re-introduce" philosophy into 
political appraisal in the course of his essay! Nonetheless, in order 
to "bring philosophy" into the activity, as it were, he makes two 
observations towards the end of the essay which, unfortunately for his 
argument, serve only to establish the "Red Queen" view more firmly than 
ever. He first asks whether these "endless disputes" are genuine 
disputes? and, secondly, "In what ways should we expect recognition of the 
essentially contestedness of a given concept by all its users to affect 
the character or level of the conflicts and arguments to which it gives 
rise?". 19 
In response to the first question, Gallie argues that the disputes ~ 
genuine disputes because they can manifest what he calls a "logic of 
conversion". This would be such that even died-in-the-wool opponents could 
recognize the force of an argument which might lead a weaker minded colleague 
to abandon their use of the essentially contested concept in question for a 
rival one. This kind of argument, however, is vacuous if it is intended as 
a prop for re-introducing "reason" or "philosophy" (in any recognizable 
sense) to Gallie's framework because philosophical "argument" either can 
help settle the dispute or it cannot. Gallie's avowed belief here, is that 
it cannot, because "fundamental differences of attitude of a kind for which 
no logical justification can be given, must also lie back of the kind of 
situation which we have discussed". 20 [my emphasis] If argument cannot 
settle these issues, however, and if, at whatever stage, acceptance or 
rejection of an essentially contested concept depends upon factors of 
personality irrespective of argument or judgement, all a "logic of conversion'' 
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would amount to would be, not logic at all but Rhetoric, in the sense of its 
classical usage: i.e. it would be an appeal aimed at manipulating the 
emotions, not arguments directed at 'reason'. The disputes are certainly 
"genuine" but their genuineness lies in the fact that they are between 
opinions so totally alien to one another that philosophy (or any form of 
reasoning, indeed) can never help to settle them. 
This aspect of his thinking crops up again in his response to the second 
question. He differentiates between a "higher" and a "lower" recognition 
of the fact that one has opponents in the use of an essentially contested 
concept. The higher, and better, recognition (though why it is better is 
never stated) being the recognition that such is a necessary part of the 
activity in which you are engaged. What he wants to derive from this is a 
spirit of mutual toleration - the recognition of rival uses "as not only 
logically possible and humanly likely but as of permanent potential critical 
value to one's own use or interpretation of the concept in question". 21 
This is certainly Wonderland logic, for one cannot spend the best part of 
an essay describing a situation in which rival uses of certain concepts are 
endemic in the nature of those concepts, and where argument is of no use in 
resolving the differences, and then say that where two rival - and possibly 
contradictory - uses are in dispute, each should recognize in the other an 
equally valid rival use of "permanent, potential critical value". You 
could not say to a Nazi, given Gallie's premisses, "you are quite within 
your rights to define "Jew" as you do but you must realise that another's 
concept of "Jew" is equally viable and, in any case, has permanent potential 
critical value for your own". The whole point of the Nazi's conception of 
"Jew" (or of a Marxist's conception of capitalism and so on) is that, for 
the believers they are true. Gallie's argument presupposes the acceptance 
of the possibility of error, or of a "rival use" being (in some way) correct. 
This, however, is precisely what, in the above example, the Nazi would never 
admit, and indeed, could not admit. Gallie is building into his argument 
something which on his own argument is an essentially contested concept in 
itself - the idea that to have competing uses of a term helps you to improve 
your use or conception of it. 
The second idea which helps to place "Humpty Dumpty" and the "Red Queen" in a 
broader context is the concept of "ideology". This, in many ways, follows on 
- 9 -
from what we have seen of Gallie's arguments. Despite the varied uses of 
the term "ideology", it is generally agreed that it is used to refer to an 
organized set of moral and/or political beliefs - (the type of belief that 
would, for example, make use of an essentially contested concept). One 
persuasive and well-argued account of ideology suggests that "ideologies 
are doctrines to which we can adhere, they are not properly speaking 
theories", 22 and that "we have ideological beliefs in a world not 
ideological knowledge of the world". 23 Even if the specific sense of this 
is doubtful, it is only within the framework of such beliefs that a single 
concept - "democracy", for example, or "revolution" - can be understood, and 
equally, therefore, different ideologies will mean different things when 
they use the same terms - "In calling an example of the crime treason a 
'revolution' , a Marxist does not succeed in distinguishing it from any other 
illegal seizure of power beyond the fact that he, and those who claim to 
share his convictions approve of its occurrence .......... To substantiate 
24 
an ideological claim we must refer to the doctrine to which it belongs". 
In other words, when an ideology uses a term, it means what that ideology 
says it means neither more nor less - the "Humpty Dumpty" view of moral 
and political concepts! 
It will be seen then, that the "Red Queen" view and the "Humpty Dumpty" 
view go hand in hand in political philosophy. The one restricts philosophy 
to an essentially under-labouring task and denies it any moral role in 
political theory, the other explains and elucidates the "interminable'' nature 
of moral and political discourse, and outlines the kinds of normative 
argument you find in it. It attempts to show that moral a~gument is, in 
fact, not argument at all but expressions of moral opinion and,indeed. 
can never be anything else. 
III 
Some of the "implications'' of this will, by now, be obvious. As philosophy, 
from this viewpoint, is an entirely second order activity (i.e. it is 
concerned only with description and analysis) then much of the traditional 
task of political philosophy - which Berlin was describing in the passage I 
quoted earlier - is simply not ''philosophy" at all and we can never expect 
any rational resolution of such issues. 
- 10 -
It is not the case, however, that as some argue, this type of 
philosophising rules out prescription completely. Even Wittgenstein did 
not interpret literally his own oft quoted remark that philosophy "leaves 
everything as it is" 25 (as is shown, for example, by his comment to 
Norman Malcolm apropos of "national characters"). 26 Even when its tasks 
are as limited as the under-labourers would have them, philosophy still 
'prescribes': it still says that one way of viewing a problem is incorrect 
or incoherent, and another is correct or, at least, more correct. To again 
follow Wittgenstein, it helps us to get clear the "bumps" in our imperfect 
understanding. 27 
What the "under-labourers" say we cannot do is to prescribe in moral, or 
ethical spheres. Of course, they say, we can analyse political or moral 
claims and by so doing may clear up a "bump" in our understanding, but at 
this point we have to stop, or we simply cease being philosophers. In 
the words of Moritz Schlick "ethics is a system of knowledge ....... its 
only goal is the truth. Every science is, as such, purely theoretical, it 
seeks to understand .......... there is no greater danger than to change from 
a philosopher into a moralist, from an investigator into a preacher." 28 
The most Schlick will admit is that ethics as a normative science may 
furnish justification for action only "in a relative- hypothetical way ..... 
it justifies a certain judgement only to the extent that it shows that the 
judgement corresponds to a certain norm; that this norm itself is ''right" 
or "justified" it can neither show nor, by itself, determine''. 29 In other 
words, for Schlick, ethics function in a similar way to "essentially 
contested concepts", or "ideologies" - within a given framework 
possibilities for some sort of prescription exist, but outside them (or 
between them) they do not: even within such a framework Schlick is 
suspicious of preaching; "Even as a normative science" he says, "a science 
can do no more than explain." 30 
The writings of Schlick and the rest of the logical positivists (and their 
fellow travellers, and occasional companions) 31 have, of course, influenced 
much moralphilosophy in this century, and the arguments I have discussed 
here were amplified by a later generation of writers; in particular 
C.L. Stevenson, the high priest of the "emotivist" theory of ethics which, in 
many ways, is the logical inheritor of all the foregoing and which is 
certainly a classic formulation of the "Humpty Dumpty" approach. Even many 
writers who argued against this view of ethics - I have already mentioned 
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Rawls - often seem to avoid providing any real challenge at this level. 
This, of course, should not be taken to mean that no challenge is made, 
but as I suggested earlier, such challenges as are made often merely 
scratch the surface, and don't go much deeper. In part. I suspect this is 
because, as Mac!ntyre says, "such writers cannot agree among themselves 
either on what the character of moral rationality is, or on 
the morality which is to be founded on that rationality" 32 and, 
therefore, they fail to find any kind of answer to those like Gallie 
who take this to be an inevitable, indeed essential, part of ethics. 
There is a wider problem here. Increasingly, as I have SU8gested. there has been no 
shortage of philosophe~s prepared to challenge the main lines of the 
arguments I have been describing. Rawls has done so and, on occasions 
others, like Walzer, Nagel and the various philosophers referred 
to earlier have all worked fruitfully on several substantive questions 
of ethics, without bothering their heads too much about the nature of 
what they were doing. The results, however, have still left a vital 
gap in an important area of philosophical concern. "Humpty Dumpty" 
and the ''Red Queen" still in an important sense control the battlefield, 
even if some of their opponents no longer recognize that the war is 
still on. Even a writer as avowedly a "political" philosopher as 
Honderich, for example, has a conception of philosophy which, (with 
very little distortion) can be seen as a variant of the "Red Queen" 
and "Humpty Dumpty" approach. 33 I suggest that part of the reason for 
this is simply that the sources of "Humpty Dumpty" and the "Red Queen" 
are a lot more complex, varied and sophisticated than some of their 
more intemperate critics have supposed and that, therefore, they cannot 
be rejected merely by a rejection of logical positivism, emotivism and 
so on. Certainly, it is these movements which have helped them to the 
prominent position they occupy in twentieth century thought but, as I 
have suggested several times, the arguments and assumptions on which 
they are based are much older. The positivists happened to articulate 
a particularly "pure" conception of this type of philosophy, but it 
did not begin with them and, therefore, could not be expected to end 
with them either. 
It is interesting, however, that some philosophers who do not share 
the under-labourer conception of philosophy have come, with various 
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qualifications, to adopt the "Humpty Dumpty"/"Red Queen view when it 
comes to morals and politics. This is the case with writers who 
otherwise deeply disagree with one another (and sometimes with the "under-
l ::iliou rers"). Perha:;>s t..'1e two most interest ire examples of this a;~e Mici1ael Oakeshot t 
and Elizabeth Anscombe: but 0noti-.er case in point is Gordon Graham, who 
has argued a classic "Red Queen" case that philosophical reflection 
can have no effect on practical politics in an admirably short and 
lucid form. 34 According to traditional conceptions of political 
philosophy, argues Graham, "if a man proposes to do 'X', advancing 
'Y' as his reason, then to show him that 'Y' is nonsense is to 
eliminate his reason for doing 'X'". 35 However, "the apparently 
straightforward character of this argument depends upon our overlooking 
an ambiguity in the phrase 'showing 'Y' to be nonsense'. For showing a 
man may mean persuading him, or proving to him, or both. Now it does 
not follow from the fact that a man has a thesis proven to him ........ . 
that he is persuaded by that demonstration ......... the philosopher's 
especial skill consists in tracing the implications of beliefs and. 
proposals (and since it is) only when we are persuaded to change our 
beliefs that practical politics is underway, it follows that at best 
the preceding argument has established that the exercise of 
philosophical reasons may, as it happens, in certain circumstances, 
have certain repercussions in the political affairs of those who listen 
and argue .......... A man's philosophical enquiries may make him more 
confident, more hesitant, more sceptical, or more enthusiastic in his 
political endeavours, but none of these responses will be a conclusion 
forced upon him by the logic of his own arguments (though he may think 
. t . ) " 36 l lS • 
There are two key points in this discussion. The first is his contention 
that "proving" does not imply "persuading'', and the conclusion he draws 
from it; and the second is his somewhat curious conception of "practical 
politics": As far as the first is concerned, Graham clearly has a point. 
My showing you that X is nonsense 37 obviously will not necessitate 
your abandoning X, nor will it necessarily eliminate your reason for 
doing X, (not the same thing at all!). In politics he is quite right 
that "proof" - in whatever sense - is rarely enough; persuasion, either 
rhetorical or physical is usually necessary. However, the force of this 
point in carrying Graham's argument is dependent upon his way of seeing 
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"practical politics". This, remember, takes place only "when we are 
actually persuaded to change our beliefs", but surely this is a most 
eccentric conception. "Practical Politics" are underway not only when 
we are persuaded to change our beliefs, but while we are being persuaded 
- indeed part of 'practical politics' is surely the very act of trying 
to persuade someone to change his beliefs or actions. It is interwoven 
with the whole structure within which that "attempted persuasion" takes 
place and, therefore, exists within the boundaries of many essentially 
contested concepts or competing "ideological frameworks". 
Now most political philosophers have generally never claimed any more 
than they could offer arguments for or against certain positions - they 
have never said that people would necessarily take their advice (though 
most of them, understandably, thought they should). Yet these arguments 
often took place against the "practical politics" of the day and in some 
ways were contributions to "practical politics" considered, as it were 
as a cultural activity. A philosophical enquiry leading a philosopher 
to espouse course X, in "practical politics" might be rejected for a 
whole variety of reasons, but it would still be an argument generated 
by philosophical enquiry and appertaining to practical politics. (I 
attempt to illustrate one very obvious case of this - the philosophes 
political views during the Enlightenment- in Chapter Two). 
What is important here is to see that Graham's conception of philosophy 
is no help to his argument on this point. "Understanding in philosophy" 
he says elliptically, "does not consist in reaching the end but in 
making the journey". 38 This may be so, indeed, as I shall suggest later, 
in some sense it is so, but it does nothing in this form to say that a 
philosophical argument may not contribute to practical politics. Only 
an argument which simply excluded philosophical consideration by 
definition from normative moral and political enquiry could thus support 
the "Red Queen" stand that Graham takes. As Michael Oakeshott once 
remarked apropos of Hayek, "a plan to resist all planning may be better 
than its opposite (but) it is still part of the same style of politics". 39 
Equally, moral or political philosophy which denies that one can do 
moral or political philosophy is in the same style of thinking as that 
which it opposes - because it is saying that there is a certain way of 
behaving, thinking and acting we should eschew. This kind of logic can 
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often be seen at work even where, as in Graham's case, the philosopher 
is not an "under-labourer". 
IV 
Very little in intellectual history developes in isolation, of course, 
and what I have cailed "Humpty Dumpty" and the "Red Queen" is 
naturally no exception to this rule. Macintyre - who calls the same 
phenomenon 'emotivism' - sees the interminable nature of modern moral 
discourse but instead of seeing it as an inevitable feature of the 
nature of moral and political conduct, he argues that it is a mistake, 
and suggests that it was brought about by "episodes in the history of 
philosophy (and) that it is only in the light of that history that we 
can understand how the idiosyncracies of every day contemporary moral 
discourse came to be". 40 Now I shall return to some of the 
methodological assumptions of this view in chapters two and six· but, for now 
an examination of it, yields considerable dividends in tracing the 
sources of Humpty Dumpty' and the' Red Queen'. The key period for 
Macintyre is 1630-1880, and especially that part of this period which 
is generally referred to as the "Enlightenment". "It is only in the 
later 17th Century and the 18th Century" he writes, "when (the) 
distinguishing of the moral from the theological, the legal and 
aesthetic has become a received doctrine that the project of an 
independent rational justification for morality becomes not merely 
the concern of individual thinkers, but central to Northern European 
41 
culture". 
It is Macintyre's thesis, crucially, that this period also saw the 
breakdown of this project and that it was this failure that paved the 
way for the 'modern' view of morality that he labels as "emotivist". 
It is also worth noting that Hume is seen in many ways as a Chief 
Villian in both the building-up and breakdown of the enlightenment 
project, while Kant, though given his share of the blame, is credited 
with having come within a hair's breadth of noticing its collapse. 
The emotivist view, says Macintyre, "envisages moral debate in terms of 
a confrontation between incompatible and incommensurable moral premisses, 
and moral commitment as the expression of a criterionless choice between 
such premisses, a type of choice for which no rational justification can 
be given" 42 As far a~ politics is concerned this view is, of course, 
what I have called the 'Humpty Dumpty' view. 
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Parts of Macintyre's arguments can, I think, be largely accepted. His 
view of the Enlightenment as consciously revolutionary dovetails very 
largely with the opinion of the majority of Enlightenment thinkers 
themselves, in that they saw themselves as emancipators of their age 
from the dead hand of superstition, and so on (though naturally in 
general they do not think they failed)~ 3 Many modern scholars, of course, 
also agree up to a point. Peter Gay, for example, one of the foremost 
Scholars of Enlightenment thought, argues forcefully for the view that it 
was this period that set the preconditions for much modern thinking - the 
3rd Book in his influential interpretation of the Enlightenment is even 
entitled: 'The Pursuit of Modernity .44 
However, it is necessary to pause here and deal briefly with the most 
notorious departure from this view: Carl Becker's The Heavenly City of 
45 the Eighteenth Century Philosophers· , and I should point out that it 
is necessary to refute Becker's view because, although I disagree with 
Macintyre's conclusions, his view of the Enlightenment project is an 
important one for the structure of my later argument, and it is 
essential,therefore, to consider the most dangerous objection to it. 
"I know it is the custom to call theThirteenth C~ntury the age of faith" 
Becker writes, "and to contrast it with Eighte~nth Century, which is thought 
to be pre-eminently the age of reason ......... there were certainly many 
differences between Voltaire and St. Thomas Aquinas but the two men had 
much in common for all that. What they had in common was the profound 
. 46 
conviction that their beliefs could be reasonably demonstrated". Thus, 
he argues, that the underlying preconceptions of Eighteenth Century 
thought were still, allowance made for certain alterations in bias, 
essentially the same as those of the T6irteenth Century. "I shall attempt 
to show", he concludes, ''that the philosophers demolished The Heavenly City 
of St. Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials". 47 
If Becker is right, then obviously, we will dismiss Macintyre, Gay and 
the others. However, on this I think Macintyre can be defended. Despite 
making some pertinent remarks against those (both the philosophes 
themselves and some of their later admirers) who have too exalted a view 
of the break with the past represented by the Enlightenment, and despite 
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a lucid, cogent and witty interpretation of the Enlightenment which 
shows very clearly the extent of continuity with earlier theories of 
the World, it is my view that Becker fails to establish the conceptual 
similarity of t11e ideas of t~1e philoso~~1es to tile liledi;:J.eval cou;:;ins 
a.nd - ~ore impoPtantly - their cHffe~nence from modern ones. 
There are several reasons for this. Becker's arguments, though opposed 
to Macintyre's on the nature of The Enlightenment, display a similar 
conception about what is important in "Modern Thought" - i.e. the 
'interminable' nature of disputes in modern moral thought and the 
contrast of this with the similarity between Eighteenth Century and 
Mediaeval ideas in the belief that these arguments could be "reasonably 
demonstrated". "For good or ill", he says, "we must now regard the 
world as a continuous flux; a ceaseless and infinitely complicated 
process of waste and repair", 48 and he later emphasizes this point: 
"Edit and interpret the conclusions of modern science as tenderly as 
we.like, it is still quite impossible for us to regard man as the 
Child of God for whom the Earth was created as a temporary habitation". 49 
Two observations can surely be made on these remarks. The first is 
simply that the second remark is extraordinarily simplistic. If 
Becker means literally it is impossible for any man to believe in man 
as a Child of God he is merely incorrect as it is obvious that many 
millions of people do conceive of God and man in this way. It is more 
likely, of course, that Becker is referring to the fact that the 
intellectual climate is no longer congenial to this idea, as (by 
implication) it was in the Eighteenth Century. 
When Becker says that the "World pattern that determines the character 
and direction of modern thinking" is that "man is but a foundling in 
the cosmos, abandoned by the forces that created him", 50 he may be 
echoing one prominent "Climate of opinion" (his own phrase) within 
modern thought, but there are other equally important aspects of 
'modern thought' (a phrase, incidentally, he fails to define) which 
he ignores and, furthermore, there are in any case aspects of 
"Enlightenment thought" which prefigure this. Diderot, in La Reve 
D'Alambert, for example, and as Becker himself admits, Humes's 
arguments in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion: "To read 
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Hume's dialogues," he writes, "after having read ........ the earnest 
deists and optimistic philosophers of the early century, is to 
experience a slight chill, a feeling of apprehension. It is as if, at 
the high noon of the Enlightenment, at the hour of the siesta when 
everything is quiet and secure all about, one was suddenly aware 
of a short, sharp slipping of the foundations, a faint, far-off tremor 
running underneath the solid ground of common sense". 51 
What I find mystifying is why, having gone this far, Becker cannot see 
how many more "modern styles of thinking" are prefigured in the more 
seminal minds of the Enlightenment, Hume, Diderot and, of course, Kant -
whom Becker nowhere mentions, surely a most curious omission in a work 
purporting to deal with 18th Century philosophers. Moreover, one can 
easily admit this without denying that there was far more continuity 
between the philosophes and the styles of thinking they revolted 
against than they themselves thought. Of course, it is always a 
simplification to talk of "Enlightenment thought" (or, "Modern" thought 
or "Mediaeval" thought) at all, except in a purely explanatory 
historical sense, although in any historical period certain 
predominant strains can often be isolated, and it is this that allows 
scholars like Gay, Cassirer 52 (and indeed Becker himself) to 
legitimately link the 18th Century philosophers together and, as I 
argue later (in Part Two) many very different "Styles of Thought" 
or - if you will - climates of opinion, are interwoven to make up the 
tapestry we.call "Enlightenment thought" and it is only to be expected 
that there is almost as much disagreement as there is agreement. In 
Hume's case, to take one example, religion, politics and economics 
were just 3 of the areas where he differed very sharply from the 
French philosophes, -as Gibbon, a man who admired both sides of this 
argument, noted. The philosophes ., he says, "laughed at the scepticism 
of Hume, (and) preached the tenets of atheism with the bigotry of 
dogmatists". 53 Yet that did not prevent them considering one another 
as brothers in a common cause. 
There is one further point here, o~ly obliquely a refutation of Becker's 
central thesis, but one which is of great significance for the rest of 
my arguments. Many characteristically €nlightenment subjects are still 
centre-stage in philosophy and the social sciences and, again, of 
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nobody is this more true than Hume. To cite one modern philosopher 
"An exhaustive guide to discussions of Hume's problems and their 
descendants as they appear in 20th Century philosophy would be an almost 
t:;4 
exhaustive guide to 20th Century philosophy". ~ Yet this presents an 
insurmountable problem for Becker, as Hume was considered among the most 
important thinkers of the Enlightenment, both by his contemporaries and 
subsequently, and if - as Becker contends - the Enlightenment is so 
distant from modern world views, it is more than a little curious that this 
55 
should be so. Given all of this it seems fair to conclude with the bulk 
of modern scholarship - and with Macintyre - that decisive conceptual shifts 
were made during this period which continue to be important in Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Century thought. The point, however, is to isolate precisely what 
these shifts actually consisted of and what they led to. Hatintyre 
thinks, first, that they gave rise to what he calls emotivism, (and what I 
have divided into 'Humpty Dumpty' and the 'Red Queen') and secondly, that 
the Enlightenment project failed and that it is this failure which was the 
means whereby this process occurred. 
I want to make it plain that on these two crucial points I part company 
from Macintyre. I do not deny that certain elements of nlightenment 
thought contributed very powerfully to the various theories which underpin 
emotivism and that, in some ways, this thought was new and original, though 
it had, as I have said, a respectable tradition behind it running back to 
the Enlightenment's beloved Classics. Unlike Macintyre, however, though I 
consider much of it to be wrong-headed, I do not think that a return to 
some form of Aristotelean teleology 56 is the answer to it. Moreover, it 
is largely (or so I would art;ue) lilXIe£·n inteqn·etations of tile Enlightenment 
tha~ have given credence to Macintyre's supposition that the specific 
"decisive" shifts that occurred gave rise to emotivism, and it is 
precisely these interpretations I am concerned - in at least one important 
sense - to challenge in the next three chapters. This is particularly true 
of Hume's thought, which in this century has been most often cast as the 
principal agent of this shift of philosophical viewpoint. I want to 
suggest (and shall do so in Chapter Five) that if this is true it is true 
only in a very partial way, and that in fact it ignores or distorts many 
aspects of Hume's thought. However, I am running ahead of myself. 
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This chapter has been concerned to sketch a general outline of 
the main reasons why the notion of political philosophy has been 
seen as a problem in a good deal of ethical theorising in the 
twentieth century, and to look at the account of the origin of 
this problem - Alisdair Macintyre's -with which I shall be 
chiefly concerned. 
This account has as i~ centrepiece, a contention concerning 
the status and implications of the political and ethical 
theorising of the Enlightenment. It is this contention that I 
shall be concerned to challenge in chapters three - five of 
the present work: specifically by examining the views on the 
relation of theory to practice of perhaps the two most 
philosophically significant Enlightenment thinkers - David Hume 
57 
and Emmanuel Kant, 
Before I embark on this, however, I want to look more closely 
at the methodological assumptions that underlie Macintyre's 
solution, and relate them to both the tradition they were 
chiefly designed to challenge (the analytical tradition, of 
course,) and to the thought of another theorist who might in 
some ways be seen as an ally of Macintyre. Examining these 
issues in more detail will help to set the methodological scene 
for my concluding chapter, and will also illumine far more 
clearly precisely what is at stake with Macintyre's thesis 
about the Enlightenment. It is to this task, then, that 
I now turn. 
CHAPTER 2 
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Laying Claim to Politics: Culture, History and the 
'Reconstruction of Philosophy'. 
"It is difficult not to notice a curious unrest in 
the philosophic atmosphere ..... a loosening of old 
landmarks, a softening of oppositions, a mutual 
borrowing from one another on the part of systems 
anciently closed, and an interest in new suggestions". 
William James 
"Nothing is just in itself, everything shifts with time". 
Pascal 
In this chapter, I want to explore in more detail certain key 
claims in the structure of the arguments I have sketched, in 
outline, above. Many of these claims have to do with the 
supposedly contingent nature of the relation of philosophy to 
politics, and they are drawn largely from two schools of thought, 
the analytic and that school which, at least in Anglo-American 
philosophy has most recently and most successfully challenged the 
analytic approach i.e., that which emphasises the key role of 
the 'history' of philosophy in our understanding. 
This investigation, for a number of reasons, will concentrate on 
specific representatives of the aforementioned schools rather 
than attempting any more detailed overview than that offered in 
chapter one, the specific representatives being, in the case of 
the analytic school, Bernard Williams, and in the case of (what 
I shall call) the 'historical' school, Alisdair Macintyre and 
Richard Rorty. I make no claim that these are the only 
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representatives that could have been chosen, but, to my mind at 
least, they are the most interesting. 
I 
To begin with, then, let us look at the latest metamorphosis of 
the analytic school. One of its most influential voices in 
moral thought over the last decade-and-a-half has been Bernard 
Williams. In his book Ethics and the Limits of PhilosophyP 
Williams clearly identifies himself with the analytical tradition: 
"The philosophy of this book" he writes "can no doubt be called, 
on some broad specification, 'analytical', and so is much of the 
philosophy it discusses ..... What distinguishes analytical 
philosophy from other contemporary philosophy ..... is a certain 
way of going on, which involves argument, distinctions and so 
far as it remembers to try and achieve it and succeeds, moderately 
plain speech. As an alternative to plain speech it distinguishes 
sharply between obscurity and technicality. It always rejects 
the first but the second it sometimes finds a necessity. This 
feature "he comments", particularly enrages some of its enemies. 
Wanting philosophy to be at once profound and accessible, they 
resent technicality and are comforted by obscurity" (1). 
This much would probably be accepted by virtually all analytically 
minded philosophers, though I cannot resist pointing out that 
the analytical school's most important and original thinker -
Wittgenstein, of course - was, at times, a maddeningly obscure 
philosopher (2). Nonetheless, as I say, most analytical philosophers 
would agree with Williams up to this point. After this point, 
however, they might begin to part company. Williams has none 
of the 'pure' analytical philosopher's zeal to rigidly demarcate 
off 'moral philosophy' from consideration as philosophy at all; 
Williams' project is more modestly to point out the limits of 
modern moral philosophy, which, he thinks, is not "well-adjusted 
to the modern world"(3), and to suggest ways in which we might 
modify our ethical conceptions so as to be more in tune with it. 
His chosen solution is to massively reformulate some ideas 
implicit in ancient thought(4), but his concern in the book is 
not to ''concede to abstract ethical enquiry its claim to provide 
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the only intellectual surroundings"(5) for ideas about freedom, 
social justice etc., that Williams happens to think valuable 
(though on what grounds they are 'valuable', he doesn't say). 
In other words, Williams is engaged in a characteristic piece of 
Red Queen theorising, on oc~asion masked by what earlier analytical 
philosophers might see as concessions to prescriptive thinking. 
In fact, however, these concessions do no damage to the 
essential integrity of Williams' Red Queen message, indeed, by 
moderating it, they strengthen it. At the end of the book 
Williams confesses that despite the strictures on moral thought 
that he has outlined, "my ... optimistic belief is in the continuing 
possibility of a meaningful individual life, that does not reject 
society, and indeed shares its perceptions with other people to a 
considerable depth, but is enough unlike others ... to make it 
somebody' s. Philosophy", he says, "can help make (such) a 
society possible .... Some people might even get help from 
philosophy in living such a life - but not, as Socrates supposed, 
each reflective person, and not from the ground up" (6). In 
other words, philosophy's role for each reflective person is a 
contingent one. The argument here is very like Graham's that 
I quoted in chapter one i.e., that the most philosophy can hope 
for is that 'in certain circumstances, philosophy may, as it 
happens, have certain repercussions in the affairs of those who 
listen and argue', but no more than this. 
This analysis of Williams' argument is given further support if 
one examines some of his essays, which have the further advantage 
of showing just how far Williams has taken the Red Queen 
conception of moral and political theorising away from its 
foundations without abandoning its characteristic stance. 
In 'Conflicts of Values'(7), for example, he argues, echoing 
explicitly Isiah Berlin(8) (and implicitly Gallie's point that 
I discussed in chapter one), "It is my view .... that value 
conflict is .... something necessarily involved in human values, 
and to be taken as central by an adequate understanding of 
them"(9). Later on in the essay he strengthens the claim: 
"Values", he says, "or at least the most basic values are not 
only plural but in a real sense incommensurable"(lO), and 
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he goes on to argue that any attempt to "remove moral uncertainty, 
by constructing a philosophical ethical theory (in the sense of 
systematising moral belief) is a misguided one "(11). 
In 'The Truth in Relativism', he claims that whatever else might 
be true of relativism, "there is 
area of ethical relativism"(12) 
truth in relativism (in) the 
and that this is so only when 
a number of conditions obtain, his purpose in the paper being 
to sketch in those conditions. One of them is that any two 
conflicting systems (called by Williams S1 and S2) must be 
exclusive of one another. "That this should in some sense be 
so is", says Williams, "a necessary condition of the problems 
arising to which relativism is supposed to provide an answer"(13). 
Elaborating this, he says that it must be impossible to live, 
at one and the same time, in S1 and S2, and makes a distinction 
(borrowing the terms from Newman's A Grammar of Assent) between 
real and notional confrontation. This is to examine cases in 
which "Mutual awareness can be regarded as, in principle, a 
development independant of the existence of S1 and S2"(14). 
In other words, in the terms in which we will confront this 
later on, Williams is here addressing the question of 
incommensurability. Real confrontation is defined as follows: 
"For any S, there has to be something that counts as assenting 
to that S, fully accepting it or living within it -whatever 
it is, in that sort of case, for S to be 'somebody's'. There 
is a real confrontation between S1 and S2 at a given time if there 
is a group at that time for whom each of S1 and S2 is a real 
option"(lS). Williams defines a 'real option' as follows: 
a real option for a group if it is either their S or it is 
possible for them to go over to S2; where going over to S2 
involves, first, that it is possible for them to live within 
or hold S2 and retain their hold on reality, and, second, to 
"S2 is 
the extent that rational comparison between S2 and their present 
outlook is possible, they could acknowledge their transition to 
S2 in the light of such comparison"(16). A notional 
confrontation, on the other hand, "resembles real confrontation 
in that there are persons who are aware of S1 and S2, and aware 
of their differences; it differs from it in that at least one 
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of Sl and S2 do not present a real option to them"(l7). 
The conclusion which Williams wants to draw from all this is 
that "Relativism, with regard to a given type of S, is the 
view that for one whose S stands in purely notional confrontation 
with such an S, questions of appraisal of it do not genuinely 
arise. This form of relativism, unlike most others, is coherent. 
The truth in relativism ..... is that for ethical outlooks at 
least this standpoint is correct ..... because, unlike most 
other forms it manages, in the distinction between real and 
notional confrontation, to cohere with two propositions 
both of which are true. The first is that we must have a form 
of thought not relativized to our own existing S for thinking 
about other Ss which may be of concern to us, and to express 
those concerns. The second is that we can nevertheless recognize 
that there can be many Ss which are related to our concerns too 
distantly for our judgments to have any grip on them, while 
admitting that other persons' judgment might get a grip on 
them, namely, those for whom they were a real option"(l8). 
These arguments illumine precisely the Red Queen and Humpty 
Dumpty stance taken by Williams. His incommensurability of 
values thesis clearly expresses a variant of the classic Humpty 
Dumpty argument asserted (in other ways) by Gallie, Partridge, 
Manning, Schlick and others. To be sure he does so at a level 
of philosophical sophistication unmatched by any of them, but 
the point is essentially the same. The argument is, of course, 
buttressed and deepened by the discussions in 'The Truth in 
Relativism'. Real confrontations are confrontations where 
essentially contested concepts are at issue and where, in Gallie's 
formulation, there is the possibility of a 'logic of 
conversion' i.e., where either of the two competing essentially 
contested concepts are (this time in Williams' terms) real 
options. We cannot, Williams would want to claim, be seriously 
relativist about these confrontations as the systems involved 
are (in a similar way to Manning's 'ideologies') the ways in 
which we view, and orient ourselves in, the world. 
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We can be relativist in our treatment of notional confrontations, 
however, because our notions of reality are not engaged to the 
same extent. The implications of this are that, in either case, 
philosophy (in the sense of a 'philosophical ethical theory') 
cannot help to resolve any conflicts that may arise; a philosophy 
must, after all, be part of one of the competing Ss in a real or 
notional confrontation, and, in so far as it tried to straddle 
both (a philosopher like Mill, for example, trying to combine 
utilitarianism with other philosophies) the result is likely 
to be uneasy tension or outright confusion and conceptual failure. 
Part of the case that Williams makes in these various works 
(elaborated at greatest length in Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy) is that a good deal of the problem in moral philosophy, 
which helps to create the mistakes that he sees his work as at 
least partially correcting, lies in a notion of the ethical that 
is too strictly tied to a particular notion of the moral. A 
number of his arguments are directed at this idea. One of his 
most important and influential papers, 'Moral Luck', is a complex 
argument aimed especially at exploding the notion of morality he takes 
to be current among 'us' (presumably twentieth century Western 
European man). This notion is that "there is one basic form 
of value, moral value, which is immune to luck and - in the 
crucial term of the idea's most rigorous exponent - 'unconditioned' 
.... such a conception has an ultimate form of justice at its 
heart, and that is its allure"(l9). 
The idea's 'most rigerous exponant', of course, is Kant and for 
Williams, Kantian modes of thought express "in a very pure form, 
something which is basic to our ideas of morality"(20). It 
is this something which Williams sees himself as challenging, 
both directly (as in 'Moral Luck' and Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy) and indirectly in other aspects of his work. The 
'something' that he is challenging is quite simply this primacy of 
the moral in our culture. "Scepticism about the freedom of 
morality from luck", he says, "will leave us with a concept of 
morality, but one less important, certainly than ours is usually 
taken to be; and that will not be ours, since one thing that 
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is particularly important about ours is how important it is 
taken to be"(21). In Ethics and the Limits of Philoso2hy, 
Williams expands on the idea that the solution to this might 
be found in certain notions belonging to classical thought. 
When he claims that the resources of modern moral philosophy are 
not 'well-adjusted' to the modern world, he argues that this is 
so "because it is too much caught up in it, unreflectively 
appealing to administrative ideas of rationality. In other 
ways, notably in its more Kantian forms, it is not involved 
enough; it is governed by a dream of a community of reason 
that is too far removed from any concrete sense of a 
particular ethical life ..... it is not a paradox that in 
these very new circumstances very old philosophies may have 
more to offer than moderately new ones, and a historical story 
could be told to show why this is so. It would involve the 
coming and departure of Christianity (which helps to explain 
why the ancient world is nearer than it may seem) and the 
failures of the Enlightenment (which make its characteristic 
philosophies so unhelpful)"(22). 
Now, it might have occurred to some by this point, that these 
rather grandiloquent claims that Williams is making do not sound 
much like the kind of philosophy I was associating with Humpty 
Dumpty and the Red Queen in my last chapter, but a close 
examination reveals a really quite remarkable degree of 
overlap. The status of Williams as a Humpty Dumpty theorist 
is easily established, when one bears in mind my discussion 
above of his incommensurability thesis. The Red Queen aspect 
of his thought is more effectively hidden but emerges as soon 
as one reflects for a moment on the nature of his claims about 
the status of 'morality', and what his solutions would mean, 
when coupled with his Humpty Dumpty pronouncements about values. 
Philosophy's task while not certainly merely an 'underlabouring' 
one, is still very different from its traditional role; it 
could no more arbitrate in that dispute Berlin mentions in its 
Williamsite mode than it could in its 'harder' Schlickian one(23). 
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Its effect on practical life would still be a contingent one. 
To be sure Williams does not say that it can have no effect 
on practical activity, but then not even Graham argued that. 
Williams' arguments amount, then, to a wide-ranging and 
sophisticated reformulation of the Humpty Dumpty and Red Queen 
case, one that has been extremely influential in discussions 
within contemporary moral and political theory. Before 
attempting to discuss them in detail, however, I want to turn 
to two thinkers who, if Williams could be called a 'critical 
friend' of analytical philosophy, would probably qualify for 
its criminal hall of fame as deserters of the 'good old cause': 
Richard Rorty and Alisdair Macintyre. 
II 
Before I embark on this, however, I should, I think, correct 
a misapprehension I may have encouraged. I have referred to 
the 'historical school' within philosophy, but this must only 
be taken to indicate a very general approach, and only this in a 
very general sense. In a similar way to most philosophical 
schools, the methods of approach within it vary greatly. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to discern a centra~ core of the 
approach which justifies my use of the appelation 'school'. 
This core is nicely expressed in the introductory section of a 
book of essays drawn from the members of the school, Philosophy 
in History (24): ''There is, in our view, nothing general to be 
said in answer to the question, 'how should the history of 
philosophy be written?' except as self consciously as one can -
in as full awareness as possible of the variety of contemporary 
concerns to which a past figure may be relevant .... in Britain 
and America, the historiography of philosophy has recently been 
less self conscious than it ought to have been. In particular 
the influence of Analytic philosophy has worked against self 
consciousness of the desired sort"(25). The reason for this, 
the editors go on to say, is analytic philosophers' assertion 
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that they (and they, almost alone) understand what questions 
are 'the genuinely philosophical ones'(26) and that, as a 
consequence, "it has become customary to take the concerns 
of contemporary analytic philosophy as the focus of attention, 
and to leave aside present day religious ..... literary or 
political concerns, as well as those of non-analytic 
philosophers"(27). At best, the editors think, this has 
produced a historiography of philosophy less like history and 
more like a collection of anecdotes: "Stories about people 
who almost stumbled on what we now know to be philosophy are 
like stories about people who would have discovered America if 
they had just sailed a little further. A collection of such 
stories cannot be a history of anything"(28). 
The real problem here, according to the editors, is that the 
Analytical Philosophers want to have their cake and eat it too, 
but, "This will not work. Analytic philosophers cannot both 
be the discoverers of what Descartes and Kant were really up to 
and be the culmination of a great tradition, participants in the 
final episode in a narrative of progress ..... This problem of lack 
of self-consciousness concerning one's place in history was 
less acute before the rise of analytic philosophy because 
training in the subject was then much more historical this 
approach to philosophy .... did have the advantage of inculcating 
a sense of historical contingency, a sense that .... philosophy 
might not be a natural kind, something with a real essence, and 
the word 'philosophy' functions as a demonstrative - marking 
out an area of logical space which the speaker occupies - rather 
than a rigid designator"(29). 
Now it is true, of course, that within this broad based critique 
of the analytic tradition there is room for many different 
approaches but I shall concentrate initially on two. The 
first is that of Richard Rorty. Rorty's conception is expressed 
in a number of influential papers and, most powerfully, of course, 
in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. In this work, Rorty 
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offers a classic illustration of how an emphasis on history 
can alter our philosophical perspective, by giving an historical 
account of the origins of the 'standard' philosophical problems, 
(and how they came to be the standard ones), which amounts to 
an account of the rise and fall of the mind and, in Richard 
Bernstein's words, "the prized philosophical discipline-
'epistemology'"(30). Of course, Rorty does a good deal more in 
the book than this; it becomes indeed, a meditation on the 
nature of philosophy itself. A key to understanding the true 
significance of Rorty's view is found in his repeated assertion 
that philosophy is not 'foundational', in the sense that 
"culture is the assemblage of claims to knowledge, and philosophy 
adjudicates such claims ..... (because) Philosophy's central 
concern is to be a general theory of representation, a theory 
which will divide culture up into areas which represent reality 
well, those which represent it less well and those which do 
not represent it at all"(31). 
This view is attacked again and again throughout the book. It 
is Rorty's central claim that there is no foundational 
discipline that, again to quote Bernstein's perceptive criticism, 
"There is no part of culture that is more privileged than any 
other part - and the illusion that there must be such a discipline 
is one that needs to be exorcised"(32). To illustrate how 
he thinks philosophy ought to be carried on, Rorty borrows 
an analogy from an interesting source. The source is Michael 
Oakeshott's essay 'The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of 
Mankind', and the analogy he borrows is that of a conversation. 
Oakeshott's claim is that human modes of inquiry should be 
conceived of in terms of a 'conversation': "In a conversation", 
he says, "the participants are not engaged in an enquiry or a 
debate; there is no truth to be discovered, no proposition to 
be affirmed, no conclusion sought .... the cogency of their 
utterences does not depend on their speaking the same idiom; 
they may differ without disagreeing"(33). This, remarks Rorty 
"catches the tone in which philosophy should be discussed"(34). 
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Earlier in his book, Rorty had divided philosophers into two 
types, mainstream ones - called by Rorty 'systematic philosophers -
and more peripheral thinkers, called 'edifying philosophers'. 
Figures he mentions as 'edifying philosophers' include Goethe, 
Kierkegaard, Santayana, William James and Rorty's three heroes 
of twentieth century philosophy, Dewey, the later Wittgenstein 
and the later Heidegger. "These writers", he says, "have kept 
alive the suggestion that, even when we have justified true belief 
about everything we want to know, we may have no more than 
conformity to the norms of the day. They have kept alive the 
historicist sense that this century's 'superstition' was the 
last century's triumph of reason, as well as the relativists' 
sense that the latest vocabulary ...• may not express priviledged 
representations of essences, but be just another of the potential 
infinity of vocabularies in which the world can be described"(35). 
Now although Rorty recognizes that edifying philosophy is 
inevitably parasitic upon systematic philosophy, he thinks that 
the distinction is a crucial one, because edifying philosophers 
are the cutting edge of the attack on the idea of philosophy 
as foundational, on what he calls the 'whole project of 
commensuration' that is the great aim of systematic philosophy. 
, 
Wed this analysis to his adaptation of Oakeshotts metaphor of 
conversation, and we have how Rorty thinks of the nature of 
philosophy; we can view philosophers - especially edifying 
philosophers -as 'conversational partners' rather than "seeing 
them as holding views on subjects of common concern"(36), and 
thus the "philosophers moral concern should be with continuing 
the conversation of the West, rather than with insisting upon a 
place for the traditional problems of modern philosophy within 
that conversation"(37). 
Naturally, all this has certain implications for both the 
practice of philosophy, and, as it were, the practice of practice. 
In his paper 'The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres.', 
Rorty spells out the implications of his view for the former. 
He identifies four 'genres' of attempts to make sense of 
- 31 -
philosophies past:- rational reconstruction; for example 
(a work I shall be looking at in some detail later on, in 
chapter four) Strawson' s The Bounds of Sense and Bennet's 
Locke, Berkely, Hume: Central Themes: Historical 
reconstruction; that is to say reconstructions which abide 
by a maxim outlined by Quentin Skinner that "no agent can 
eventually be said to have meant or done something which he 
could never be brought to accept as a correct description of 
what he had meant or done"(38): Geistesgeschichte, or 'canon 
formation', and Rorty says that Hegel is paradigmatic here, but 
also singles out Heidegger, Reichenbach, Foucault, Blumenburg 
and [interestingly] Macintyre(39): finally there is what 
Rorty calls Doxography, which is, Rorty says, "exemplified by 
books which start from Thales or Descartes and wind up with 
some figure roughly contemporary with the author, ticking 
off what various figures traditionally called 'philosophers' 
had to say about problems traditionally called 'philosophical'"(40). 
According to Rorty, the first three are perfect~y reasonable 
enquiries - if they are carried out in the right manner and 
in the right spirit - but the latter is not because it assumes 
that "philosophy is the name of a natural kind: the name of a 
discipline which in all ages and places has managed to dig 
down to the same, deep, fundamental questions"(41). The 
general reasons that Rorty gives for opposing this idea are 
familiar from Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Its 
real problem is that it puts, as it were, the conceptual cart 
before the historical horse:" (it is) the attempt to impose 
a problematic on a canon drawn up without reference to that 
problematic, or, conversely, to impose a canon on a problematic 
drawn up without reference to that canon"(42). To finally 
get rid of the idea that philosophy is a natural kind, Rorty 
thinks we need "more and better contextualist historical 
reconstructions on the one hand, and more self-confident 
Geistesgeschichte on the other"(43). 
We have, then, what Rorty calls a 'Hegelian triad' of concepts 
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in the historiography of philosophy and one much larger and 
more diffuse genre which Rorty also wishes to mention, though, 
strictly speaking it falls outside the triad. This is 
'intellectual history', by which term Rorty means "descriptions 
of what the intellectuals were up to at a given time, and of 
their interaction with the rest of society - descriptions 
which, for the most part, bracket the question of what 
activities which intellectuals were conducting"(44). One of 
the chief advantages for Rorty in 'intellectual history' is 
that it embraces discussions of those peripheral figures in 
'the history of philosophy', who yet have been enormously 
influential in just the areas that are supposed to be the 
province of 'the great philosophers'; "the people .... who, in 
fact, did the jobs which philosophers are popularly supposed 
to do - impelling social reform, supplying new vocabularies 
for moral deliberation, deflecting the course of scientific 
and literary disciplines into new channels .... (for example) 
Paracelsus, Montaigne, Grotius, Bayle, Lessing, Paine, 
Coleridge .... Mathew Arnold, Weber, Freud, Franz Boas 
T.S.Kuhn"(45). Rorty sums up his account of this genre by 
asserting that "intellectual history is the raw material for 
the historiography of philosophy - or, to vary the metaphor, 
the ground out of which histories of philosophy grow"(46). 
In the closing sections of his essay, Rorty glancingly mentions 
a problem to which I shall return later, and it is as well 
to see his own answer to it in advance. The problem is the 
suspicion that ''If we have the sort of complicated, thick, 
intellectual history which is wary of canons (philosophical, 
literary, scientific, or other) do we not have enough?"(47). 
Rorty's answer is that we do not have enough because "we need 
mountain peaks to look up to .... we .... need the idea that 
there is such a thing as philosophy in the honorific sense -
the idea that there are, had we but the wit to pose them, 
certain questions which everybody should always have been 
asking. We cannot give up this idea without giving up the 
notion that the intellectuals of the previous epochs of European 
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history form a community, a community of which it is good 
to be a member. If we are to persist in this image of 
ourselves, then we have to have both imaginary conversations 
with the dead and the conviction that we have seen further than 
they. That means we need Geistesgeschichte, self-justificatory 
conversations .... I have been writing on the assumption that 
we .... want to make our conversation with the dead richer 
and fuller"(48). 
As I say, this problem is one to which I shall be returning, 
but it is clear from what he says that Rorty believes very 
strongly in the need for Geistesgeschichte. I want to turn 
now, briefly, to the author of such a 'self-justificatory con\ers:ttion 
moreover one whom I have already had occasion to discuss in an 
earlier chapter; Alisdair Macintyre. 
III 
It should not be assumed, of course, that Macintyre necessarily 
accepts Rorty's genre distinction, or, for that matter, his 
terminology, but it is clear that there is considerable sympathy 
between them at least on the importance for philosophy of its 
past. This much is obvious from the central thesis of 
After Virtue that I outlined in my last chapter. What I want 
to do here, however, is to look at some of the aspects of 
Macintyre~ arguments in the light of my outline of the thought 
of Williams and Rorty, and then to reflect on what that implies 
for Macintyre~ main thesis in After Virtue, that I discussed 
in chapter one, and for those two strong currents within modern 
political thought, Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen. 
To begin with, it is perhaps best to look at an essay of 
Macintyre's which explicitly addresses the question of the 
relationship of philosophy to its past(49). Here, a number 
of the criticisms contained in After Virtue are repeated(SO), 
but Macintyre's main aim is different, nothing less, in fact, 
than to offer a challenge to the incommensurability of values 
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thesis that is one of the main planks in the Humpty Dumpty 
construction. This at once sets him dramaticalLy apart from 
all 'analytical philosophers' (even of the more venturesome 
Williamsesque type) and also, though less dramatically, from 
his equally historically minded colleague Rorty. 
Macintyre poses the problem thus:-
'Thilosophy, so it is sometimes claimed, differs from the 
natural sciences in its inability to resolve fundamental 
disagreements; since philosophers address the world in varying 
and discordant voices, why should any attention be paid to 
them?"(Sl). He goes on to say that one superficially attractive 
solution is simply to deal with the philosophical past in two 
different ways, essentially what Rorty would call 'rational 
reconstruction' and 'historical reconstruction'. In the 
former "we shall admit philosophers of the past to our debates 
only on our own terms, and if that involves historical distortion, 
so much perhaps the better"(52). As historians of philosophy, 
on the other hand, "we shall be genuinely scrupulous in trying 
to understand the past as it actually was and, if this makes the 
past philosophically irrelevant, we shall simply decry relevance 
and, where others speak of antiquarianism, we shall speak of 
scholarship"(53). 
However, argues Macintyre, this is no real solution for "the 
study of the past will have been defined so as to exclude any 
consideration of what is true or good or rationally warranted, 
rather than what they then, with their peculiar concepts of 
truth, goodness and rationality believed to be so. Enquiries 
into what actually is true, good and rational will be reserved 
for the present. But notice that for any particular philosophical 
generation its occupation of the present can only be temporary; 
in some not too distant future it will have been transmuted into 
one or more part of the philosophical past .... it will turn 
out not to have contributed to an enquiry continuing through 
generations, but to have removed itself from active philosophical 
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enquiry to become a mere subject matter for historians .... 
so the philosophical nullifying of the past by this conception 
of the relationship between past and present turns out to be 
a way of nullifying ourselves in advance"(S4). 
To meet this challenge, Macintyre thinks we must be able to 
confront the philosophical past philosophically as well as 
historically, but to provide such an account requires us facing 
up (and overcoming) the problems "Of how issues can be rationally 
resolved when they divide the adherants of large and 
comprehensive points of view whose systematic disagreements 
extend to disagreements about how those disagreements are to 
be characterised"(SS): or, in other words, the problems of 
incommensurability, first defined in relation to the history 
and philosophy of science by Kuhn (56) (though, of course, the 
problem is much older than him). There have been a number of 
responses to Kuhn's identification, but, according to Macintyre, 
all parties agree that "If and insofar as the concept of 
incommensurability has application to a choice between rival 
bodies of theory, then we can have no rational grounds for 
accepting any one of those rivals rather than another''(S7). 
It is this assertion that Macintyre wishes to dispute. 
He does so by drawing attention to two points that he feels 
philosophers of science, and others who have discussed the 
phenomenon of incommensurability, have, hitherto, taken 
insufficient note of. The first is the essentially historical 
existence of theories in the natural sciences, as elsewhere. 
"There is no such thing", Macintyre argues, "as the Kinetic 
theory of gasses; there is only the Kinetic theory as it was 
in 1850, the theory as it was in 1870, the theory as it is now 
and so on .... Bodies of theory, that is to say, themselves 
progress or fail to progress and they do so because and insofar 
as they provide by their incoherencies and inadequacies -
incoherencies and inadequacies judged by the standards of the 
body of theory itself - a definition of problems the solution 
of which provides direction for the formulation and reformulation 
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of that body of theory .... by providing itself with problems, 
a body of theory provides itself with goals and with some 
measure of its own progress or lack of progress towards those 
goals"(58). 
The second point consists in remembering that "Particular small 
sc~le theories come to us for the most part embedded in larger 
bodies of theory; and such larger bodies of theory are in turn 
embedded in still more comprhensive schemes of belief. It 
is these schemes of belief which provide the framework of 
continuity through time within which the transition from one 
incommensurable body of theory to its rival is made; and there 
has to be such a framework, for without the conceptual resources 
which it affords we could not understand the two bodies of theory 
as rivals which provide alternative and incompatible accounts 
of one and the same subject matter and which offer us rival 
and incompatible means of attaining one and the same set of 
theoretical goals"(59). 
This matters, according to Macintyre, because these two points 
are required, not only for the statement of the problems of 
incommensurability, but also for their solution, and he 
formulates the solution as a criterion "by means of which the 
rational superiority of one large scale body of theory to another 
can be judged. One large scale body of theory .... may be 
judged decisively superior to another .... if and only if the 
former body of theory enables us to give an adequate and, by 
the best standards we have, true explanation of why the latter 
body of theory both enjoyed the success and victories that 
it did and suffered the defeats and frustrations that it did, 
where success and failure, victory and defeat are defined in 
terms of the standards for success and failure, victory and 
defeat provided by .... the internal problematic of the latter 
body of theory .... it is success and failure, progress and 
sterility in terms of both of the problems and the goals that 
were or could have been identified by the adherants of the 
rationally inferior theory"(60). 
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Essentially then Macintyre's solution rests on the assertion 
that the history of natural science is, in a sense, sovereign 
over the natural sciences: "At least where those large-scale 
incommensurable bodies of theory .... are concerned, the 
superior theory in natural science is that which affords 
grounds for a certain sort of historical explanation, that 
which gives to an historical narrative an intelligibility it 
would not otherwise possess"(61). At this point, however, 
Macintyre's argument hits a snag, because, for his general 
point to be carried, this analysis must be translatable from 
the history of science to the history of philosophy, but, 
whereas Kuhn was able to define what counted as the history of 
science by reference to the modern natural sciences, no such 
recourse is open to Macintyre. "It would be fatal to our whole 
project", Macintyre concedes, "to allow the philosophical present 
to determine what was to be counted as the philosophical past"(62). 
Here, Macintyre's solution is a kind of conceptual elaboration 
of Whitehead's celebrated obiter dicta that all philosophy is 
but a footnote to Plato, for his argument is that "Nobody is 
to count as a philosopher who does not have to be judged in 
the end against standards set by Plato Plato transcends, 
in just the way I have described [i.e. in the natural sciences], 
the limitations of Pre-Socratic philosophy and in so doing 
sets a standard for all later attempts to transcend his 
limitations in turn .... all philosophers after Plato must 
confront a situation in which if you cannot transcend the 
limitations or what you take to be the limitations of Plato's 
fundamental positions then you have no sufficient reason for 
failing to recognize yourself as a Platonist .... to recognize 
this is to provide.for philosophy that minimal unity both 
prospectively and retrospectively which the present condition 
of the natural sciences provides retrospectively"(63). 
There are two further points that Macintyre makes, in order to 
complete his argument. The first is to point out, against 
an obvious objection, that "Even the most radical of philosophical 
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conflicts occur within the context of not dissimilar 
continuities .... that is to say, the types of discontinuity 
and difference catalogued at the beginning of my argument 
require as their counterpart an equally comprehensive catalogue 
of the types of continuity, resemblance and reccurance"(64). 
Secondly, he asserts that philosophical arguments and debates 
are of at least two distinct kinds: "There are of course those 
that occur within a very largely shared body of assumptions 
about background beliefs, standards of argument .... and so on. 
But there are also the types of debate or conflict between 
rival large-scale standpoints .... where disagreement is 
systematic in a way that apparently limits the possibility 
of any common standard for the rational resolution of 
disagreement .... What constitutes the rational superiority 
of one large-scale philosophical standpoint over another is its 
ability to transcend the limitations of that other by providing, 
from its own point of view, a better explanation and 
understanding of the failures, frustrations and incoherancies of 
the other point of view (failure, frustrations and incoherancies, 
that is, as judged by the standards internal to that other 
point of view) than that other point of view can give of 
itself"(65). 
Thus, Macintyre is able to conclude that the history of 
philosophy is, in fact, sovereign over the rest of the discipline, 
a conclusion which, he thinks, will seem "paradoxical to some 
and unwelcome to many"(66), but he identifies himself as part 
of a tradition which includes Vico, Hegel and Collingwood. 
That tradition has an interest of its own for my wider theme, 
and I shall be returning to it later, but for the moment let me 
look at how what Macintyre, Rorty and Williams say fits into 
that larger theme. 
IV 
It is interesting to begin this by considering that issue on 
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which at least two of the participants in the 'conversation' -
I use the phrase out of courtesy for Rorty - confront one 
another directly: incommensurability. "Basic values are 
not only plural, but in a real sense incommensurable"(67), 
we will remember Williams claiming, whereas, as we have just seen, 
Macintyre thinks that their alleged incommensurability can be 
successfully dissolved by the history of philosophy. I want 
to see how Macintyre's arguments might fare if we put them 
into Williamsite mode. 
Let us, then, consider two incommensurable bodies of theory - Sl 
and S2 - that stand in real confrontation with one another (they 
must, of course be in real and not notional confrontation). 
Williams' case, at least as expressed in 'Conflicts of Values' 
is that the claim that values are incommensurable says at least 
three important things:-
"1. There is no one currency in terms of which each 
conflict of values can be resolved. 
2. It is not true that for each conflict of values, 
there is some value, indepeidant of any of the conflicting 
values, which can be appealed to in order to resolve 
that conflict. 
3. It is not true that for each conflict of values, there 
is some value which can be appealed to (independant or 
not) in order rationally to resolve that conflict"(68). 
Now Williams holds that "value conflict is .... necessarily 
involved in human values, and to be taken as central by an 
adequate understanding of them"(69), but that the above three 
propositions allow a version of incommensurability which denies 
that no conflict of values can ever be resolved (the usual 
position elicited from incommensurability, according to 
Williams), but develops the truth of the view that to see 
the conflict of values as harmful - pathological is the word 
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Williams uses - is to wrongly assimilate conflicts of moral 
belief with theoretical contradiction: "Rather", he says, 
"we should see such needs as there are to reduce conflict and 
to rationalise our moral thought as having a more social and 
personal basis"(70). 
In the context outlined above then, a real confrontation 
between Sl and S2, though it may exhibit a 'logic of conversion' 
a la Gallie, could not be resolved [though it might be 
dissolved - for example by the changing social, technological 
or political environment(71)] i.e., the competition between 
the values could not be 'decided', with one being accorded the 
palm as the rational victor, the other being the loser. There 
might be a social need to dissolve the dispute, however, which 
would demand, according to Williams, an 'equilibrium' between 
public and private which would further illumine the relations 
between conflict and rationalisation in values(72). 
Nonetheless this solution of the value conflict would be in 
accordance with the thesis of incommensurability, in that the 
introduction of the public/private dimension and the need for 
'rationalisation' would not remove the conflict of values 
it would merely structure it. There would still be no 
'rational' way of moving from Sl to S2 (what might be at stake, 
after all, could easily include what was to count as 
rationality); to become an inhabitant of S2 would necessarily 
require the abandonment of Sl, given always that the twoS's 
were genuinely in real, and not notional, confrontation. 
How do Macintyre and Rorty respond to this? To begin with, 
it seems clear that Rorty is, in some ways, a more extreme 
supporter of the incommensurability thesis even than Williams, 
though for very different reasons. For Rorty, we cannot escape 
the cultural 'grid' [he explicitly uses this Focaultian term(73)] 
of which we are a part, in our case that which emerged in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. "We are the heirs", 
he says, "of three hundred years of rhetoric about the importance 
of distinguishing sharply between science (and other areas of 
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inquiry). This rhetoric has formed the culture of Europe .... 
but to proclaim our loyalty to these distinctions is not to say 
that there are 'objective' and 'rational' standards for 
adopting them"(74). He could, in many ways accept Williams' 
analysis of ethical statements, but Williams could not accept 
Rorty's thesis because it carries away something that is vital 
to analytic philosophy, the contention that Philosophy is, if 
not a natural kind, then at least a quasi-natural kind, that 
certain problems (mind/body, subject/object, sense/reference) 
are 'philosophical', whilst others (poetic imagery, structure 
of the novel, musical tonality, political action) are not. 
Rorty repeats time and again, throughout Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature, that "the true and the right are matters 
of social practice"(75), or that "objectivity should be seen 
as conformity to norms of justification we find about us"(76). 
Now, it might be thought that this position of Rorty's is, in 
fact, a yet purer form of Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen, but 
this is not so. Far from saying that Philosophy can have 
no effect on Politics as philosophy, other than a purely 
contingent one, Rorty is arguing that the explicit relationship 
of politics and philosophy will be a cultural event in itself, 
different in differing cultures. Sometimes that link will be 
very marked, as, for example, in Imperial China and the ancient 
(European) world, sometimes one will define the other out, as 
in the 'hard' linguistic philosophers of the mid-twentieth 
century, or certain totalitarian regimes(77). His thought 
has a little more sympathy for the Humpty Dumpty view that 
words, or at any rate, meanings are to a certain extent 
internally defined, but it would be a very much attenuated Humpty 
Dumpty view, given that the internal definitions would have to 
be culturally located rather than located in (say) a particular 
ideology. 
Interestingly, Richard Bernstein has suggested that, in a sense, 
Rorty can be seen as attempting to recover the notion of 
phronesis, Aristotle's idea of practical reasoning which makes 
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no appeals to ultimate standards or eternal foundations, but, 
in effect, turning Aristotle on his head by denying Aristotle's 
contrast between phronesis and noesis, contemplative 
understanding(78). This is an interesting suggestion for a 
number of reasons: partly because both Williams and Macintyre 
also make a reversion to classical thought (in Macintyre's 
case, of course, a direct return to Aristotle), but more 
importantly because it shows beyond any doubt just how radical 
Rorty's break with traditional philosophy is. In a sense, Rorty 
is infinitely more radical than the most ferocious logical 
positivist, because, however limited the role prescribed for 
philosophy by the hard core of the underlabourer school, within 
those parameters philosophy is truly sovereign; indeed in some 
ways it was a desire to ensure philosophy's certain sovereignty 
that created the impetus for the 'linguistic turn' in the first 
place. On Rorty's account, however, 'philosophy' is never 
sovereign, it is merely one strand in the conversation of the 
West; one strand among many. 
There is, however, a weakness, or, at any rate, a tension in 
Rorty's argument. It is implicit in his somewhat rhetorical 
last sentence (in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature) and 
made obvious, I think, in his 'Historiography of Philosophy' 
essay. The logic of Rorty's case can, as he admits, quite 
happily take on board rational and historical reconstruction, 
always providing these are carried out in the right manner, 
but geistesgeschichte is surely a different matter. Anticipating 
this objection towards the end of his essay, Rorty claims 
that we cannot get along without canons; as I mentioned earlier, 
for Rorty, "We need mountain peaks to look up to .... we cannot 
give up this idea without giving up the idea that the 
intellectuals of the previous epochs of European history form 
a community, a community of which it is good to be a member"(79). 
This, however, is simply conceptual wish-fulfillment. For one 
thing 'the intellectuals of the previous epochs of European 
history' do not form a community, they form several, at least 
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if you assume 'community' to refer to something other than a 
mere geographical boundary. On Rorty's argument, these 
communities may hold a conversation together, but to assume 
they are one is to assume that there is something specific 
to each of them that yet they all share and this, of course, is 
to fall into the trap of essentialism that Rorty so vigorously 
criticises elsewhere. 
Part of the problem here is that Rorty is, in a sense, trapped 
himself by his own obsession - the failures of previous 
philosophy. He cannot seem to see the force of his own 
liberating case and remains bound in the chains that he has 
helped others to cast off(80). From my point of view, however, 
Rorty's most interesting admission is that "We have to have 
both imaginary conversations with the dead, and the conviction 
that we have seen further than they"(81). What is significant 
about this is that no-where does Rorty truly address what would 
constitute 'seeing further' than 'the mighty dead'. By whose 
perspective? Well, obviously, Rorty might reply, ours; but, 
in a very real sense, on Rorty's arguments, we cannot see 
'further' than our predecessors, we can only see differently. 
When Rorty says that to proclaim our loyalty to the distinctions 
that have, in large part, created Modern European culture is not 
to say that there are objective or rational standards for 
adopting them, he is, in effect, removing the possibility that 
we can legitimately see 'further' than our ancestors, because 
we are not looking at the same thing. Our knowledge claims 
are, of course, more relevant for us, they are part of the 
intellectual air we breathe (indeed, in many ways, they are 
the lungs through which we breathe that air) but they are 
incommensurable with other theories or claims and can, therefore, 
not see 'further' or more accurately, they merely perceive the 
relevant 'reality' in a different way. 
Rorty's addiction to the notion of incommensurability is the 
true stumbling block for his defence of Geistesgeschichte because 
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it undercuts the reasons he outlines for Geistesgeschichte. 
We need 'mountain peaks to look up to'? Why, if the only 
mountain we can climb is our own? He claims that only the 
'impassioned conversation' of competing geistesgeschichten 
can maintain that 'sense of community' that he believes we need 
so much, but that assumes an adequate definition of 'sense of 
community' (which Rorty nowhere offers us) and accession to 
the belief that we do, in fact, need the 'sense of community' 
to which Rorty appeals and if, as I suggested earlier, European 
thought is not a community but several, this belief would seem 
to be difficult to sustain. 
Rorty's response, then, would appear to open the door to a 
line of thought which challenges the Humpty Dumpty/Red Queen 
approach by denying philosophy any status as a natural kind, 
but would not do anything to delineate the relationship of 
philosophy to politics except in the broadly contingent way 
suggested by Rorty's (and Oakeshott's) metaphor of 'conversation'. 
It is, however, suggestive in its critique of the analytical 
school's lack of historical self-consciousness. I shall 
suggest later(in chapter six) ways in which the approach might 
be modified so as to avoid the kind of problems outlined 
above, and also so that its position on the theory/practice 
dichotomy is clearer and more illuminating. Yet, if Rorty 
and Williams are enemies in general intent they are at least 
allies in that both accept the incommensurability of values 
thesis. Where does this leave Rorty's ally in the historical 
'school', Macintyre? 
v 
First of all, it is important to be clear that Macintyre, both 
in After Virtue and in his later work, stands firmly out against 
any form of the incommensurability thesis. In fact, of course, 
this thesis, in its purest and most uncompromising form, is at 
the heart of what Macintyre thinks Nietzsche divines in the 
modern moral life and reflection upon it: "It was Nietzsche's 
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historic achievement to understand more clearly than any other 
philosopher .... not only that what purported to be appeals 
to objectiv~ty were in fact expressions of subjective will, but 
also the nature of the problems this posed for moral philosophy"(82). 
Thus, for Macintyre, "Either one must follow through the 
aspirations and the collapse of the different versions of the 
enlightenment project until there remains only the Nietzshean 
diagnosis and the Nietzschean problematic or one must hold 
the enlightenment project was not only a mistake, but sh9uld 
never have been commenced in the first place. There is no 
third alternative"(83). 
Macintyre erects this conclusion on his two premisses; (1) that 
the Enlightenment 'project' as he calls it, was to provide an 
'independent', 'rational' justification of morality and (2) that 
it was the failure of this project that created the conceptual 
void - 'emotivism', Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen or whatever 
- which Nietzsche so accutely divines. Thus, it follows that 
what was destroyed or corrupted by the Enlightenment project, 
i.e., the approach to ethics which reached its apogee in the 
high and late middle ages and which took the moral and political 
writings of Aristotle as canonical,is the only path left for us 
to follow, and so we arrive at the choice posed for us by 
Macintyre in chapter 9 of After Virtue: Nietzsche or Aristotle. 
The rest of Macintyre's book is, of course, devoted to a 
reconstruction of the Aristotelean case, one which, he thinks, 
solves the problems of the moral life outlined in his 'disquieting 
suggestion' at the start of the book. The details of this case 
do not at present concern me, but it is important to note that 
Macintyre's sketch of the 'Virtues' comes down, in chapters 
fourteen and fifteen, to a complex argument for a unitary core 
of the 'Virtues', and which provides the basis for his assertion 
that it is Aristotle we should prefer over Nietzsche. 
Macintyre builds this unitary core from a three tiered argument: 
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"The first stage requires a background account of what I 
shall call a practice, the second an account of what I have 
already characterised as the narrative order of a single 
human life and the third, an account a good deal fuller than 
I have given up to now of what constitutes a moral tradition. 
Each later stage presupposes the earlier, but not, vice 
versa"(84). A practice, for Macintyre, is "(A) coherent and 
complex form of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive 
of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers 
to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended"(SS). 
This notion is necessary for Macintyre because of his initial 
definition of a virtue as "An acquired human quality the 
possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve 
those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of 
which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods"(86). 
One problem, however, with the role of the notion of a practice 
here is that it is simply too broad, considered of and for 
itself, to support any concrete notion of the virtues that 
could escape the charge of being relativistic or empty(87). 
What is lacking, as one perceptive critic has put it, "is any 
standard or principle for ordering or evaluating the confusing 
array of practices"(88). 
Macintyre concedes this but attempts to circumvent it by 
outlining a Telos of a whole human life, which would transcend 
what he calls 'limiting goods and practices' by constituting 
the good of a whole life; the good of a human life conceived 
as a unity. This involves Macintyre in a tremendous amount 
of intellectual juggling with concepts as slippery and complex 
as the concept of a person, the notion of intelligible action, 
personal identity and the character of a narrative history. 
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I shall be returning to some of these points in detail in 
Chapter Six, and will, therefore, discuss Macintyre's specific 
arguments there, but note that his conclusion is that "the good 
life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life 
for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those 
which will enable us to understand what more and what else 
the good life for man is"(89). 
Macintyre completes his three stage argument by asserting that 
we are never able to seek for the good (or by extension, exercise 
the virtues) as individuals: "I am someone's son or daughter, 
someone else's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that 
city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong 
to this clan, that tribe, this nation"(90). Thus we function 
within, and gain our social identity through, communities and 
communities have histories and develop traditions. Vital and 
alive traditions, Macintyre says, "embody continuities of 
conflict"(91) and "the virtues find their point and purpose not 
only in sustaining those relationships necessary if the variety 
of goods internal to practices are to be achieved and not only 
in sustaining the form of an individual life in which that 
individual may seek out his or her good as the good of his or 
her whole life, but also in sustaining those traditions which 
provide practices and individual lives with their necessary 
historical context"(92) [my emphasis]. 
We have now reached the point where we can see, without any 
ambiguity, the significance both of incommensurability as an 
idea, and of the way in which, in 'The Relationship of Philosophy 
to its Past', Macintyre seeks to combat it. Incommensurability 
is fatal to his case because it would permit there to be an 
infinite variety of practices or traditions which could not be 
effectively compared to one another in a prescriptive way. 
In Williams' language they would be in real, not notional 
confrontation. This would vitiate everything Macintyre is 
trying to achieve and so he suggests (in 'The Relationship of 
Philosophy to its Past') a way in which we can compare traditions, 
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belief systems or whatever such that one can be adjudged 
superior to another. 
Even the more attenuated version of incommensurability 
Williams puts forward in Ethics and The Limits of Philosophy(93), 
which he calls the 'relativism of distance'(94), would be too 
much for Macintyre. 
Note, however, that just as Williams and Rorty show some points 
of overlap on incommensurability, so Macintyre and Williams 
are close to one another in that both suggest the best route 
forward for ethics is a return to some form of classical 
phylosophy. Note also that all three agree that to a greater 
or lesser extent, and in different ways, a 'wrong turn' was 
taken during the 17th and 18th centuries and that, at the very 
least, for our conceptual world to be rooted in theirs is 
as serious a mistake as it is a truth. They do not agree 
what the 'wrong turn' was, nor what the solution to it is, 
nor where its real significance lies, but to the fact of there 
being such a 'wrong turn' they speak with one voice. 
VI 
Thus, for representatives of both the analytical school and the 
historical school, the period culminating in the Enlightenment 
is a crucial one. For Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen it is 
crucial also, for, on these arguments, they were born, or 
invented, at that time, and their eminence dates from the 
changes in our conceptual landscape wrought by that period. 
Some applaud the turn (the logical positivists, for example, 
and the 'hard' linguist~c philosophers) others, while approving 
of some of the results (th~ general implications, for example, of 
Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen) are deeply opposed to some 
others (this, perhaps, is true of Rorty in a way). Of all 
of the philosophers I have discussed in detail only Macintyre 
deplores both the turn and the results, and thinks that 
philosophy's role in the practical world is not as contingent 
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as the analytical philosophers believe, nor as tangental as 
Rorty appears to think, and he predicates these claims on an 
analysis of the character of that 'wrong turn'. 
We appear to have seen, as William James once wrote about 
another philosophical era, a "curious unrest in the philosophic 
landscape .... a loosening of old landmarks, a softening of 
opposites, a mutual borrowing"(95). In the work of the 
three thinkers I have discussed in this chapter, all of this 
has been present, and yet the relationship between philosophy and 
practice seems as unsatisfactorily explained as ever. In my 
next three chapters I want to suggest that the view of the 
Enlightenment glimpsed, from time to time, in all of these 
writers (explicitly in Macintyre, implicitly in Williams and 
to a lesser extent Rorty) is at best a partial truth and at 
worst a distortion. I want to argue that certain ideas 
arising out of the 'grid' (and I shall return to this Focaultian 
term in chapter six) of Enlightenment political thought, and 
particularly some of the ideas of Hume and Kant within that 
'grid', are peculiarly apposite in discussing the relationship 
of theory to practice in the late twentieth century. Then 
in my final chapter, the last part of this study, I shall draw 
the moral of this interpretation for the practice of the history 
of philosophy, for the nature and limits of political theory 
and for the relationship of 'philosophy' to practice more 
generally. 
PART 2: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT'S POLITICS. 
CHAPTER 3 
- so -
'Placing Man in Society' 
The Enlightenment and Politics 
"Everything I have said is drawn from nature 
and highly favourable to the liberty of the 
Citizen." 
Montesquieu in 
De !'esprit des lois 
"Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains." 
Rousseau in 
Du Contrat Social 
I am conscious that in discussing the Enlightenment's involvement in, and 
attitudes towards, politics I am following a path well-trodden by scholars 
far more learned than I. Peter Gayland Ernst Cassirer2(to name but two of 
the most celebrated) have each dealt with the entire subject magisterially, 
and commentaries on the individual philosophes political ideas are, of 
course, legion. However, I may, I hope, be forgiven for treading this 
well-worn ground in that my aim, in this chapter, is not just to argue for 
a particular interpretation of the Enlightenment's view of politics but 
also to prepare the way for the analysis of the arguments of Hume and Kant 
that I shall offer in my next two chapters. Thus my chief aim in discussing 
the Enlightenment's view of politics is to draw attention to the 
significance of these arguments for the pro.blems posed in my first two chapter 
by placing them in the appropriate (and I hope illuminating) historical 
context. 
It is important that I sketch this context in some detail for two reasons. 
First, of course, for any serious understanding of the meaning and 
significance of a philosophy to be valid the intellectual climate in which 
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it was produced must itself be understood (I freely concede this 
much to Rorty and to Macintyre). Secondly, and perhaps 
more significantly, since my interpretation of Hume and Kant will differ 
in some respects from other - and well received - interpretations the 
foundations of that interpretation must, in any case, be laid bare, and 
those foundations are firmly located in the general matrix of 
Enlightenment political thought. 
I. 
Let me begin then, with a text:-
"The philosophy of Enlightenment" writes Gay, "insisted on man's essential 
autonomy: man is responsible to himself, to his own rational interests, to 
his self-development and by an inescapable extension, to the welfare of 
his fellow man" 3(my emphasis). 
Gay is here referring explicitly to the Enlightenment's political 
philosophy, and the one thing that immediately strikes one about this 
assertion is, simply, the fact that the political writings of the members 
of the philosophic family are remarkable not for their unity but for their 
apparent diversity: Voltaire is a relativist and a believer in enlightened 
autocracy; Rousseau, a democratic radical; Becceria a legal (though 
humane) absolutist and so on. Can we make a unity out of such diverse 
material? or is the proclaimed unity a false creature created, as Roy 
Porter suggests, by "mingled academic imperialism and tidy mindedness n? 4 
In fact the answer to this ~uestion is both yes aaG. no. The::'e was, I thin!c, in the 
Enlightenment as a whole a unity in aim, though a diversity in method, and 
in its political aspect this unity in aim follows directly from the 
generally accepted values of the Enlightenment; liberty, tolerance, 
progress, criticism. According to Cassirer,in politics "The philosophy 
of the Enlightenment tackles once more Plato's fundamental question of 
the relationship between might and right, adapting the ancient problem 
to its own intellectual milieu" 5 and this view contains an important 
truth in that the philosophes, in their reflections on politics (and 
their actions in politics) sought a political order that would be at once 
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intelligent, rational and humane; moreover, one that would strengthen 
and maintain institutions which would promote such values for the future. 
Cassirer's view must be amended, however, at least to the extent of 
pointing out that the 'right' individual philosophes opposed to 'might' 
(and sometimes even their definition of what constituted eithei" ) 
differed considerably one from another, and it is this that leads to the 
diverse means they adopt to achieve their (generally agreed) aim. 
Within this broad agreement on the general aspec~ of w~at politics should 
aim toward, there was, however, one crucial and far-reaching difference 
I 
both in method and solution,that divided the Enlightenment. I shall 
argue that this is best seen as a division between the 'mainstream' of 
Enlightenment political thought - rational, critical, naturalistic - and 
a powerful, though muted, undercurrent, and for a moment I want to 
elaborate on this distinction. 
The mainstream is committed to the reform of obvious abuses which stand 
in the way of 'intelligent humane and rational' administration, and it 
runs as a central thread through many discussions of politics in the 
period of the Enlightenment. In most respects in this field (as in so 
many others) the true originator is Montesquieu, and especially 
De l'esprit des lois. "I have not drawn my principles from my prejudices" 
wrote Montesquieu, announcing his project in the preface, "but from the 
nature of things". 6 It was a claim that echoed through the century of 
Enli~htenment. 
Gay calls Montesquieu "the most influential writer of the eighteenth 
century" 7 and whether or not this claim is acceptable (and I would want 
a fairly careful definition of his use of 'influential' before I would be 
prepared to accept it without heavy qualification) the influence 
Montesquieu had in the eighteenth century itself is manifest. In 
Scotland, France, America and Italy. De l'esprit des lois was hugely 
successful - leading Becceria to call its author the "immortal 
Montesquieu", cnl Hamilton, ''.ihat great man'. Hume corresponded with him and 
even Catherine the Great (not noted for her commitment to the cause of 
Enlightenment) found it at least politic to claim that she was his devoted 
follower. 8 
Montesquieu's great treatise is, of course, extraordinarily wide ranging 
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and I have no intention of even attempting to summarize it here, I merely want 
to draw attention to certain crucial aspects of it as far as its treatment of 
politics is concerned. Essentially these aspects are those which ally reason, 
humanity and liberality - those aspects, in other words, which gave the work 
its lasting contemporary influence. These aspects are prefigured to some 
extent in Montesquieu's Lettres Persanes 9 and consist largely of a social 
relativism uneasily combined with a radical individualism, but which both 
lead to the conclusion that- in the words of Franz Neuman-"there is ...... no 
10 
universally applicable solution. There are only types of solution." It 
also, of course, leads (in practical terms) to some of Montesquieu's most 
influential ideas - his criticism of slavery (anticipated by his treatment 
of it in Lettres Persanes) is, of course, a good example; an attack in which 
he was followed by many philosophes 1 most importantly Voltaire and 
11 Rousseau. 
More influential still were his arguments in Book XII of De l'esprit des lois-
which Neuman calls the "Magna Carta of the Citizen". 12 In Chapter II of 
Book XII he discusses his 'fundamental principle' - political liberty - which 
depends on 'security', in its turn dependent on the soundness of the Laws. 13 
He therefore goes on to discuss what will make the Laws 'sound' and here, 
too, prefigures concerns that the later Enlightenment were to take up and 
elaborate. Voltaire, for example, became an unceasing propagandist against 
the French legal system, a concern stemming from his involvement in the 
notorious r.alas case, but also following on from his admiration for 
M t . 14 on esqu1.eu. 
Perhaps the greatest flowering of this particular influence of Montesquieu's, 
however, was Becceria's Dei Delitti e Delle Pene, (1764). Here Becceria 
combines Montesquieu's legal theories with a thoroughgoing utilitarianism 
('the scientific principle of Society', says Becceria, 'is that the greatest 
happiness must be divided by the greatest number') to produce the 
Enlightenment's finest blueprint for legal reform, and it became (in the 
words of Owen Chadwick) "the book which above all others interested the rest 
of Europe in the brilliance and originality of Italian enlightened thought". 15 
Here again the hallmarks are rationality and humanity. Following Montesquieu, 
Becceria insists that laws must be arranged such that punishments for crime 
differ in severity. If all crimes are punished with equal severity where is 
the incentive for the criminal to commit the les2e~ instena of t~e ;reater one? 
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Becceria specifically concentrates his critical fire on torture and ·the 
Death Penalty, heavily criticised by Montesquieu in both Lettres Persanes 
and De l'sprit des lois, Becceria's withering arguments in Dei Delitti 
bore interesting fruit. In 1772, for example, Gustavvs III of Sweden 
abolished torture, giving the credit to Becceria; more significantly, in 
1792-3, during the tumultuous debate in the French National Assembly over 
an appropriate punishment for Louis XVI, the 'last of the French 
philosophes' and true inheritors of the Enlightenment- Condorcet and Paine-
were united in their opposition to the Death Penalty demanded by the Jacobins:-
"What justice truly demands" wrote Condorcet, "is that ..... the general 
principles of jurisprudence in favour of the accused should be preserved 
or even extended ..... (Louis's Crimes) must be judged and punished like 
crimes of the same sort committed by any other man." 16 
Paine even went so far as to suggest that 'Louis Capet'- as he was now 
known - be exiled to the United States - there to learn the duties of a 
citizen, which (once acquired) would allow him back into the Republic as 
'Citizen Capet'. In a very real sense Paine and Condorcet were speaking 
in the accents of the waning Enlightenment; indeed these were almost the 
last words of the Enlightenment in France, before it was engulfed by the 
terror, the Revolutionary War and Napoleon. As Michael Walzer has argued 
"the lesson (Condorcet) and his friends wanted to teach was not only that 
kings were citizens, but also that citizens (including traitors) had rights 
17 that could not be taken away even by the will of the people". Here they 
spoke as representatives of a line of thought that can be traced back 
18 through Voltaire and Becceria to Montesquieu, and thus were the true 
inheritors of the main current of Enlightenme~t thought. 
Even when the philosophes addressed subjects of only tangental relation 
to politics, the general political values they held dear - reason, liberty, 
, 
tolerance, humanity - come through. Diderot's Supplement au Voyage de 
Bougainville(1772) is, ostensibly, not about politics at all. It is rather 
an essay in what might be called 'moral anthropology', as its purpose is to 
(invidiously) contrast "hypocritical Christian civilization with pure, 
19 honest, free Tahitian civilization." Nonetheless, it has distinct 
political implications as Christian morality was, in the eighteenth century, 
an essential prop for a series of assumptions about political society and, 
therefore, if it was undermined, so were they ( a point very well understood 
by Hume; see my discussion in Chapter Five below). Like Montesquieu, 
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Diderot believed that it is through man's own nature that the true principles 
of society are found (though his reasons for thinking so are rather different 
as I suggest in my next section). Thus, Diderot's revolutionary view of 
sexuality in Supplement au voyage de Bougamville also has revolutionary 
political implications. It is Diderot's aim to show that Christian morality 
is 'unnatural' about sexuality and, therefore, in error, and the implications 
of this are that sexual relations should (indeed must) be liberalised in 
20 
accordance with the dictates of our nature and the concept of reason. In 
political terms, this is a cry (again) for tolerance and humanity and the 
removal of institutional restraints on natural human freedoms - exactly the 
same kind of thing we observed in Montesquieu, Voltaire and Becceria. 
The fact that Voltaire was a believer in enlightened autocracy or that Diderot's 
political views fluctuated between near-democracy, Montesquieuan liberalism 
and Voltairean enlightened autocracy, does not mean that their aim was in 
reality any different from the liberal Montesquieu or the absolutist Becceria -
in Gay's words "as the philosophes understood it the science of politics was 
a supremely practical science with two related tasks; to provide intelligent, 
humane administrators and to discover forms of government that would establish, 
strengthen and maintain rational institutions in a rational political 
21 
atmosphere". Indeed, for the philosophes the eclecticism of the forms of 
government they favoured to 'establish, strengthen and maintain rational 
institutions' was an advantage and one in keeping with the observed facts of 
human nature. Bentham perhaps summed this view up most neatly with his 
aphorism that "I should think myself a weak reasoner and bad citizen ...... . 
were I not, though a Royalist in London, a republican in Paris". 22 
II 
There was then, a central current of Enlightenment thought about politics - a 
'mainstream' as I have called it. It is, therefore, worthwhile at this point 
to examine in more detail some of the cardinal non-political assumptions of 
this mainstream and see how they influenced its political ideas. Although 
there are several doctrines which might be considered for my purpose I am 
going to concentrate on one - the Enlightenment's concept of, and development 
of, the 'Science of Man'. 
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The Enlightenment's obsession with science is well known. Voltaire was a 
supremely successful scientific populariser, Diderot, D'Alambert, Buffon, 
Helvetius (to say nothing of Hume and Kant) all wrote influential works 
with important philosophical implications for science. Newton was the 
'Divine Newton' or the 'Immortal Newton' - the culture hero of the 
Enlightenment-, and the philosophes aspired to be 'Newtons of the Mind'. 23 
What, however, did this acknowledged ambition actually represent? D'Alambert, 
in a celebrated essay,gave perhaps the best answer;"from the principles of 
the secular sciences to the foundations of religious revelation, from 
metaphysics to matters of taste, from music to morals, from the laws of 
princes to those of peoples, from natural law to the arbitrary laws of 
nations ...... everything has been discussed and analysed. The fruit or 
sequel of this general effervescence of minds has been to cast new light on 
some matters and new shadows on others, just as the effect of the ebb and 
flow of the tide is to leave some things on the shore and to wash others 
24 
away." 
The key word here is'analysed', for this is what all the philosophes attempted 
to do. Montesquieu claimed to be a 'scientist of society' and, however far 
his performance fell short of his intention he was taken as such and (as I 
have already indicated) other philosophes strove to emulate him. "Laws" he 
claimed, "in their broadest sense are the necessary relations which are 
derived from the nature of things" 25 and the function of the science of man 
was first, to comprehensively analyse 'the nature of things' before 
proceeding to discuss that derivation. It is, of course, also well known 
that the eighteenth century proved to have a marked hostility to the system 
building that was at once the characteristic and the glory of seventeenth 
century philosophy. Not until the very end of the Enlightenment did a great 
philosophical system emerge- Kant's -and this in Germany where the influence 
of Liebniz on the philosophes was strongest. Liebniz's principal work in 
epistemology - the New Essays on Human Understanding - did not appear until 
1765 and it fed into the Enlightenment through its influence on German 
Aufklarer like Wolff and Baumgarten. In tu>'n, therefore, it indirectly 
influenced Kant. 26 
In France and elsewhere 'systematic' treatises were very few and far between. 
This was largely becaus~ the Enlightenment's central assumptions in 
epistemology were empirical - influenced by Bacon, Locke, Newton (of course) 
and Hartley - 27 but also, in part, the result of a changing conception of 
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reason. As Cassirer said "in the great metaphysical systems of the 
(seventeenth) century ....... reason is the realm of the 'eternal verities' 
of those truths held in common by the human and divine mind. What we know 
through reason, we therefore behold 'in God'. Every act of reason mir~ors the 
..... intelligable world. The eighteenth century takes reason in a different 
and more modest sense. It is no longer the sum of 'innate ideas' given prior 
to all experience, which reveals the absolute essence of things. Reason is 
now looked upon rather as an acquisition than as a heritage. It is not the 
treasury of the mind in which the truth, like a minted coin, lies stored; it 
is rather the original intellectual force which guides the discovery and 
determination of truth .......... What reason is and what it can do can 
never be known by its results but only by its function. And its most 
important function is to bind and to dissolve." 28 Lessing expressed this 
in one vivid phrase - the power of reason, he said, was not 'in the 
possession but in the acquisition of truth.' (my emphasis). 
This view of reason is seen repeatedly throughout the Enlightenment. It is, 
according to Diderot, the purpose of the Encyclopaedie to bring about a 
29 
change in the manners of thinking it is Montesquieu's method in 
De l'esprit des lois and it goes hand in hand with the re-evaluation of the 
nature and role of the passions, that was such a characteristic of 
Enlightenment thought. The most interesting case of this is , of course, 
Hume (although he is also something of a curious case! 30 ) but it is a common 
theme for the philosophes; "I forgive everything that is inspired by passion" 
wrote Diderot to Sophie Volland 31 in a moment of pardonable hyperbole, but, 
in a less exaggerated sense his philosophical friends would have agreed with 
his remark. In this sense the Enlightenment was a 'revolt against rationalism' 
though not- most emphatically not- a revolt against rationality,(adietinction made 
brilliantly in polemical form by Diderot in Supplement au voyage de Bougainville. ). 
The downgraded conception of reason and the rehabilitation of the passions 
led to an emphasis on philosophical psychology. This became, in Gay's words, 
'The Strategic Science' - as it provided the premises from which the philosophes 
argued in their attacks on religion, on the political status quo, on hierarchy 
and on hypocrisy of all sorts. 32 
It was Locke, of course, that laid the foundation for Enlightenment pschology 
(and it really remained in the Lockean mode until Kant). 33 This psychology 
in turn laid the foundation for epistemology, which had marked implications 
for the Enlightenment's view of politics. A classic, if extreme, case in point 
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is Diderot's La R~ve D'Alambert. Here the content of most of the diaiogue 
is scientific and technical and it argues for a very radical materialism and 
2 determinism far more radical than many of his fellow philosophers 
liked . This materialistic determinism is developed through an uncompromisi~g 
empiricism and a kind of Lockean psychology carried to extremes - but there 
is no doubt that Diderot's primary aim was a moral one, as in the Supplement 
au voyage de Bougeinville: to point out the foundations of man's behaviour, 
its implications, how we should (and should not) react to this, and wh~t it 
is right to praise and right to blame. For Diderot, his conclusions meant a 
radical change, not only in morality, bu;in the social conditions which 
allowed (indeed sanctioned) the existing morality that he was criticising. 
It was, therefore, a 'political' work- although it had not been composed 
specifically as one. 
It must be admitted, of course, that Diderot's views in La R~ve D'Alambert 
were not typical. D'Alambert himself, and his mistress Julie deL 'espinasse 
disavowed them when they were circulated in manuscript form, but the close 
connection between psychology, epistemology, morality and politics observed 
in that work was largely staple fare for the philosophes. Voltaire's 
Lettres Philosophigue is another good example, as is Adam Smith's Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (albeit of a different kind). Towards the end of the 
Enlightenment period this tendency was seen most obviously in Condorcet - in 
his masterpiece the Esguisse d'un tableau historigue de progres de l'esprit 
humain (written in 1793-4) and in many of his lesser known but equally 
. t t• 34 1n eres 1ng essays. 
Condorcet is an interesting example because, as I have already remarked, he 
is one of the last true representatives of the Enlightenment in France, and 
even if Gay is right that his Esguisse "is as much a caricature of the 
Enlightenment as its testament" 35 it is still important to see (albeit in 
caricature) how the Enlightenment at the end of the 'century of philosophy' 
was expressing itself. There is certainly no sign in the Esguisse of any 
belief that the Enlightenment project was a failure - quite the contrary. 
In fact, Condorcet believes (and expresses in a wonderful rhetorical sally) 
that one day "the sun will shine only on freemen on this earth, on men who 
will recognize no master but their reason; when tyrants and slaves, priests 
and their stupid or hypocritical instruments will exist only in history as 
on the stage; where men will study the efforts and sufferings that 
characterized the past only to guard vigilantly against any recurrance of 
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superstition and tyranny." Here in this one sentence are embraced all the 
hallmarks of the Enlightenment as I have discussed them in this chapter; 
reason, tolerance, humanity, freedom. The Esquisse indeed has a self-
confidence absent in most of the works of the earlier Enlightenment. In 
his own early works too, Condorcet displayed the essential unity of the 
Enlightenment approach. In 1785, for example, he published an essay on 
applying probability theory to politics, which, drawing on the work of 
Pascal and Liebniz, suggested a concept of 'collective reason' similar in 
form (though different in content) to Rousseau's general will:-
"When he submits to a law contrary to his opinion (man) must say to himself 
'It is not now a question of myself alone, but of everyone. I ought not, 
therefore, conduct myself according to what I believe to be reasonable, but 
according to what all, in discovering, like me, their own opinion, ought to 
regard as being in conformity with reason and truth." 37 
His main contention in the essay is to argue from theories of probability to 
conclusions in politics, and even though he is again far more self-confident 
than the men and women of the early Enlightenment (like Montesquieu) the 
general project is still the same: The Science of Man . 
III 
The assertion that there was a 'mainstream' to Enlightenment thought about 
politics naturally implies that there was a 'substream' or undercurrent as 
well. In fact, the undercurrent has been as influential (and in some 
fields more influential) than the 'mainstream'. Its major figure, of course, 
is Rousseau. 
In political theory the force and (almost inevitably) ambiguity of Rousseau's 
thought has long been recognized, but it is interesting for a moment to 
consider it in relation to the rest of the Enlightenment. 
For many years, of course, Rousseau was the outcast of the philosophic family. 
His views were in many ways opposed to theirs, and his temperament and ever 
increasing paranoia drove a firm wedge between him and all who were - at one 
time or another - his friends. Diderot, Voltaire, D'Alambert, Hume - all 
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ended estranged from him (though Diderot and Hume remained admiring of him 
an~ sympathetic). Yet, as Gay has remarked, "Rousseau may not have 
been wholly in the Enlightenment ,but h-:! vas of it - the philosophes and 
Rousseau needed each other in friendship as in enmity." 38 Yet he was a 
stupendously annoying individual, a wRJ.king paradox - "A playwright who 
inveighed against the theatre, a moralist who abandoned his children, a 
religious philosopher who changed his confession twice for dubious reasons, 
a libertarian who could not get compulsion out of his mind, a deist who 
accused his fellow deists of irreligion, a professional celebrant of 
friendship who broke with everyone." 39 Nevertheless, he is of the 
Enlightenment even if, at times, his ideas appear to put him beyond it. 
His problems were the common currency of Enlightenment thought and his 
solutions, though radical and often startlingly at variance with those of 
other philosophes, are firmly 'Ol:lci1ored in 'the soil 
of the Enlightenment'. The main difference between Rousseau's political 
thought and the mainstream Enlightenment is predicated - as might be 
expected - on his view of man. In his Dijon Academy prize-winning essay 
'Discours sur les sciences et les artes' he proclaims the importance of the 
science of man (though he does not call it that) in characteristically 
rhetorical, (but firmly Enlightenment,) terms:-
"It is a great and beautiful spectacle to see man raising himself from 
nothingness by his own efforts ....•. lifting himself above himself, soaring 
in spirit up to the celestial regions, like the sun ......... and what is 
still greater and more difficult, returning into himself to study man and 
to get to know his nature, his duties and his end." 40 
With this concern, of course, the rest of the Enlightenment would be thoroughly 
in agreement (as Berman says, Rousseau's argument here "prefigures the 
inner structure of the Enlightenment as a whole") 41 , but the conclusions 
Rousseau arrives at about the state of existing society - and the reasons for 
it - go far beyond anything his fellow philosophes (at the time of the essay 
on arts and sciences) had suggested. At the heart of these conclusions, of 
course, is his view that man was - by nature - pre-moral (neither bad nor 
good, but innocent), and that he was not civilized, but fatally corrupted 
by existing cultures and society. Rousseau's intense exhortations to virtue 
42 
as a counter to this corruption, only point it up the more, and his 
insistence many years later (in the third dialogue of Rousseau juge de Jean 
Jagues) that "our spirits have been corrupted to the degree that our arts 
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and sciences have advanced towards perfection" showed that however much he 
might have cause to qualify that early work, the idea central to it was 
still in the same place at the end of his career that it was at its beginning. 
His later works, in particular the three great works of the late 1750's 
and early 1760's, La Nouvelle Heloise, Du Contrat Social and Emile, all pose 
this problem again, in their different ways, and offer partial solutions to 
it. As Gay has remarked, however, "we must not call Rousseau a primitivist 
because he attacked modern civilization" 44 , he was after all, very insistent 
that mere destruction of institutions would only serve to kill possible 
45 
avenues of remedy, while leaving the vice and corruption extant. The view 
of man on which this was based was, therefore, not a simple case of 
primitivism or a recourse to the 'noble savage'. Rousseau's account of man, 
culled from Du Contrat Social and Emile, is an imaginative reconstruction of 
man's 'nature, duties and end'. It is not an 'historical' recreation of man's 
nature, for it is partly through the process of history itself that man's 
nature has become corrupted, 46 but it uses that history to provide insight 
and illumination. In a powerful image, Rousseau describes just what an 
onslaught man's true nature faces:-
"Man's nature" (he wrote in Emile) "is like a young tree which has, by 
mischance, been born in the middle of a large highway ....... how important 
it is to separate the new tree from the great highway, to protect it from 
the crushing force of social conventions." 47 
In Emile, of course, Rousseau's solution is to isolate the 'young tree', to 
'build a wall around the root'. Du Contrat Social is the second half of that 
solution; to erect a society which can then allow the wall to be dismantled; 
in Gay's words "Emile has shown the making of moral man, the Contrat Social 
shows the making of moral society." 48 Both halves of this solution are, 
Rousseau believes, necessary because of the interdependence he perceives 
between corrupt man and corrupt society. An uncorrupted man in present 
society would soon - and inevitably - become corrupt; equally, corrupt men 
would soon destroy a society based on the principles of Du Contrat Social. 
Thus, both moral men and a moral society are necessary and this means, of 
course, that both are, in their present state, corrupt. 
This is the centrepiece of the real point at issue between Rousseau and the 
mainstream Enlightenment. Those of the philosophes who reflected on it 
certainly believed that there were serious things wrong with their society. 
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This was most obviously true in France, but looking at the character of the 
Enlightenment elsewhere (in Italy and Germany for example) amply confirms a 
general feeling of social malaise. 49 Even in Britain, usually regarded as 
a haven of tolerance and liberality, some Enlightenment thought was critical 
50 
of the status quo. Then, again, many philosophes had a distinctly 
unflattering view of their fellowman (as he currently existed), even if they 
felt that he was capable of Enlightenment. 51 
Yet there is a crucial difference between these critical attitudes and 
Rousseau's. As Berman rightly points out "The Paris Rousseau criticized was 
essentially no different from the Paris Montesquieu had celebrated. Rousseau 
did not call attention to new facts, but rather examined the acknowledged 
facts of metropolitan life from a radically new perspective." 52 The 'radical 
new perspective' essentially consists of Rousseau's concept of alienation - in 
particular self-alienation - the conclusions that Rousseau draws from the fact 
of alienation and the solutions he is forced to proffer because of it. He was 
not, of course, entirely alone in seeing man as alienated (Pascal, for 
instance, also believed that) but he ~virtually a lone voice in saying 
that this alienation was curable, and in trying to show how. 
Essentially Rousseau's argument consists in showing that to dissolve this 
alienation, and to discover and adhere to his true nature man must 'order 
himself in relation to the whole cosmic order' (i.e. that order ordained by 
God), 53 rather than attempting to bend the universe to his will. Rousseau 
believed that there are some universally applicable truths "admitted by all 
times, all sages, recognized by every nation and engraved in the human heart 
in indelible characters." 54 Now, as I have already indicated, to a certain 
extent mainstream Enlightenment thinkers also believed this, but Rousseau's 
concept of man's nature is so different from theirs that the role this 
belief plays in his political thought becomes equally different. 
When man passes from the state of nature to civil society, Rousseau argues, 
justice is substituted for instinct and thus morality enters man's nature. 
"It is then only, with the voice of duty succeeding physical impulse and 
right succeeding desire, that man who has, up to then, thought of himself 
alone, finds himself compelled to act on other principles and to consult his 
reason before he listens to his inclinations."55 It is this prospect that 
brings forth man's greatest opportunity and (at the same time) greatest 
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danger - "his faculties are so ennobled" says Rousseau, "that if the abuse 
of his new condition did not often degrade him below the one from which he 
emerged he would endlessly bless the happy moment that tore him from it 
forever, and which, in place of a stupid and narrow animal, made him a 
man." 
56 
Of course, Rousseau's concept is that, at present at least, the 'new 
condition is abused but man can remedy that if he wishes to, and Emile and 
Du Contrat Social are Rousseau's attempt to point the way. In Emile the 
stoic tag 'live according to nature' is wedded to human educational 
development, and in Du Contrat Social it is used to help set up a state that 
will permit the truly 'educated' man to live a moral life. 
This transition is the centrepiece of Rousseau's moral theory and the arena 
of his greatest clash with the other philosophes. His political theory, 
somewhat relativistic like theirs as far as forms of government were 
concerned, was in one vital respect different. For Rousseau, the citizen 
must be 'ruler and ruled', 'law giver and subject' 57 , and one means of 
achieving this was the 'general will'. This concept, with all its 
ambiguity, is indicative of the difference upheld in Rousseau's view of 
political society, when contrasted with (say) Montesquieu's, Voltaire's 
or Diderot's. The 'general will' is a result of what Gay has called 
Rousseau's hunger for Community' 58 , and this, of course, has its source 
in Rousseau's view of alienation. For alienation to be avoided, the 
social structure must be such that all individuals rule themselves at the 
same time as they rule others for "the natural man exists entirely for 
himself. He is the numerical, the whole, he enters into relations only 
with himself or with men like him. The citizen is only the numerator of 
a fraction whose value depends on the denominator, his value depends on 
the whole." 59 The conversion of 'natural men' into 'citizens' is what 
the 'general will' is designed to accomplish, and despite all Rousseau's 
protestations that freedom was the most important thing for him, it is 
this concept more than any other that has allowed his opponents to call 
him a totalitarian. In my view, however, those who do so misread him. 
It is true that in an unreformed society, compulsion (by a supreme 
legislator) would be occasionally necessary, but the important point is 
that the institutions of Du Contrat Social are meant to apply chiefly to 
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a society of individuals educated as Emile was. Rousseau is no 
totalitarian because (like the good disciple of Montesquieu he once was 
and, in part remained to the end) man does have 'inalienable rights', if 
they are understood correctly. As John Plamenatz has said "In Rousseau's 
State nobody can ever speak for the people except the people, and even 
they are sovereign only as an assembly of equals whose every member has 
the right against all others that they shall not so act as to make his 
opinion count for nothing. This idea may be unattainable, but it is not 
totalitarian." 60 
Rousseau, then, takes a view of man which is radically different from his 
fellow philosophes and bases a political theory on it, which has equally 
radical implications. He was not a typical philosophe but then, as Gay 
h "tt h t t . 1 th" 61 d h" k t as wrl en, e was no a yplca any lng an lS wor represen s a 
powerful, if lonely, voice in the Enlightenment's view of politics, 
looking back to Plato and forward to political problems that were only to 
come into full focus after the Enlightenment had waned and its other 
champions were ignored or derided. Yet in important respects, the political 
thought of the Enlightenment includes Rousseau as a characteristic exemplar, 
as it does Montesquieu~ and if Montesquieu was the most influential 18th 
Century writer for the 18th Century, certainly as far as political thought 
is concerned, Rousseau bids fair to being its most influential writer for 
the 19th and 20th Centuries. As Ernst Cassirer has said "in (this) clash 
of doctrines ..... and in Rousseau's passionate quarrel with his epoch, the 
inner spiritual unity of the age appears once more in a new light. 
Rousseau is a true son of the Enlightenment even when he attacks it ...... . 
(he) did not question the world of the Enlightenment, he only transferred 
its centre of gravity to another position." 62 
IV 
In arguing that there was a mainstream of Enlightenment thought about 
politics, represented at its best by Montesquieu (and apparent in Becceria, 
Voltaire, Diderot and others) and a powerful (but solitary) minor current 
best exemplified by Rousseau, it will be noticed that two figures are, by 
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and large, conspicuous by their absence - David Hume and Immanuel Kant. 
This is not, of course, accidental, I intend to deal with them both at 
some length in a while, but first let me return briefly to the problems 
I outlined at the end of Chapter One. 
Essentially, it will be remembered, these were twofold - first a thesis 
about the nature and effect of the Enlightenment project of finding an 
independent rational justification for 'morality' and secondly, the modern 
renderings (that I have referred to as 'Humpty Dumpty' and the 'Red Queen') 
which - on at least one reading - grew out of t~at failure, in t~e sense that it 
was the collapse of that project that allowed modern trends in moral and political 
philosophy to become intellectually attractive. 
It seems to me that the foregoing casts serious doubts on the view, which 
Macintyre holds (surprisingly for someone so well read in the literature 
of the period) that the philosophes wanted to distinguish "the moral from 
the theological, the legal from the asethetic" and to create an "independent 
rational justification for morality."63 It is true that they were no longer 
prepared to base morality on theological maxims, but it is not the case that 
they 'distinguished' between theology, morality, aesthetics and law, if by 
'distinguished' Macintyre means 'separated'. As my brief overview of both 
main currents of Enlightenment moral and political thought indicate, their 
attitudes were consistent (even when they disagreed with one another) over 
a whole range of topics, and this stemmed from their (generally) common 
philosophical position which in the human sciences created their 'science 
of man'. Nor is it true that any of the thinkers so far discussed have any 
real sense of the 'failure' of the project that Macintyre trumpets. One 
of the thinkers whom he alludes to having realised the thin ice on which 
(according to him) the Enlightenment was skating, is Diderot. Macintyre 
argues, first of all, that "Diderot and Hume very largely share the view 
taken by Kierkegaard" (who, Macintyre alleges, first isolated the 'failure' 
of the Enlightenment) "and Kant of the Content of Morality."64 This is 
simply incorrect. While Diderot certainly shares the general Enlightenment 
view that there are some universally valid norms and that it is the 
business of the'science of man'to lay them bare, it is nonsense to say that 
his view of the 'Content' of Morality is that of a "conventional bourgois 
moralist with as staid a view of mar~iage, of promises, of truth telling 
and of conscientiousness as any adherent of Kantian duty." 65 This, 
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remember, of the man who told Sophie Volland that "I forgive anything that 
66 is inspired by passion", who anticipated Chamfort's cynical definition 
of love as 'nothing but the contact of two epidermises' by calling it 'the 
67 transitory rubbing of two inte~~ines', and whose Suppl~ment au voyage 
de Bo~qeinville posited a revolutionary view of sexual morality very far 
from anything Kant was likely to approve of. 
Macintyre attempts to defuse criticism at this point by arguing that in the 
Supplement Diderot tries to distinguish "between these desires which are 
natural to man - the desires obeyed by the imaginary Polynesians of his 
narrative - and those artificially formed, and corrupted desires which 
civilization breeds in us. But, in the very act of making this distinction 
he undermines his own attempt to find a basis for morality in human 
physiological nature. For he himself is forced to find grounds for 
discriminating between desires (and) ..... in Le Neveu de Rameau he forces 
himself to recognize that there are · rival and incompatible desires and 
rival· and incompatible orderings of desire." 68 
~ Unfortunately, this is too simplistic a reading of both the Supplement and 
Le Neveu de Rameau. The latter, to begin with, is a much more complicated 
dialogue than Macintyre seems to believe. He says, for example, that "in 
Le Neveu de Rameau, the 'moi', the philosophe with whom the older Diderot 
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so clearly identifies himself,is a conventional bourgois moralist" (my 
emphasis). Now it is true that, insofar as either of the speakers in the 
Dialogue is Diderot, it is the 'moi', but the point of the dialogue is that 
Diderot is exploring two positions, distant yet related, opposed yet in a 
subtle way parasitic one upon the other. His model here, is a satire of 
Horace, where Davus, one of Horace's slaves, is the Rameau figure. It is 
instructive, in fact, to compare the two dialogues - for Diderot's is by 
far the more balanced of the two. Rameau is given less to say than Davus, 
the 'moi' more than Horace, but the success of the dialogue is the dramatic 
fusion between the two, and even the 'moi' is scarcely a 'conventional 
bourgois moralist.' Diderot's 'moi' (where he is most like Diderot) is a 
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stoic, but a se~sual one. 
There is another point here. Macintyre, it seems, is attempting to have his 
cake and eat it. For you cannot, on the one hand,, argue that Diderot was a 
'conventional bourgois moralist' who believed in marriage, truth-telling and 
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so on, and at the same time argue that he recognized that there were 'rival 
and incompatible desires and ·rival and incompatible orderings of desire'. 
Either he is a moral relativist or he is not. Macintyre is suggesting, of 
course, that Diderot is effectively claiming what Isaiah Berlin once alleged 
Machiavelli claimed - that morality was simply a quagmire of competing value 
systems and all we can do is to choose our side and stand to our arms. 71 In 
other words that he is recognizing that what the Enlightenment is trying to 
do cannot be done, and collapsing into 'emotivism' as a result. 
My argument earlier, however, and my additional points here, suggest on the 
contrary that Diderot, as far as morality and politics are concerned, stood 
firmly in the mainstream of the Enlightenment, in believing (in Cassirer's 
words) that, "(the) belief in the immutable moral nature of man, and in a 
firm principle of justice arising from this nature remains unshakeable." 72 
All of his works show this, from the Encyclopaedie to Le Neveu de Rameau and 
" La Reve D'Alambert. He is, by turns, a determinist, a relativist and a 
materialist, he traverses the whole way from an a priori to a utilitarian 
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foundation for ethics, but in his ethics he remains an ethical naturalist 
of a somewhat peculiar sort (and this is the real message of the Supplement)-
"the man who despises the pleasures of the senses", he once wrote to the 
Princess of Nassau - Saarbruck "is either a lying hypocrite or a crippled 
creature, but the man who prefers a voluptuous sensation to consciousness 
of a good condition is a diseased creature." 74 
MacLntyre then, fails to carry his point as far as Diderot is concerned and 
(by extension )more broadly, in that in no sense did the mainstream 
Enlightenment feel that it had failed. At a more general level, however, he 
has a point in that these ways of thinking were new and did alter the 
philosophical and general cultural perceptions of the age (though not 
necessarily in the way Macintyre thinks). In Chapter Six I shall be taking 
this up in greater detail. The Enlightenment's 'reconstruction' of the old 
Platonic question of 'might and right' is just that - i.e. a 'reconstruction'-
but it dramatically shifts the ground of philosophical discussion of politics. 
To show how this is so in detail, is part of my reason for discussing Hume 
and Kant in my next two chapters, but first I want to make a few more 
general remarks. 
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For the philosophers of the Vienna Circle (and other fellow travellers and 
occasional confreres) the Enlightenment in general (and Hume in particular) 
semed a very inviting parallel. It too, they ar~ued, had been hostile to 
metaphysics and 'system building'; it too had been empirical, critical and had 
tried to use scientific method in philosophy; it too was concerned to 
describe, not prescribe. For the same reasons, the empirical tradition in 
British philosophy - represented by the analytical philosophers (excepting 
the early Wittgenstein) laid claim to the two pi1ilosophers w:1o most clearly, 
they felt, represented their activities in traditional philosophy - Locke 
and Hume. One was, with Newton, the great forerunner and folk-hero of the 
Enlightenment, the other its most subtle and important philosophical 
representative (or so the argument went). 75 
It will by now be obvious, I hope, that this view is a serious misreading 
of the Enlightenment's general approach, and that for the Enlightenment, 
all philosophy could have profoundly practical implications. Indeed, 
virtually all the work of the Enlightenment in literature, aesthetics, 
religion, law,political economy or philosophy (strictly so-called) was 
'political' in the sense that the implications of accepting it would (and 
did) mean profound social and political changes. 
The Enlightenment's 'science of man' (whether it was Montesquieu's or 
Rousseau's) was intended to have practical implications of the most direct 
kind; this much seems certain. It would, therefore, be interesting to glance 
bi~iefly at the two most important political events of the second i1alf of the 
eighteenth century which, if the Enlightenment had succeeded, should have 
been influenced by it. 
Thesetwo events are, of course, the American and French Revolutions, and 
the fact that both were profoundly affected by the literature of the 
Enlightenment is now, I think, established beyond any real doubt. 76 The 
question remains, however, exactly what was the influence? More 
specifically (and more germane to my purpose) can this relationship be said 
to be symptomatic of the Enlightenment's view of the effect of philosophy on 
politics? And how far can it be said to be a distinct view of the 
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relationship? If we can answer these two questions positively, we can then 
pass on to look at some of the arguments that chiefly sustain this view of 
the relationship, and then see how far these arguments bear out - or not -
the views of Macintyre on the one hand, and of the 'Humpty Dumpty' and 'Red 
Queen' theorists on the other. 
What then, of America? As J.R. Pole has pointed out, "The American context 
for the reception of Enlightenment ideas was not only a natural environment 
very different from - and much emptier than - Europe's, nor merely a context 
of particular clusters of community in that environment. It was also a 
specific context of political and ecclesiastical institutions." 77 He adds 
that these institutions, creations of the seventeenth, not the eighteenth 
century, were modelled on precisely these same elements of British 
government which so excited the admiration of the philosophes. These 
considerations meant that the Enlightenment in America did have, in certain 
respects, what we might term a different texture than in Europe, and 
particularly in France. It is this, in part, which bear's out May's view 
that the Enlightenment in America has been seen too often as merely a 
European idea transplanted to America - that it has been (in his word) 
'homogenized' too often, and he also rightly stresses the role of religion 
in America, (very different from the role it played in Europe). 
Too much, however, should not be made of this. American philosophes shared 
the general approach of their European coevals. The emphasis on nature -
seen in different guises in Montesquieu, Diderot and Rousseau (to say 
nothing of Hume) - is present and observable in the American Enlightenment, 
and its choice of heroes - Bacon, Locke and Newton - are t~1e familin•· (indeed 
inevitable) trio. 78 All the leading figures of the Revolution were steeped 
in the literature, language, manners and style of the European 
Enlightenment. 79 
Of the European philosophes Montesquieu was (again) overwhelmingly the most 
influential. Members of the Scottish Enlightenment - especially Adam 
Ferguson - were also greatly admired. There are also echoes of Addison and 
Steele, of Voltaire and of Hume in the writings of Jefferson, Madison 
Hamilton and Adams. 80 In Madison's grandiloquent language the fourteenth 
Federalist announced in ringing and uncomprising prose the project of the 
American republic and, in unmistakable terms, nailed the flag of the 
Enlightenment to its masthead:-
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"Is it not to the Glory of the people of America that, whilst they have paid 
a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have 
not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to 
overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their 
situation and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly spirit, 
posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the example 
of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favour of 
private rights and public happiness." 81 
Here are all the hallmarks of the Enlightenment - veneration for antiquity, 
(but an antiquity recast to 'recapture its essence' for their own 
cultural milieux as Cassirer suggested); trust in experience; a critical 
regard for others' opinions and other solutions, and a belief in individual 
rights and social welfare. To be sure, there was added to it a self-
confidence, almost an arrogance that is absent from the earlier writings 
of the Enlightenment. It is a self-confidence mirrored by that of the early 
writings of (for example) Condorcet, before the terror had darkened his 
vision; the self-confidence of the representative of an intellectual movement 
whose era is moving the way he wants and expects. As a contemporary said, 
"The researches of the human mind after social h01.ppine.ss have been carried to 
a great extent, the treasures of knowledge acquired by the labours of the 
philosophers, sages and legislators through a long succession of years are 
laid open for our use, and their collected wisdom may be happily applied in 
82 the establishment of our forms of government." This is a characteristic 
piece of Enlightenment rhetoric; in their various ways, Montesquieu, 
Diderot, Voltaire, even Hume and Kant, said or implied similar things, but 
it was not a philosophe who said it; when George Washington could speak thus, 
(as Gay has said) "who could deny that the labours of the philosophes had 
entered the mainstream of eighteenth century life." 83 
It is not necessary to delve too far into the debates over the character of 
the Enlightenment in America, but it is worth recalling briefly May's 
division of the Enlightenment into four contrasting phases, and his 
characterization of certain cardinal features of the pre-Revolutionary 
American Enlightenment as representative of what he calls the 'Moderate 
Enlightenment'. 84 This view of the Enlightenment stresses its emphasis 
on harmony and order through knowledge of nature, (though all four phases 
are linked by the same element Cassirer placed such emphasis on in his 
general study of the Enlightenment: Reason). It is the character of the 
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Enlightenment best represented (again) by Montesquieu in Europe, and it is 
no accident that it was Montesquieu who was far and away the most 
influential philosophe in America. The "social and political assumptions 
of the 'Moderate Enlightenment' in America were, argues Pole, "deeply 
Conservative. Intellectually it implies that all the structural facts we 
need to know are known, so that when new ones are discovered they will 
85 
merely fill gaps in an existing scheme of knowledge." This analysis 
can be wedded to Morton White's 86 to suggest a very obvious congruity 
between the philosophical assumptions of the Enlightenment and its political 
pronouncements and actions. White's argument is that Jefferson and the 
drafters of the Declaration of Independence used a philosophical concept 
('self-evidence') with a long history (White traces it back to Aquinas) and 
conservative implications. 'Self-evidence' for Jefferson, as for Locke, 
(argues White) did not necessarily mean evident to everybody; only evident 
to those who understood the essence of the category which was self-evident. 
Thus, "we hold these truths to be self-evident" can be read as holding to a 
tradition of elite leadership (of those who did understand the essence of 
the truths concerned), which is fundamentally conservative. Other aspects 
of Enlightenment thought - in particular its emphasis on education and its 
basic optimism - may have led Jefferson towards a more egalitarian conception 
(at least this is what Pole suggests) of differential endowment and, 
therefore, to favour a more 'democratic' political order; Pole concluding 
that "to democratize epistemology is a decisive step towards democratizing 
society." 87 Other, more peripheral concerns of the European Enlightenment 
also had important influences in America. The emphasis placed on collective 
values and 'republican virtue' by Adam Ferguson, for example, was obviously 
of great interest to a fledgeling republic and, as a similar emphasis is 
seen in many writers of the Scottish Enlightenment (Hutcheson, Reid and 
even the early Adam Smith) it is no surprise to find them also widely read. 
Viner's famous remark that "Eighteenth Century ethics was, and was 
proclaimed as being, social ethics" 88 is certainly true of America! 
All these characterisations of the American Enlightenment show then, that, 
in general - as a cultural matrix, as it were - the Enlightenment's views 
on politics were widely influential in the period of the Revolution, and 
that - on a more specific point - the Enlightenment's philosophical views 
shaped to a certain extent, its political approach. This, of course, begs 
a question: what counts as a 'philosophical' view, and I shall come back 
to this in a moment, but first, let me turn ~o France. 
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Norman Hampson has rightly stressed that "To ask what relationship, if 
any, linked the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, is a legitimate 
question -provided one does not expect the answer to be either scientific 
or simple." 89 Having just looked at the tangled skein of the 
Enlightenment's relationship with the American Revolution, it is not likely 
that we would expect the answer to be either. 
Of course, any attempt to assess the importance of an intellectual movement 
in practical affairs (particularly one as diverse as the Enlightenment) is 
bound to be extraordinarily difficult, but again (as with America) I want 
to look and see how the relationship between philosophy and politics is 
mirrored in the relationship between the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution. 
It is, of course, a well-known thesis that the Enlightenment and the 
Revolution stand as cause and effect - in Taine's picturesque phrase "When 
we see a man ...... apparently sound and of peaceful habits drink eagerly 
of a new liquor, then suddenly fall to the ground, foaming at the mouth .. 
....... we have no hesitation in supposing that in the pleasant draught 
there was some dangerous ingredient."90 More recent Scholarship has amply 
demonstrated the falsity of this view, but there is at least a grain of 
truth in it. The Enlightenment did not cause the Revolution, but (largely 
by chance) the events of the revolution gave political power and influence 
to the men who were likely to have been most influenced by it. 91 Again, 
in the tracts of the revolution the influence of Montesquieu is strong, and 
active in the first phase of the revolution is Condorcet, on whose role -
as last standard bearer of the mainstream Enlightenment in France - we have 
already had reason to comment. 
Increasingly, however, the leading Revolutionaries saw their revolution in 
Messianic terms,and gradually the dominant intellectual influence became 
Rousseau. The complexities and ambiguities in Rousseau's thought - still 
of the EnlightenmentWc~u originally articulated- permitted the pressures 
of war and revolution to lead the Revolutionaries into paths that led them 
away from the critical, tolerant values of the mainstream Enlightenment. 
Of course, one cannot (and should not) attempt a causal analysis of the 
terror by looking at Du Contrat Social, but nonetheless, Rousseau's 
influence on the way the Revolutionaries perceived what they were doing -
- 73 -
and consequently on how they did it - is marked and, I think, undeniable. 
His influence on what was, perhaps, the most influential revolutionary 
tract, Sieyes' Qu'est cegue les Tiers Etat? is great (especially on 
Sieyes' approach to sovereignty and the General will), and the speeches of 
St. Just and Robespierre echo with Rousseauean phrases and ideas. The 
emphasis on collective values (and republican virtue) seen in the American 
Revolution is present here also - only in its Rousseauean formulation, not 
its Fergusonean one. 
There were, of course, many other points of contact - the attempt to reform 
the French legal system along the lines suggested in Becceria's Dei Delitti; 
the campaign against the slave trade; the initial proclamation of religious 
toleration. These influences - representative of the mainstream 
Enlightenment - grew less as the revolution progressed, and its international 
situation grew graver but they were there; Rousseau's influence, of 
course, shifted the emphasis, but his reflections in many respects helped to 
set the parameters of debate for the more radical revolutionaries and, as 
Cobban has said:-
"Unless by an effort of the imagination we can establish some sort of 
empathy with men who felt themselves in the front rank of (an) Homeric battle, 
we shall never understand very much about the Revolution." 92 
Quite so: and it was Rousseau (and, therefore, the powerful undercurrent 
of the Enlightenment) who helped to create the atmosphere of 'Homeric 
struggle' that they felt, and so influenced how they conducted it. 
VI 
There is, then, little doubt both that the philosophes intended their 
writings to have practical effect that that they did have such an effect -
though assuredly not always what the philosophes may have intended. Pace 
Macintyre, there is little evidence in any of this that the Enlightenment 
thinkers felt that their project had failed; indeed, on the contrary, the 
later writings of the Enlightenment radiate a self-confidence that 
bespeaks success not failure and to which Condorcet's Esguisse and the 
Federalist papers both bear eloquent testimony. 
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Furthermore, in the writings of the Enlightenment, we see a mingling of 
the literary, political, economic, historical and philosophical that all 
reinforce each other. In Montesquieu, Diderot and Rousseau, for example, 
we see social science, philosophy and political theory welded together 
into an indissoluble whole. This is not to say, of course, that they did 
not sometimes do what they said they were not doing, or allow confusions 
to creep into their works, but it is to say that arguments first advanced 
as philosophy led to others in politics, economics, history and so on -
and the process was not all one way. The philosophes were concerned with 
Science and with laying bare the nature of things - placing man in Society 
as D'Alambert said. These led to their views of what should be done - both 
by way of constructing (or reconstructing) institutions (hence Du Contrat 
Social) and also in terms of personal behaviour (hence Supplement au 
Voyage de Bougainville). 
Now, of course, those theorists that I referred to in Chapter One as holding 
the 'Humpty Dumpty' and 'Red Queen' view of political theory would argue 
that though the philosophes may have done this, if and when they did they 
were simply not doing philosophy. They were being 'ideological', or perhaps 
aesthetic, but not philosophical, because to be philosophical means not 
doing (as philosophy) the kind of thing that Helvetius, Montesquieu, 
Rousseau, Diderot, D'Alambert, Buffon (and a host of others) all did. 
This, naturally, brings us to the question of what constitutes a 
'philosophical approach' to politics - and how far a truly philosophical 
approach may be said to have (and expect to have) practical implications. 
If it cannot, then (at the very least) the methodology of the 
Enlightenment is radically misconceived and so - as a result - are a large 
number of its conclusions and apparatus. 
It is this question that my next three chapters intend to examine, but it 
is worthwhile to pause for a moment to see what the crucial issues here 
are. As I said at the beginning of this chapter, I have discussed the 
central assumptions of Enlightenment political thought in order to pave the 
way for a discussion of Hume and Kant. This is for a number of reasons, 
which I shall here enumerate. 
Their moral and political philosophy has ~e~eived incr~&Gi~g acrutiny 
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93 (until recently Hume's more than Kant's). A number of extremely prominent 
modern philosophers ascribe to one or the other, the foundations of their 
views, or attempt to reinterpret their theories for a 'modern' (and 
allegedly more sophisticated) audience. 94 One modern Hume scholar has gone 
so far as to say that "an exhaustive guide to discussions of Hume's problems 
and their descendants as they appear in 20th Century philosophy would be an 
almost exhaustive guide to 20th Century philosophy", 95 and the author of a recent 
history of philosophy in English credits Kant with inducing far-reaching 
changes in the emphasis placed on a whole host of philosophical topics - in 
particular epistemological topics- by subsequent philosophers. 96 
Their influence, then, is and has been immense and has been as great, if not 
greater, on those philosophers disposed to a 'Humpty Dumpty' or 'Red Queen' 
view of the world, as on others. Yet the very fact that Kant's 
transcendentalism or Hume's psychology need - so some of their interpreters 
feel - to be radically restructured or even replaced, suggests that there 
is somethingin their theories which analytical philosophers, and those 
close to them, are suspicious of. 
Interestingly, approaching the same question from a different angle, a number 
of historians of ideas have questioned the value of the Humean or Kantian 
political or social philosophy outside their own time or place. Duncan Forbes, 
author of one of the best modern interpretations of Hume's political thought, 
has suggested this, and John Dunn and Ralph Walker have both (in different 
ways) suggested it of Kant. 97 The various formulations of this argument (and 
I have some sympathy with it) I shall return to in detail in Chapter Six, 
but it is important as a first step to see how Kant and Hume viewed the 
relationship themselves. 
It is this that I attempt in the next two chapters and it is for this reason 
that I have sketched (in a fairly detailed way) the intellectual currents of 
the time. It will be my argument that, to a certain extent, Kant subsumed 
elements of both the mainstream and minor currents of Enlightenment moral 
and political thought in his own political theory and, of course, for this 
to be valid, I have to make clear what those currents were. Cassirer has 
called Kant's philosophy "that edifice which overshadows the Enlightenment 
even while it represents its final glorification."98 I think that is going 
too far, but he is right (or so I shall argue) in suggesting that Kant's 
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philosophy attempts a final re-working of many of the central currents of 
Enlightenment political thought centering on its concept of reason and 
that he does so at a level of philosophical sophistication unmatched by 
earlier writers, with one exception, that of David Hume. For Gay, Hume is 
the "complete modern pagan ........... the most isolated and the most 
representative of philosophes; he was simply the purest, most modern specimen 
of the little flock." 99 I shall argue that in this assessment Gay is half 
right and half wrong. Right, in that Hume is the most isolated of the 
philosophes, wrong in suggesting that the reason for this was that he was 
simply the 'purest' of the flock, or its most 'modern' member. My argument 
is that Hume's philosophy - in his moral and political as much as his 
general philosophy - exhibits the critical, sceptical face of the 
Enlightenment to an unprecedented degree, but that this theory, too, as much 
as Kant's, was intended to have practical implications and to affect the way 
l . d t 100 we lVe an ac . 
These two theories, then, represent two key elements in the Enlightenment's 
concept of the relationship of theory to practise, philosophy to politics -
reason and scepticism. In examining them, some of the crucial arguments -
briefly observed in the reasonings of the 'Humpty Dumpty' and 'Red Queen' 
theorists in Chapter One - will be available for further examination, but 
Hume and Kant must (like any other philophers) be examined first in the 
context of their time. Having looked at their arguments, I then want, in 
Chapter Six , to look at some recent and more sophisticated versions of the 
'Humpty Dumpty'/'Red Queen' approach, and to examine its methodological 
underpinnings in some detail. At that point in the final chapter, I 
shall discuss how consideration of the arguments of Hume and Kant, in their 
contextual setting, throw new and revealing light on how we can conceive of 
the relationship of philosophy and politics and, therefore, show how 'Humpty 
Dumpty' and the 'Red Queen' can finally be laid to rest. 
CHAPTER 4 
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KANT: Politics and the Claims of Reason 
"Reason showed freedom to be conceivable only 
in o~der that its supposed impossibility might 
not endanger Reasons very being and plunge it 
into an abyss of Scepticism". 
Kant: 
Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. 
"The Rights of man must be held sacred however 
great a sacrifice the ruling power may have 
to make. There can be no half-measures here; 
it is no use devising hybrid solutions such 
as a pragmatically conditioned right halfway 
between right and utility. For all politics 
must bend the knee before right". 
Kant: 
Zum Eiwigen Frieden. 
I have already quoted Ernst Cassirer's opinion that Kant's 
philosophy "is an edifice which overshadows the Enlightenment 
even while it represents its final glorification" 1 and have 
indicated that, whilst a laudatory oversimplification, it contains 
an element of truth. My aim in this chapter is to present an 
interpretation of Kant's view of the relationship of philosophy to 
politics which will illustrate how far we might accept Cassirer's 
dictum (and how far not) and what the significance of this is 
for Enlightenment thought in general and my special concern in 
particular. 
I 
In general, over the last few years, Kant's political philosophy 
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h 1 1 b . d 2 1 as s ow y ecome recogn1se not on y as worthy of study in its 
own right, but also as important for an understanding of the 
critical philosophy as a whole. However, as it is necessary for 
my argument, I will briefly sketch the outlines of Kant's political 
theory and it seems appropriate to begin, therefore, by quoting 
Kant himself on the relation of theory and practice, as expressed 
in his essay 'Uber dem Gemeinspruch: Das Mag in der Theorie 
Richtig Sein, taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis' (here referred to 
as 'The Essay on Theory and Practice'). "A collection of rules" 
he writes "is termed a theory if the rules concerned are 
envisaged as principles of a fairly general nature, and if they are 
abstracted from numerous conditions which, nonetheless, necessarily 
influence their practical application. Conversely, not all 
activities are called practice, but only those realizations of a 
particular purpose which are considered to comply with certain 
generally concerned principles of procedure" (KPW 61/ AA VIII 273). 
This passage is illuminating in a number of ways. It first 
of all indicates that Kant held the worlds of theory and practice 
to be distinct though inter-connected. Other philosophers 
have done this, of course, but Kant is unique in the priority he 
assigns to the two worlds. As Howard Williams says "What is 
unique about the distinction Kant draws between theoretical reason 
and practical reason is that he places the practical world above 
the theoretical world" 3 . This priority of practical reason is 
associated with the structure of the first Critique (to which I 
shall return) but it shows, clearly enough, the importance of 
the practical for Kant. Against those like Aristotle (and Hume) 
who would take men as they are in practical reasoning, Kant says 
that it is crucial in ethical and political theory to take men 
as they should be. 
The passage also suggests, of course, that theoretical and 
practical reasoning can be conjoined because, as Lewis White Beck 
4 
suggests , both are trying to do the same thing i.e., impose 
order on the chaos of our experience. In its own terms, however, 
theoretical reason is unable to do this (it cannot know enough), 
but practical reason can: it "follows our demands for unconditional 
conditions for every motive and for the unity of motives in a 
pattern of life" and is "an immanent reason actually producing 
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the objects to correspond to its ideas" 5 . 
This is its role in politics as it is, more generally, in 
morality. "Nowhere" Kant writes in the section on politics of 
his Theory and Practice essay "does practice so readily bypass all 
pure principles of reason and treat theory so presumptuously as 
in the question of what is needed for a good political 
constitution ...... but" he argues "reason provides a concept 
which we express by the words political right. And this concept 
has binding force for human beings who coexist in a state of 
antagonism produced by their natural freedom, so that it has an 
objective practical reality irrespective of the good or ill it 
may produce (for these can only be known by experience). Thus 
it is based on a priori principles, for experience cannot provide 
knowledge of what is right and there is a theory of political 
right to which practice must conform before it can be valid" 
(KPW 86/AA VIII 306). If we examine this statement more 
closely and see how Kant deploys the sense of it in his treatment 
of politics, the exact nature of the relationship between philosophy 
and practical (especially political) activity in his thought becomes 
strikingly apparent. This problem is, however, made more difficult 
by the wide variety of views held by scholars about Kant's 
political thought. For some (like Reiss, Williams or Saner) "he 
ought to be ranked among the leading political thinkers of all 
times" 6 , for his political thought, in some sense, is "the heart 
of his philosophising" 7 , whereas for those like Dunn and Walker 
"Kant's domestic politics seem merely archaic and fusty" 8 My 
sympathies lie, quite emphatically, with the former school 
of thought but the permutations of their rival arguments 
do not, for the present, concern me, though I shall have 
something to say about it at the end of this chapter. 
For Kant the central question of the political relationship 
is his account of the question of political obligation. In 
considering his views on the relationship of philosophy to 
politics this is a doubly effective place to start for it 
presents us with the stark picture of a man whose political 
thought is, in its general tenor, unimpeachably liberal, 
own 
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completely forbidding the act of rebellion in theory, while at 
the same time welcoming certain acts of rebellion in practice 
(i.e., the French and American Revolutions). Does this show 
Kant's account of the necessary relationship between theory and 
practice to be incoherent? Kant is certainly singularly unambiguous 
in his denial of a right to rebellion: "All resistance against 
the supreme legislative power" he writes in the essay on Theory 
and Practice "all incitement of the subjects to violent expressions 
of discontent, all defiance which breaks out into rebellion, is the 
greatest and most punishable crime in a Commonwealth, ·for it destroys 
its very foundations. This prohibition is absolute". (my 
emphasis). (KPW 81/AA VIII 299). This prohibition sits 
uneasily in the rest of Kant's political thinking which has, as I 
shall elaborate later, 'Freedom' as its centrepiece. As Kant 
argues in his essay Was ist Aufklarung "all that is needed is 
Freedom and the freedom in question is the most innocuous form 
of all - freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters". 
(KPW 55/AA VIII 36). A deeper look even here, however, reveals 
qualifications, as in Kant's quoting twice, with seeming approval, 
Frederick the Great's saying "Argue as much as you like, and 
about whatever you like, but obey!" (KPW 55 and 59) also, despite 
his own injunction in the same essay that "matters of religion 
(are) the focal point of enlightenment" (KPW 59), it is seen in 
his accepting the decision of Frederick that he should never 
write again on the subject of religion after the publication of 
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Blossen Vernunft, in 1793. 
Reiss, rightly I think, suggests that Kant was not easy in his 
own mind about this and quotes an unpublished note of Kant's. 
"Repudiation and denial of one's inner conviction are evil" it reads, 
"but silence in a case like the present one is the duty of a subject 
and while all that one says must be true, this does not mean that 
it is one's duty to speak out the whole truth in public". 
(KPW 2/~ XII 406). This unpublished note is, I think, very 
interesting and revealing, not only about Kant's attitude to that 
particular case but also for interpretation of his central moral 
doctrines - but I shall return to this later. However, it is 
surely apparent from the above that Kant's political thinking does 
have seeming inconsistencies in it. How might we reconcile them? 
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To do this we need to go back to the very beginnings of the 
critical philosophy and remind ourselves that even the great 
edifice of the first Critique, predominantly concerned as it 
is with the problems of speculative reason, has a practical 
purpose too:-
"So far .... as our Critique limits speculative 
reason it is indeed negative; but since it thereby 
removes an obstacle which stands in the way of the 
employment of practical reason .... it has .... a 
positive and very important use immediately we are 
convinced that there is an absolutely necessary 
practical employment of pure reason - the moral -
in which it inevitably goes beyond the limits of 
sensibility". (CPR (B) 26-27/AA III 16). 
Kant's whole moral philosophy rests on the distinction between 
the sensible world and the moral world (to use his own terminology 
between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds) for which the Critique 
of Pure Reason was intended to lay the most important conceptual 
foundations. Structuring the world as he does, therefore, moral 
principles must be inviolable from empirical attack:-
"A law, if it is to hold morally (i.e., as a ground 
of obligation), must imply absolute necessity .... the 
ground of obligation .... must not be sought in the 
nature of man or in the circumstances in which he is 
placed but sought a priori solely in the concepts 
of pure reason". ( FMM p. 5-6/ AA IV 389). 
The above quotation also introduces the predominant element in 
Kant's moral theory- the concept of obligation. Now the-
general thrust of Kant's moral theory is well enough known to 
obviate the need for me to outline it here, 9 but it must be seen 
that it rests on the foundations erected in the first Critique -
principally the postulate of freedom enshrined in the third 
antinomy and assumed throughout the rest of his work. 
Kant intended his moral philosophy to be a guide for individual 
moral action and equally his political philosophy is a guide for 
- 82 -
political action. "A state" he says in Der Metaphysik der Sitten 
"is a union of a multitude of men under Laws of Justice. In so 
far as these laws are necessary a priori and follow from the 
concepts of external justice in general .... the form of the state 
is that of a state in general, that is the idea of what a state 
ought to be according to pure principles of justice. This idea 
provides an internal guide and standard for every actual union 
of men in a commonwealth". (MJ p.77/AA VI 313). No clearer 
indication of Kant's belief that philosophy could be a guide to 
political practice could be given. 
Kant's ordering of powers within a state is also relevant here. 
Kant distinguishes between a state of nature, which can include 
societies of sorts, and a state under rightful laws, which is 
out of the state of nature. What makes the difference is the 
organisation of the three branches of government - sovereign, 
executive and judicial - and Kant makes quite clear, as Peter 
Nicholson has rightly pointed out, 10 that the sovereign- for 
which Nicholson reads the legislative power - is, in fact, supreme. 
It is the sovereign, of course, which passes the laws which 
establish the framework of civil society. For Kant this means 
what he calls 'Public Law', for he argues that there are two 
types of law; natural law (or Private Law) and civil law 
(or Public Law). This division is predicated upon the distinction 
he makes (which I have already remarked upon) between a society 
within a state of nature and one beyond the state of nature. The 
transition from state of nature to civil society is made by 
means of the separation of powers and conceived' through the idea 
of the original contract:-
"All the three authorities .... are necessary to the 
formation of a state .... they embody the relationship 
of a universal suzerain (who, if regarded under the 
laws of freedom, can be none other than the united people) 
to the aggregate of individuals regarded as subjects. 
That is the relationship of commander (imperans) to 
one who obeys (subditus). The act by means of 
which the people constitute themselves a state is 
the original contract. More properly it is the 
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idea of that act that alone enables us to conceive of 
the legitimacy of the state". (MJ 80/AA VI 315). 
Now Kant, of course, does not consider this to have been a 
necessary historical process (though approximations to it may 
have occured in the past). It is a conceptual device, but a 
conceptual device of great practical importance for it is the apex 
of Kant's political thought and the point at which his moral and 
political philosophies converge and, therefore, the point at which 
the unity of his philosophical enterprise is most apparent. 
Let us look at this a little more closely. Kant's denial of 
the right to resist in the essay on theory and practice is 
repeated, with added emphasis, in the first part of the 
Metaphysik der Sitten:-
"There can .... be no legitimate resistance of the people 
to the legislative chief of the state; it is the 
people's duty to endure even the most intolerable abuse 
of supreme authority. The reason for this is that 
resistance to the supreme legislature can itself only be 
unlawful, indeed it must be conceived as destroying the 
entire lawful constitution because, in order for it 
to be authorised, there would have to be a public law 
that would permit the resistance". (MJ 86/AA VI320). 
Indeed, Kant goes even further:-
"Moreover, if a revolution has succeeded .... the 
illegitimacy of its beginning and of its success cannot 
free the subjects from being bound to accept the new 
order of things as good citizens". (MJ 89/AA VI 323). 
He concludes, in fact, that - in an almost Hobbesean phrase 
"the sovereign in the state has many rights with respect to the 
subject but no (coercive) duties". (MJ 85/AA VX 319). 
Kant's reasons for this denial, as the above quotation suggests, 
are rooted in his moral philosophy. For an individual, under 
no matter what provocation, to resist the sovereign is a violation 
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of the moral law, that "I should never act in such a way that 
I could not also will that my maxim should be a universal law". 
(FMM 21/AA IV 402). It is so, for the simple and obvious reason 
that such an act of resistance could not, according to Kant, 
be universalized without destroying the concept of law itself 
and thereby destroying the state. Resistance to the sovereign 
is also (transparently) unlawful - in order for it not to be, 
there would have to be a law authorising it; a ridiculous state 
of affairs which, Kant says, is patently self-contradictory 
as it would imply a power greater than that which is, necessarily, 
the greatest power in the land. Kant's system of duties for the 
individual citizen is based on a second dichotomy. "All legislation" 
argues Kant "consists of two elements: first a law that 
objectively represents the action that is to be done as necessary, 
that is what makes the action a duty; second an incentive 
that subjectively links the ground determinigg ~lll to this 
action with the representation of the law .... therefore" Kant 
continues "all legislation can .... be differentiated with regard 
to the incentives. If legislation makes an action a duty and 
at the same time makes this duty the incentive it is ethical. 
If it does not include the latter condition in the law and 
therefore admits an incentive other than the Idea of duty itself, 
it is juridical The mere agreement or disagreement of an 
action within the law is called legality; but when the Idea 
of duty arising from the law is at the same time the incentive 
of the action, then the agreement is called the morality of the 
action". (MJ 18-19 / AA VI 218-19). 
Kant concludes from all this that "All duties, simply because 
they are duties, belong to Ethics. But their legislation is 
not therefore,always included under ethics: in the case of 
many duties it is quite outside ethics". (MJ 20 /AA VI 220). 
For Kant, therefore, political obligation is both an ethical 
and a juridical duty and thus doubly enjoined on citizens. 
An act of rebellion is wrong because it 'destroys the very 
foundation of a commonwealth': it is also, obviously, illegal. 
Kant offers us, however, a further aspect of the relationship 
between philosophy and practice if we consider briefly the 
remarks he makes about history. It is an over-remarked irony 
- 85 -
in the history of ideas that the same Kant who gave such an 
unambiguous denial of the right to revolt, was a sympathizer 
with the two most successful revolutions of his own time: the 
American and French Revolutions! (H~ine even went so far as 
to call him "the philosopher of the French Revolution"). 
There is only a superficial incongruity here, however, and the 
way it is resolved can be seen in Kant's writings on history 
where his reflections show once again the centrality to his thought 
of the postulate of freedom. As I have already said, in his 
famous essay defining the Enlightenment Kant stated "All that 
is needed is freedom .... freedom to make public use of ones 
reason on all matters". (KPW 55 I AA VIII 36). Of course 
this is not yet achieved (very far from it); "If it is asked 
whether we at present live in an enlightened age the answer is 
no, but we do live in an age of Enlightenment". (KPW 58/AA VIII 40). 
He suggests in the latter part of the essay that eventually 
this gradual accretion of freedom will achieve the end he sets for 
it - enlightenment itself: "mans emergence from his self-incurred 
immaturity". (KPW 54/AA VIII 35). In a paper published the 
same year (1794), Idee zu einer Allgemeinen Geschichte in 
weltburgerlicher Absicht, Kant enlarges upon this theme. He does 
so tentatively, with no great certainty, regarding the enterprise 
chiefly as what a "philosophical mind well acquainted with history" 
(KPW 53/AA VIII 31) might derive from its study but, nonetheless, 
believes that it can "give us some guidance in explaining the 
thoroughly confused interplay of human affairs". (KPW 52/AA VIII 31). 
Kant develops his thesis by arguing first, that all natural 
capacities develop in conformity with some end; secondly, that, 
in man, such capacities as are associated with Reason could be 
developed fully only in the species (not the individual) and 
thirdly, that nature intended man's happiness to be a product 
of his own instinct and reason. With these three observations 
made, Kant argues that the inevitable antagonism within society 
creates "Law governed social order and thus leads to the greatest 
problem for the human species ..... that of attaining a civil 
society which can administer justice universally". (KPW 45/AA 
VIII 22). This state may never come into being, Kant thinks, but 
some approximation to it will. A law-governed relationship between 
states will begin the process, in its turn brought about by the 
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same antagonism that operates in the civil union, "Distress 
(of wars etc.) .... force .... states .... to renounce brutish 
freedom and seek calm and security within a law governed 
constitution". (KPW 48/AA VIII 24). Gradually, as nations 
become more and more interdependant, war will be seen as 
prohibitively expensive and internally too damaging to be considered 
and thus "after many revolutions .... a universal cosmopolitan 
existance will at last be realised as the matrix within which 
all the original capacities of the human race may develop 
The history of the human race .... can be regarded as the 
realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring out an internally -
and for this purpose also externally - perfect constitution 
as the only possible state within which all natural capacities 
of mankind can be developed completely". (KPW 51/50 /AA VIII 28/27). 
Kant's argument in the Idea for a Universal History is, be it 
noted, a purely explanatory one and one aimed (in Kantian terminology) 
at the phenomenal world; it attempts to show how an aim manifestly 
good in the context of Kant's general moral philosophy, can 
(or even will) be achieved. I shall, therefore, call it Kant's 
'phenomenal' teleology. 
There is another side to this teleological approach which 
interconnects both with the empirical, explanatory argument 
outlined above and with the a priori arguments of Kant's moral 
philosophy. This is the approach to teleology found in part ii of 
the Kritik der Urteilskraft. Here, Kant displays precisely what 
it is that, for ~m, makes morality so uniquely important for 
mankind and it is here that Kant's difference from Hume (and 
indeed, from all positivists, materialists, empiricists and sceptics) 
is most obvious. 
"There is nothing in nature" Kant argues (repeating a theme from 
the first Critique) "for which the determining ground present 
in itself would not be always conditioned and this holds not 
merely of external (material) nature but also of internal (thinking) 
nature - it being, of course, understood that I only am considering 
that in myself which is nature". (CJ 285/AA V 435). But 
"a thing that is to exist necessarily on account of its objective 
constitution as the final purpose of an intelligent cause, must 
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be of the kind that, in the order of purposes, it is dependant 
on no further condition than merely its idea". (CJ 285/AA V 435). 
There is only one being in the world "whose causality is 
teleological i.e., directed to purposes and is at the same time 
so constituted that the law according to which they have to 
determine purposes .... is independent of natural conditions and 
yet is itself necessary; the being of this kind is man, but man 
considered as noumenon. The only natural being in which we can 
recognise, on the side of its peculiar constitution, a super 
sensible faculty (freedom) and also the law of causality, together 
with the object which this faculty may propose to itself as highest 
purpose (the highest good in the world"). (CJ 285/!! V 435). 
We can, for the present, ignore the question of how far Kant's 
arguments may be said to be valid or not, in order to see exactly 
what it is he is trying to do. This aspect of Kant's teleology 
(in keeping with the first, I shall call it Kant's 'noumenal' 
teleology) places morality at the heart of human life - he is, 
in effuc~ saying that it is our moral capacity that makes us 
human for it is this that releases us from total servitude 
to nature and thus differentiates us from the other sentient 
aspects of creation. Of course, both aspects of teleology would, 
to Kant,reinforce each other. Phenomenal teleology would help 
individuals to recognise and act upon their moral duty and 
recognition of our final purpose and its character, will encourage 
and speed up the approximation to the 'perfect political 
constitution' Kant thinks must come. 
All the above are, of course, philosophical reflections; coherent 
observations in one of the most far-reaching and complex 
philosophical constructions - yet Kant's moral advice is rooted 
in them and the actions he wishes us to take in both the practical 
and the political worlds are conclusions drawn from his philosophical 
reasonings. Of course, in order to accept them one has to accept 
the system (or at least part of it) but for Kant there can be no 
doubt that philosophical reasoning and practical reasoning - while 
distinct - were complimentary aims of true reason. One can, 
therefore, understand how Kant's explanatory theories could show 
that the French and American Revolutions served good ends according 
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to his moral theory, whilst that self-same moral theory forbade 
the act of revolt. In Kant's view, philosophy is understanding 
the world, and the understanding of ourselves it brings about 
would commend certain actions as good (and therefore to be 
undertaken) and others as evil (and therefore to be refrained 
from). It is, after all, this capacity for reasoned moral 
experience and reflection which makes us distinctively human. 
II 
The above, then, is an outline sketch of how Kant merges his 
general philosophy and his moral and political philosophy. 
There are, of course, a number of problems with this approach 
and in section III of this chapter I shall concentrate on 
potentially the most dangerous (that Kant fails adequately to 
establish the link between his general philosophy and his moral 
theory). For the moment, however, a few points that arise out 
of this analysis deserve closer scrutiny. It will be remembered 
that, according to Gay, "The philosophy of the Enlightenment 
insisted on man's essential autonomy" and we find this feature 
across the board of Enlightenment political thou~ht from 
Montesquieu and Voltaire to Rousseau; but it is nowhere as 
well-deployed or as central as it is in Kant. Kant's moral theory, 
it has been well observed, is essentially expressed in the 
language of duty and "Kant assumed from the first that duty is 
essentially a phenomenon of volition (and) since duty expresses 
a necessary relationship between a moral subject and an object 
of his volition, it represents a necessity of freedom rather 
than of nature" 12 . 
The Enlightenment~ claims for autonomy extended across the boundary 
of morality, of course, (it was precisely this that gave it its 
political force) and Kant's theory, also his denial of the right to 
rebel, far from denying man's essential autonomy is founded upon 
it, but upon man's autonomy considered as a rationally chosen moral 
will. 
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As Schrader points out"Kant's reasoning seems to be that an 
imperative can be no stronger than the end to which it is related. 
If the end is either arbitrary or only contingently necessary, 
the imperative that enjoins us to promote it cannot be 
unconditionally binding". 13 Schrader criticises this on the 
grounds that Kant may have confused the enunciation of commands 
and their acceptance or recognition but, for the moment, this need 
not concern us. What does is the character of Kant's manifestation 
of this aspect of Enlightenment political thought. As Marcuse 
has rightly pointed out "All formulations of Kant's concept of 
right signify a synthesis of opposites: the unity of arbitrary 
will (willkur) and right, freedom and compulsion, the individual 
d h . 1114 an t e commun1ty. His emphasis on the autonomous nature of 
the will, is matched by his insistance on the necessary nature of 
human society and therefore government which coerces individual 
nature. From these two implicitly opposed premises he derives 
his two sets of duties; ethical and juridical. The juridical 
duties are in tune with the categorical imperative (indeed, 
obviously so) but they recognise and cater for (as the categorical 
imperative cannot) the dual, flawed nature of man. 15 
Here, it can be seen that the two main elements of Enlightenment 
thought are combined and synthesized in Kant. What Williams 
calls Kant's 'universalist' approach 16 mirrors, essentially, the 
Rousseauean one, 17 whilst his account of juridical duty has more 
in common with elements of mainstream Enlightenment thought. In 
this sense Kant's view of the autonomous nature of man, though 
absolute, is at home chiefly in the ethical sphere for which the 
autonomy of man in the juridical sphere helps to set the parameters. 
. 18 
Charles Taylor suggests that Kant's theory follows Rousseau's 
specifically in rejecting the mainstream (Taylor calls it 
'naturalistic') Enlightenment's view of freedom and nature. 
"It was Rousseau" he argues "who turned the tables on the 
naturalistic theory. He rehabilitates the distinction between 
virtue and vice ..... the key to vice is other-dependance, a 
failure to be determined by one's own internal purpose and virtue 
is nothing other than the recovery of this self-determination. 
Morality is critical freedom To be virtuous is to be able 
to listen to the inner voice of nature; to be dependant on oneself. 
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It was with Rousseau that (this) important feature of modern 
culture ...... emerges ..... Freedom becomes the central value 
Kant follows Rousseau in offering (a) theory of freedom as 
reconnected to morality ..... (and) the centrepiece of Kant's 
doctrine is the notion of Rationality. The error of the 
naturalistic Enlightenment for Kant is that it sees Rationality as 
having a purely instrumental role". 19 
I think Taylor is right in the sense that it was Rousseau's concern 
with connecting morality and freedom that struck a chord in Kant's 
pietist heart, but wrong in arguing that Kant was as distant as 
Rousseau from the concerns of the mainstream Enlightenment. To 
be sure Kant regarded Reason (as did Rousseau) in a different 
way than Hume - the 'representative' of the mainstream Enlightenment 
that Taylor cites 20 - but, as I shall argue in the next chapter, 
Hume, far from being the quintessential mainstream Enlightenment 
figure (as he is so often held to be and as Taylor assumes), is 
the most radical and subversive of the philosophic flock (with 
the sole exception of Rousseau himself). Kant's dictum, expressed 
memorably in the first Critique, that Reason is like a judge who 
"compels the witnesses to answer questions which he himself has 
formulated" (CPR 20/AA III 16) certainly echoes Rousseau (as 
Taylor justly claims) but does it not also echo Montesquieu who 
'draws his principles from the nature of things' examined by 
h . ? 21 lS reason. 
Taylor is right, though, in seeing Kant's notion of Rationality 
as central to his project. "Reason is given to us" as Kant says 
"as a practical f:1culty i.e., one which is meant to have an 
influence on the will" (FMM 15/AA IV 396). As I have already 
pointed out, for Kant, practical Reason was in a sense superior 
to theoretical Reason as it was determinable in a way the latter 
was not - it could provide what Williams calls "an object for 
• • 11 22 1ts concept1on The conception concerned is, fundamentally, 
a notion of freedom dependent on a conception of rationality. 
According to Taylor, for Kant, rationality imposes obligations 
on us as rational agents "The moral law is thus essentially a 
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law we give to ourselves ..... In Kant's term, the moral will 
is necessarily autonomous. The law it follows is its own; what 
reason and reason alone has dictated to it. And so Kant, like 
Rousseau, makes freedom central to morality". 23 Furthermore, 
this freedom must be seen in a social context. We are free in 
that we stand in a certain kind of moral order - what Kant calls 
'Das Reich der Zwecke' - conceived as "A systematic union 
of rational beings through common objective laws". (FMM 59/AA 
IV 433). As Taylor admits, for Kant this order is an ideal- it 
is not realised on earth - but recognising it is part of being 
free and such recognition means recognising the necessity of our 
social nature. It is this recognition that brings about the 
political realm, for our harmonious social life is impossible 
without it. 
These two notions, rationality and freedom, are of crucial 
importance for Kant's political philosophy- and for his attitude 
towards how philosophy relates to politics. 
This can be best illustrated if we turn briefly to Hans Saner's 
treatment of Kant's political thought in his Widerstreit und 
Einheit: Weger zu Kant's Politischem Denken. According to Saner 
"The circle of problems central to political thought can be 
circumscribed in Kant's phrase 'The way to peace' 'Way to 
peace' is a figure of speech that encompasses the war/peace dualism, 
which in turn points to such other dualisms as repulsion/attraction, 
motion/rest, chaos/order, diversity/unity, difference/identity". 24 
Saner's view is that what this emphasises is the element of 
'conflict' or 'struggle' in Kantian thought and that it identifies 
"the turn from diversity to unity" as the same problem across the 
whole field of Kantian philosophy. 25 
He specifically concentrates on the idea_of 'polemic' _in Kant's 
work and suggests that Kant sees different 'modes' in polemical 
. 26 d1scourse. "To controvert for truth's sake; to dispute for 
27 the sake of being right i.e., superior in argument" he 
quotes Kant as saying, meaning that "A polemic carried on for 
truth's sake would be a controversy, while a dispute would be a 
quarrel sought in order to strengthen one's ego. The aim of 
the first is cognition; the aim of the second, victory. Only 
- 92 -
the first can be truly philosophical; the second is a collective 
term for philosophical perversions" 28 
Saner's conclusion is that we find two basic ideas of polemics 
in Kant - the socratic and the eristic. In Der Streit der 
Fakultaten, Kant calls the distinction one between 'lawful' and 
'unlawful' debates. (AA VII 1-116; see esp. pp 18-30). 
Saner discusses ten Kantian variants of these 'modes of polemical 
29 
combat' , but argues that they all ultimately collapse to the 
two above, each itself subdivided into two forms. "The dichotomies" 
he writes "take their bearings from the will that sets off the 
debate. There is a correspondence between controversy and lawful 
debate and between dispute and unlawful debate. Common to the 
first pair is the principle of solidarity in the will to truth 
and reason, while the principle common to the second pair is the 
1 . . 11 . h f b . . . II 30 Th f I I exc us1ve w1 to a tr1ump o su Ject1v1ty . e our types 
of polemics are, therefore, quarrel, polemical use of reason, 
debate and dispute 31 and, argues Saner, they have counterparts 
in the political realm; respectively, war of aggression sustained by 
power, war waged for the right, the political struggle for reason 
and law. 
In politics the analogies of the polemics are wedded to Kant's 
concept of taste. In Kritik der Urteilskraft Kant gives the 
antinomies of taste as follows: 
II 1 • Taste is neither disputable nor debatable. 
2. Taste is disputable. There is one taste, based 
upon objective grounds of judgement .......... 
3 . Taste is debatable, though not disputable, 
contention brings an accord into view although 
there is no compelling in it". 32 (CJ 183-191/AA 
v 338 ff). 
The importance of this lies in the fact that taste is educated 
in public, "that it is a way to civilization, just as sociality 
is such a way: that it is a means to promote culture and at the 
same time a product of culture: that it is finally a propaedeutic 
for developing morality just as the development of morality is a 
school for taste. As a means of civilization, cultivation and 
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moralization, taste becomes a public propaedeutic of republican 
polemics". 33 
Thus, in Kant, we have a theory that is both individualistic in 
the strongest terms possible (thus echoing much of the thinking 
of the mainstream Enlightenment) and socialistic in that a 
polity is necessary for us to exercise our moral capacity. 
It is interesting to note that Patrick Riley once suggested 
that Rousseau's 'General Will' could best be seen as an attempt 
to combine what he called "ancient cohesiveness and modern 
voluntarism". 34 The 'General Will', for Riley, is "a fusion of 
the generality (unity, communality) of antiquity with the 
will (consent, contract) of modernity". 35 As Riley notes, 
this leaves the problem of making will at once individual and 
communitarian. In Rousseau, according to Riley, the problem 
is solved as "consent is no longer to be a question of mere volition 
and the general will is something like a modified common good 
morality". 36 
In Rousseau, however, this notion is notoriously vague and 
ultimately gives way in his political theory to the 'deus ex 
machina' of the legislator. Now Kant, working from similar 
premisses and (as I have argued) recognising, like Rousseau, 
the dichotomy between individualism and the necessity of our 
communal life, found the bridge in the postulate of freedom 
and its necessary premiss, a universalist view of rationality. 
In these premisses and in their application, Kant fuses the 
two traditions of Enlightenment thought into one that has, as 
Taylor says, "made him one of the most important thinkers in 
37 the development of modern culture". As I have already 
stated , Kant himself in his famous laudatory essay looking 
back on 'the century of philosophy' defined enlightenment as 
"freedom to make public use of ones reason in all matters" 
(KPW 55/AA VIII 34). There, in one sentence, Kant expresses 
the three essentials of his political theory and the plainest 
possible reasons for linking philosophy and politics irrevocably 
together - individual freedom, the use of reason and a 'public arena' 
in which to use it, and (to understand all of these properly) 
the limits to reason must be known, the idea of freedom postulated 
and the 'public arena' defined. 
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III 
Finally, in this chapter, I want to paint on a somewhat broader 
canvas and indicate where I think the significance of this lies 
for my wider theme (i.e., for the 'problems of modern culture' etc 
sketched by Macintyre~ to which I referred in chapter one) and 
to answer one powerful objection to the view of Kant I have 
outlined here. 
In this, some of the ideas that distance Kant both from the 
mainstream Enlightenment and Rousseau are more obvious, and 
especially so in Die Religion Uberhalls der Grezer der Blosser 
Vernunft (hereafter Religion) which helps, with the second 
Critique, to provide for the three postulates Kant connects with 
the 'enlarged' Moral law i.e., the summun bonum; freedom, 
immortality and God. 
The first, and in many ways the most central, I have just 
explained; the second two depend on postulates explored in the 
Religion concerning the nature of the radical evil to which 
mankind is heir. This evil is that which attacks the boundaries 
of the moral law in us itself and is not merely our sensual 
appetite. In this material is to be found views of human 
nature far removed from the tolerant cynicism of Voltaire, the 
exasperated materialism of Diderot, or the anguished passion 
of Rousseau. For Kant there is both an (atemporal) fall and a 
(revolutionary and atemporal) repentance. 
The views found here can be connected to a number of remarks in 
the opus postummum and to the second part of the Kritik der 
Urteilskraft to show that Kant's teleology is far subtler than 
Macintyre, for example, allows. 38 Kant's teleology, as 
J.N.Findlay remarks, "helps to gather together Kant's whole 
39 thought regarding the relation of the phenomenal to the noumenal". 
We saw earlier 40 how, in his writings on history, Kant displays 
a 'phenomenal' teleology in the Kritik der Urteilskraft and that 
this is wedded to an organic noumenal teleology which, for Kant, 
shows that (in Findlay's words) "The possibility of unifying 
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teleology with mechanism cannot be allowed at the phenomenal 
level, we have to think in terms of the supersensuous substrate 
of nature, where the same phenomena, superficially ordered by 
a system of mechanical laws, are also the expression of a deeper 
system of organising purposes. Such a system of purposes must 
be woven around a single unifying purpose and no such unifying 
purpose is to be found in phenomenal nature ..... it is here 
that practical reason with its unconditional moral imperatives 
rescues us from the impasse; man as subject to the moral law 
has an unconditional absolute need in the fulfillment of 
that law". 41 Kant expresses it this way:-
"We have in the world only one kind of beings whose 
causality is teleological The being of this kind 
is man ..... considered as a noumenon". (CJ 285/AA V 435) 
In these reflections two points of immediate relevance to my 
purpose emerge. First, here displayed beyond any doubt at all 
is Kant's Leibnizian, rationalist heritage and it is this more 
than anything else which marks Kant off from both main strands 
of Enlightenment thought. In this he is the heir of an older 
tradition (via Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten as I mentioned in 
Chapter three)- and· therefore incorporates· this into "his philosophy. 
With this perspective it is possible to see that, far from his 
late emphasis on teleology indicating his awareness of the 
'failure' of the Enlightenment project -as Macintyre argues -
it is assumed throughout the whole critical philosophy and is 
integral to it. In its turn the critical philosophy is, in part, 
a recognition of the value of much of the mainstream Enlightenment's 
empirical, critical theorizing, without the complete abandonment 
of an earlier tradition of rationalistic thought. Rather than 
a recognition of the Enlightenment's failure, Kant's teleology 
is a measure ot its success. 
In this respect Kant offers some instructive parallels with Locke. 
John Dunn has claimed that "The entire framework of (Locke's) 
thinking was 'Theocentric' and the key commitment of his 
intellectual life as a whole was the epistemological vindication 
of this framework". 42 
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With some minor qualifications, as the above study has indicat, 
a similar claim could be made about Kant. Dunn further argues 
that "Locke presumed that there were strict theoretical implicati 
between the abandonment of theocentrism, the acceptance of a 
purely internal conception of human rational agency and the 
resting of all human rights and duties on the contingencies of 
human opinion" 43 Kant argued that, in fact, a true understanding 
of the nature of human agency and what makes it up - taking on 
board much of the critical work of the mainstream Enlightenment 
and the individual/community dichotomy of Rousseau - would show 
that God was necessary for it and thus provide the requisite 
theocentric element. 
In this Kant was, of course, disagreeing with his fellows in 
the philosophical family on both sides and also (as I shall examine 
in the next Chapter) underestimating the threat posed by Hume 
both to himself and to the others. Yet, again, it was in no 
sense a 'failure' of the Enlightenment Kant diagnosed -more 
its emerging success. 
"If it is now asked whether we at present live in an 
enlightened age the answer is no, but we do live in an 
age of Enlightenment ..... once the germ on which nature 
has lavished most care -man's inclination and vocation 
to think freely- has developed ..... it gradually reacts 
upon the mentality of the people, who thus gradually 
become increasingly able to act freely". 
(KPW 58,59/AA VIII 40,41). 
Given all of the above, it will be seen that Kant's philosophy 
is, in one sense, the 'final glorification of the Enlightenment' 
(as Cassirer argued) but only when the difference~ as well as 
the similarities, between the two are clarified. Kant plainly 
saw his philosophy as being intimately related to his political 
theory. By concentration on a number of aspects of human 
existence from understanding through to freedom, immortality 
and God, he held to a certain necessary view of rationality and 
freedom, despite the multifarious manifestations of human nature 
and predicated his moral and political theory upon this. It 
was, in its turn, buttressed by his account of how we understand 
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and what we understand and what that reveals about the nature 
of the world. 
Kant's philosophy represents a 'glorification' of Enlightenment 
thought in that most of the characteristic themes of th~ Enlightetiment 
are taken up in it. Specifically, in his political theory, the 
great divide between Rousseau and the mainstream Enlightenment 
is bridged by the postulate of freedom (predicated on the 
universalist view of Rationality) and what Kant derives from it. 
Like Rousseau,Kant believed that we must adapt ourselves to a 
cosmic order and that no-one can force us to it - we must be 
'ruler and ruled', 'lawgiver and subject' -yet the mechanism 
Kant uses to produce this effect is a view of Rationality that 
many of the mainstream Enlightenment could have accepted; there 
is no need for a 'general will' as long as there are individual 
particular wills which are in accordance with the Categorical 
Imperative. 
At the same time there is much in Kant that both has echoes of 
the past and prefigures the future. His relation to 17th Century 
Rationalism (and in particul~r Leibniz) is well known and in a 
felicitous analogy J.N.Findlay has drawn attention to the marked 
similarity of much of Kant's account of our phenomenal predicament 
to Plato's - in particular to the analogy of the Cave: "the 
Platonic cave-dwellers, like the Kantian ones, are unable to see 
the objects that cast the variously shaped and arranged shadows 
on their cave wall and had to be content with noting how they 
accompany or follow one another and with projecting such 
regularities into the imagined future, finding their substitute 
for substantial things and causal relations in the systematic 
inter-relations of the shadows whether actual or possible 
(indeed) the Kantian cave-dwellers are much disadvantaged in 
comparison with the Platonic ones and their intimations of a 
being-in-itself which transcends the vanishing and the bounded 
and which is necessary rather than contingent, are much dimmer 
and their intimations of a moral law which transcends impulse 
and of a freedom which promulgates and can carry out that law 
and of a secret teleology responsible for the beauty and order 
they see in appearances are likewise much vaguer and more 
problematic". 44 
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In a yet more apt phrase, Findlay ties together Plato and Kant 
with perhaps the most Kantian of modern thinkers - Wittgenstein 
"for,if Plato placed men in a cave from which egress was, with 
effort, possible, Kant placed them in a cave from which escape 
was impossible in this life though it remained thinkable and 
desirable. Wittgenstein, however, constructed a habitation 
for hermits (or for a single hermit) from which escape was not 
only impossible but neither thinkable nor desirable except 
. f . 11 45 ow1ng to a con us1on . 
The similarities between Kant and Wittgenstein have been 
46 
remarked on before, and they point to another interesting 
fact. A number of analytical philosophers have held Kant to 
be an immensely fruitful and interesting philosopher while 
virtually ignoring his political philosophy. Ralph Walker has 
already been mentioned, and even so acute and perceptive a critic 
as Peter Strawson in the Bounds of Sense, 47 is severe on those 
parts of Kant's system that go to make up his Transcendental 
Idealism and which include, of course, freedom, immortality 
and God; precisely tho~ parts of Kant's system most essential 
(in Kant's own view) for linking the theoretical and the practical. 
(Findlay, by contrast, would keep most of the concepts but 
abandon the name Transcendental Idealism.) 48 
Now, admittedly, Strawson's essay is specifically on the first 
Critique, so a detailed treatment of Kant's moral theory is not 
called for, but he uncompromisingly rejects as incoherent 
precisely those parts of Kant's system which Kant himself felt 
most vital to his whole project (i.e., linking together the 
theoretical and the practical):- "If the natural world were 
all there was" Strawson says "Kant (would) hold (that) human 
freedom would be an illusion and the ideal of moral justice would 
be a dream perpetually mocked by the facts. But the sphere 
denied to knowledge is thereby left open to a morally certified, 
though uncomprehending, faith that the reality of human freedom 
is somehow secured in the sphere and moral justice is really there 
attained. Clearly" he goes on "the belief in ..... supersensible 
reality is essential to this part of Kant's doctrine". 49 
Strawson further argues that "It is, manifestly, of importance ..... 
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to ensure that there is a point of connexion, in the way of 
identity, between the supersensible world and the world of human 
beings, between things as they are in themselves on the one hand 
and Kant and his meanders ..... on the other. Without such a 
point of connexion, in the way of identity, the claim that 
freedom is at least possible (though to us incomprehensible) as a 
property of supersensible beings would be without relevance to 
the moral nature or situation of human beings''. 50 
Strawson argues, however, that "There is no refuge but incoherence 
from the question how the connexion is to be made, in the way of 
identity, between the natural being, the man, with a mental 
history of thoughts, perceptions and feelings and the supersensible 
being, with no history at all, 'in which the representation 
of time has its original ground'". 51 This is because, according 
to Strawson, "The point of contact, in the way of identity 
is to be found ..... in the man's consciousness of his own 
possession and exercise of the power of thought, of the facilities 
of understanding and reason. There immediately arise (however) 
on Kant's own principles, first, that anything which can be 
ascribed to a man as a case or instance of self-consciousness must 
be something that occurs in time, and, second, that it must be 
consciousness of himself as reasoning or recognising or thinking 
something, as intellectually engaged at some point or over some 
stretch of time. Any such self-consciousness must, it seems, 
belong to the history of (and must be consciousness of some 
episode belonging to the history of) a being which has a history 
and hence is not a supersensible being, not 'the subject in which 
the representation of time has its original ground'". 52 
I have examined Strawson's argument in some detail partly because 
it represents the high-water mark of analytical sympathetic 
criticism of Kant and partly because he draws attention to a very 
real apparent lacuna in the first Critique which might vitiate 
much of the rest of Kant's undertaking if it cannot be met. 
Two considerations can be fruitfully introduced, however, to 
suggest how it might be met. 
First, it seems far from clear that Strawson's argument is as 
convincing a knock-down as he himself clearly thinks it to be. 
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To say this is not to deny that Kant displays lapses, lack of 
clarity, infelicities of argument or inconsistency in the way 
he deploys some of his arguments, but it is to suggest that 
Strawson's criticism at least partly misses the point. It does 
this because, in his treatment of the Transcendental Dialectic, he 
denies most strongly what Kant affirms i.e., that despite our 
lack of knowledge of our unitary consciousness, things in 
themselves and supersensible reality, we can think of and about 
them and that we must think about them as they are the necessary 
foundations for much of our understanding of practical, scientific 
or theoretical life. In his concern for strict certainty and 
logical coherence Strawson employs the Kantian principle of 
significance so ruthlessly that he fails to limit it as Kant does 
(as Findlay rightly points out) 53 and consequently ends up grossly 
distorting the Kantian position. It is, for example, not the 
case that Kant merely 'assumes' the identity of the real or 
supersensible subject as Strawson alleges. 54 "Pure Reason" Kant 
claims in the Antinomy of Pure Reason "is not subject to the 
form of time (CPR A551, B579/AA III 373) For since 
reason is not itself an appearance and is not subject to any 
conditions of sensibility it follows that even as regards its 
causality there is in it no time sequence and that the dynamical 
law of nature which determines succession in time in accordance 
with rules is not applicable to it ..... Reason, therefore, 
acts freely; it is not dynamically determined in the chain of 
natural causes through either outer or inner grounds antecedant 
in time". (CPR A553, B581/AA III 375-5) This might, of course, 
be invalid (on other grounds) but it is not a 'mere' assumption. 
Secondly, examination of the rest of the Kantian corpus also goes 
some way to refuting Strawson's assertion. That Strawson 
(merely by assumption?) arguably distorts whatever Kant says and,in any 
case, is certainly unjustified in alledging a prima facie incoherence 
in the Transcendental Dialectic, is born out if the introduction 
to the third Critique is examined. Here Kant divides philosophy 
into theoretical and practical by means of concepts:-
"Now there are only two kinds of concepts" he goes on "and 
these admit as many distinct principles as the possibility 
of their objects, viz: natural concepts and the concept 
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of freedom. The former renders possible theoretical 
cognition according to principles a priori, the latter 
in respect of this theoretical cognition only supplies 
in itself a negative principle (that of mere contrast) 
but, on the other hand, it furnishes fundamental 
propositions which extend the sphere of the determination 
of the will and are therefore called practical". 
(CJ 7/AA V 171) 
Kant goes on to make a further distinction between technically 
practical principles and morally practical principles (according 
to whether the concept which determines the causality of the will 
is natural or that of freedom) and then argues that "the natural 
concepts which contain the ground of all theoretical knowledge 
a priori rest on the legislation of the understanding. The 
concept of freedom which contains the ground of all sensuously 
unconditioned practical precepts a priori rests on the legislation 
of the reason. Both faculties, therefore, besides being capable 
of application as regards their logical form to principles of 
whatever origin, have also, as regards their context, their 
special legislations above which there is no other (a priori) 
and hence the division of philosophy ..... is justified. But in 
the family of the supreme cognitive faculties there is a middle 
term between the understanding and the reason. This is the 
judgement". (CJ 13/AA V 177) 
Kant alleges also a third triad - The three 'faculties' - knowledge, 
desire, and pleasure and pain and argues that "for the faculty of 
knowledge the understanding is alone legislative ..... For the 
faculty of desire, as a supreme faculty according to the concept 
of freedom, the reason (in which alone this concept has a place) 
is alone a priori -J_egislative. Now between the faculties of 
knowledge and desire there is the feeling of pleasure ..... we 
may therefore suppose provisionally that the judgement likewise 
contains in itself an a priori principle. And as pleasure or 
pain is necessarily combined with the faculty of desire ..... we 
may also suppose that the judgement will bring about a transition 
from the pure faculty of knowledge, the realm of natural concepts, 
to the realm of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use 
it makes possible the transition from understanding to reason". 
(CJ14-15/AA V 178-9) 
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Now with this argument, Kant displays very clearly how he would 
have wanted to get round Strawson's objection that "the indentity 
of the empirical self-conscious subject and the real or 
supersensible subject" 55 is simply assumed and not proved. Even 
in the first Critique the argument is given some basis (as I 
indicated above) and in the third it is made explicit that the 
link between them is not something that can be 'proved' on the 
categories of understanding or reason (the subject of the first 
two Critiques) but can be indicated by considering judgement -
the final link in the chain of rationality that bridges the two. 
A further example of this refutation of Strawson's view is 
contained -at least by implication- in Kant's lectures on 
Anthropology. 
Here he divides consciousness of ourselves into two - consciousness 
of reflection and consciousness of apprehension. "The first" 
he says "is consciousness of understanding, the second of inner 
sense ..... This self-contains a plurality of determinations 
through which an inner experience is made possible". 
(APV 15n/AA VII 134n). Here, surely, is an anticipation of the 
view that we can have a plurality of beings (noumenal and 
phenomenal, for example) and, at the same time, be one. 
Th . h f . h h . . . 56 b . lS as, o course, met w1t muc cr1t1c1sm ut 1t serves to 
illustrate at least that, in the wider context of the critical 
philosophy, the claims that Kant makes for the intimate connections 
in his system between philosophy, morality and politics are not 
incoherent (Strawson's charge) though they may, of course, be 
wrong and I shall briefly take up that particular question 
in Chapter Six. Yet if, as I have argued, Strawson is wrong 
in suggesting that Kant fails to give a plausible basis for 
his transcendental argument~ linking understanding-reason and 
judgement - and, therefore, knowledge, desire and feeling and 
philosophy, morality and politics - egress from the Kantian 
cave is, perhaps, not quite as impossible as Findlay supposed. 
Strawson's argument, though freeing the Kantian analytic, would 
have bound the dialectic (together with its moral, political 
and theological offshoots) into a Strawsonian hermitage even 
more narrow and confining than that of Wittgenstein. 
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If we take stock of the critical philosophy as a whole, however, 
I think it is clear that this is not the picture that emerges. 
The third Critique, in Peter Gay's phrase, "heals the dualisms 
that divide the world" 57 and in doing this it represents the 
purpose of the Kantian philosophy: To reconcile these 
world-dividing dualisms, Rationalist/Empiricist, Noumenal/Phenomenal, 
Knowledge/Freedom, Individual/Community. 
In so doing he tied his political thought and philosophy 
irrevocably together - one might disagree with aspects (or all) 
of both (or either) but one cannot separate them. 
CHAPTER 5 
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HUME: Scepticism and the Moral Sciences 
"To begin with clear and self-evident principles, 
to advance by timerous and sure steps, to review 
frequently our conclusions; and examine accurately 
all their consequences; .... (these) are the only 
methods by which we can ever hope to reach truth, 
and attain a proper stability and certainty in our 
determinations". 
Hume: 
The Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding. 
"Here then, is the chief triumph of art and philosophy, 
it insensibly refines the temper and it pours out to us 
those dispositions, which we should endeavour to attain, 
by a constant bent of mind and by repeated habit." 
Hume: 
The Sceptic 
Among the philosophes (as Peter Gay has observed) David Hume occupies a 
1 
prominent but rather elusive place. Much the same, I think, can be said 
of his position in modern philosophy. Not that his importance is disputed, 
only where that importance truly lies. In this chapter I want to do two 
things. First, I shall offer an interpretation of Hume which emphasises 
(or perhaps I should say re-emphasises) the central place scepticism has 
in his thought. Secondly, I shall use this to discuss how Hume's 
conception of philosophy - and by an inescapable extension his application 
of that philosophy to politics - is influenced by it. This will be a 
springboard to a discussion of the role this conception of philosophy has 
in undermining the Humpty Dumpty/ Red Queen thesis that I shall undertake 
in a later chapter. 
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To begin with, that 'elusiveness' of Hume's is best overcome by taking to 
heart T.E. Jesso~s advice that the precondition for sound Humean exegesis 
is to read as Hume himself wrote, read and lived - widely. 2 It is one of 
the strengths of a number of modern interpreters of Hume that Jessop's 
advice has been followed, and the results have shown impressively in studies 
of Hume by Duncan Forbes and David Miller - to name but two. Thus, to begin 
my examination of Hume it is as well to clear up some general points first. 
I 
"Philosophy" writes ~ume, in the Treatise ''is commonly divided into 
speculative and practical, and as morality is always comprehended under 
the latter division, it is supposed to influence our passions and actions 
and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgements of the understanding ... : .. 
Morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself 
is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, 
are not conclusions of our reason." (T.457). 
Thus, does Hume announce the central principle of his moral theory - the 
elevation of the passions (and the dethronement of reason) in moral 
judgement. Reason is "utterly impotent" in producing actions; what matters 
are our sentiments - our passions. 
Reason, he argues "is the discovery of truth or falsehood" which "consists 
in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or 
to real existence of matters of fact ......... Now, it is evident our 
passions, volitions and actions are not susceptible of any such agreement 
or disagreement, being original facts, and realities complete in themselves 
.......... it is impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true 
or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason ......... Actions 
may be laudable or blameable; but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable." 
(T.458) 
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In the introduction to the Treatise Hume makes it plain that what he is 
trying to do is explain- as part of a general 'science of man'. 
It is this, coupled with his emphasis on experience, that he sees as 
creating a method "entirely new''· In attempting "to explain the 
principles of human nature'', he says "we in effect propose a complete 
system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new and 
the only one upon which they can stand with any security." (T.XV1) 
Furthermore, although "we must endeavour to render all our principles as 
universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments 3 to the utmost, and 
explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes; it is still 
certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis that pretends 
to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature ought, at first, 
to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical." (T. XVII) For no theory, 
according to Hume, "can go beyond experience, or establish any principles 
which are not founded on that authority." (T. XVIII). 
Despite some changes of style and expression and a few changes of mind, the 
scope and effects of which I shall return to in a moment, this project is 
held to in the Enquiries, and implicit in al.l of Hume's writings. There 
are, of course, crucial questions concerning the nature of Hume's 
empiricism and the relations between the Treatise and Enquiries which I 
address later on, but for the moment I shall put them to one side as I 
develop this initial stage of my argument. 
In Section I of the first Enquiry, Hume divides what he calls moral 
4 philosophy into two, "each of which has its peculiar merit, and may 
contribute to the entertainment, instruction and reformation of mankind." 
(EHU 5). The first is an "easy and obvious philosophy, which considers man 
as influenced his measures by taste and sentiment" (EHU 5), and the second 
"considersman in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being and 
endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners" (EHU 6). 
These latter thinkers, says Hume, consider it "a reproach to all literature, 
that philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy,the 
foundations of morals, reasoning and criticism" (EHU 6). Hume describes 
these two philosophies, notes that the former has the preference of the 
"generality of mankind", and then goes on to consider the advantages of each. 
His criticism, of course, centres on the latter type of philosophy, which he 
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identifies as ''commonly called metaphysics" (EHU 9). He finds it obscure, 
"painful and fatigu!ing" (EHU 11), but, also, "as the inevitable source of 
uncertainty and error'' (EHU 11). He feels that "the justest and most 
plausible objection"against a considerable part of metaphysics is that "they 
are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of 
human vanity which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the 
understanding" (EHU 11). He adds that "the only method of freeing learning, 
at once, from these abstruse questions is to enquire seriously into the 
nature of human understanding and show, from an exact analysis of its 
powers and capacity, that it_is by no means fitted for such remote and 
abstruse subjects " (EHU 12). 
This project is, of course, what Hume attempted in Book 1 of the Treatise, 
and what he then attempted anew in the first Enquiry. He applied the same 
kind of argumentation, (transferred to "morals") in Books 2 and 3 of the 
Treatise, and,in the second Enquiry, the Essays, the Dialogues concerning 
Natural Religion, and even in the History of England (albeit in a modified 
form), we see the running thread of this enterprise. What exactly, however, 
does this method consist of, and how consistent is Hume in its use? Before 
turning to look at the most important parts of Hume's philosophical approach 
for the relationship of philosophy to politics, I must first attempt a brief 
sketch of what his method entails. 
II 
Like most philosophers, Hume usually had specific targets in mind when 
composing his works. It is the view of a large number of Humean scholars 
(a view I share) that Hume's philosophical interest was first fired by 
issues in moral philosophy_ 5 and, without being drawn too far into the 
scholarly minefield of lHume's intentions', the development of his method 
can, I think, best be seen in relation to his moral·philosophy. This has 
a double advantage for me, of course, as it leads, quite naturally, into 
his consideration of politics and, therefore, into those aspects of his 
method more salient for his treatment of that subject. 
His principal targets, to start with at least, were ethical rationalists 
like Richard Cudworth, Samuel Clarke and William Wollastan, whose cardinal 
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belief in the moral sphere was that reason alone could determine the 
benevolence or malignity of an act~ These Rationalists were, of course, 
the heirs of a long tradition in moral thought stretching back ultimately 
to Plato. Clarke, for example, held that there were "eternal and 
necessary differences" of things in nature, which make it "fit and 
reasonable" for human beings to act in a certain way "separate from 
considerations of these rules being the positive will or command of God, 
and also antecedent to any respect or regard ....... of any particular 
private and personal advantage and disadvantage." 7 Messner's view is that the 
character of Demea in Hume's Dialogues, is based on Clarke and his ideas and, 
given that Hume was making the final corrections to the Dialogues on his 
deathbed, it is reasonable to assume that if Messner is right, Hume was 
still concerned to rebut the views of thegthical rationalists long after 
the publications of even the majority of the Essays and the two Enquiries, 
let alone the Treatise. 8 
Hume at times felt,I suspect, that there is, in the ethical rationalists, 
a good deal of argument which is, in many ways, the purest sophistry 
however sincerely meant. He would have appreciated Leslie Stephen's acid 
comment on Wollastan, that "30 years of profound meditation had convinced 
Wollastan that the reason why a man should abstain from breaking his wife's 
head was that it was denying she was his wife " 9 a point which could, 
with some amendation of content or temper, be applied to most of the 
ethical rationalists. 
Hume was scarcely alone in opposing these ideas, of course. Both 
Shaftesbury and, more importantly, Hutcheson, did so as well, not to mention 
Kames, Turnball and the whole school of Common Sense philosophy that came 
after Hume, offspring, as it were, of the Scottish Enlightenment. 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson opposed the rationalists from a somewhat similar 
stand-point to Hume's, at least insofar as they too placed great emphasis 
on a ''moral-sense" - (I shall leave this elusive phrase without a 
definition, at least for the moment). For Shaftesbury, for example, virtue 
consists "in certain just disposition ........... towards the moral objects 
10 
of right or wrong," and, for Hutcheson, reason is nothing but "the 
11 
sagacity we have in prosecuting any end." Similar attacks on 
rationalism were, of course, being made by the Mainstream Enlightenment: 
Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot (indeed all the Encyclopedists) were - by 
temperament as well as by intellect - empiricists, as I indicated in 
Chapter Three. 
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How far, then, does Hume's method differ from these other responses to 
rationalism! How far is his "new scene of thought" actually "new"? 
This question must be answered before we attempt any analysis of the 
theory itself and as there has (of course) been a huge amount of scholarly 
ink spilled over this question, I do not intend to do anything other than 
indicat·ewhich interpretation I favour and why. It is no part of my 
inquiry to attempt an adjudication between the innumerable opinions already 
expressed on this subject. The quotations from Hume I have already given 
will have indicated clearly enough at least one aspect of Hume's method -
his uncompromising empiricism. Of all of the aspects of his method, it is 
probably the most familiar and commented upon:- "As the science of man is 
the only sound foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid 
foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience 
and observation " (T.XVI). This method of experience and observation was, 
of course, the hallmark of the new science whose most illustrious 
practitioner Newton Hume explicitly sets out in the 
Treatise, to emulate. Even its sub-title emphasises this empiricism: 
("being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into 
moral subjects "). Later on, when "casting the whole anew", in the first 
and second Enquiries. and in the Dissertation on the Passions, the 
empiricism remains as strong and as essential a component as ever. 
12 It has been argued, however, that after he wrote the Treatise, Hume 
progressively abandoned the psychological empiricism displayed therein, 
adopting a more modest; less systematic and more ·historically based 
empiricism,and that it was this change of mind that lies at the back of 
many of the (allegedly) surprising changes and omissions in the Enquiries, 
and, ultimately, in the famous ''disavowall" of the Treatise appended to the 
1977 edition of the complete Essays and Treatise's on several subjects. 
Even Selby-Bigge, in the introduction to his edition of the two Enquiries, 
remarks that "The psychology of sympathy, which occupies so much space in 
Book II, and on which so much depends in Book III of the Treatise, is almost 
entirely ignored in the Enquiry ........ when we come to consider the 
Treatment of Sympathy in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of morals by 
the side of its treatment in the Treatise, we shall see reason to think 
that Hume has very considerably modified his views, not only as to the 
functions of sympathy, but also as to the proper limits of psychological 
analysis." 13 
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I have two comments on this. The first is that it is certain that there 
would appear to have been a change of temper, at the very least, between 
Hume's views in the Treatise and his essays in the Essays and Enquiries. 
The note of philosophical pessimism with which Hume concludes Book I of 
the Treatise, is unique in his work, and though oft quoted is worth 
quoting again "My memory of past errors and perplexities" he writes "makes 
me diffident for the future. The wretched condition, weakness and disorder 
of the faculties, I must employ in my enquiries, increases my apprehensions. 
And the impossibility of amending or correcting these faculties, reduces me 
almost to despair " (T. 264)~ One does not need to agree fully with 
14 
commentators like Ross ~ho argues that this passage expresses 
metaphysical ''anguish" (surely an inappropriate word to use for Hume even 
here) to recognise there is something present there which nowhere recurs, 
at least in that form, anywhere else in Hume's writings although something 
similar to it is contained in the closing sections of The Dialogues, where 
~hilo makes plan the randomness and arbitrary nature of creation. Let us 
not forget, however, that in that famous disavowel of his earliest work 
Hume gives, as his reason, that he was "sensible of his error in going to 
the press too early, and he cast the whole anew in the following pieces, 
(i.e. The Enquiries, etc.) where some negligencies in his former reasoning 
II 15 
and more in The Expression, are, he hopes, corrected (My emphasis). 
This would indicate that Hume's main reasons for disavowing the Treatise 
were chiefly stylistic rather than substantive, and two other considerations 
reinforce this. Hume, obviously, was a "philosopher" in the 18th Century 
sense of the term not the 20th Century sense (a topic to which I have 
alre(idy ·.tefe.tt:e:d). He considered himself a man of letters, as he 
16 
suggests in his valedictory essay of himself (•My own lifer). Here he 
describes the "love of literary fame" as his "ruling passion''· Thus his 
desire to impress his audience could easily have led him to change the way 
he presented some of his arguments, and so to drop or modify many of the 
more explicitly difficult passages in the Treatise. Those, for example, 
on time and space, which are drastically curtailed in the first Enquiry 
from the position that they occupy in Book one of the Treatise. This would 
not necessarily mean that Hume had abandoned the views he held there -
although it would be remarkable if his views did not alter to some degree 
over the years as he was a perpetual corrector and re-assessor of his own 
works, correcting them even on his deathbed. 17 Also, whilst I would agree 
that Hume's interest in the more explicitly psychological aspects of the 
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Treatise waned, this was more, I suspect, because he came to feel that 
the essay (long or short) was a better vehicle for his method, (as well 
as for his literary ambitions) than a lengthy philosophical treatise. 
Furthermore, he was surely just as aware of "historical" empiricism in 
the Treatise as he was later - as the concluding paragraph of his 
introduction displays. "We must ........... glea.n up our experiments" he 
observes "from a continuous observation of human life and take them as 
they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in 
company, in affairs and in their pleasures." (T.XIX) and part of this 
"observation" would be historical of necessity. 
The second confirming instance of the basic continuity of Hume's method 
is that, as Mossner significantly points out, Hume's disavowel of the 
Treatise was largely brought about by the misunderstanding of it. and 
attacks on it by James Beattie and (more intelligently) by Thomas Reid. 
It must have been infuriating for Hume to have his ideas so radically 
misinterpreted and understandable that he take some steps to counter the 
misunderstanding and this interpretation is supported by his comment to 
his friend and publisher Stra!han, that the "advertisement is a complete 
answer to Dr. Reid, and to that bigoted, silly fellow, Beattie." 18 I 
therefore conclude that while there is a change in emphasis the essential 
element of the Humean approach, the empirical method,remains by and large 
the same throughout his writings and this empiricism is, naturally, very 
different from the approach of the ethical rationalists. 
If empiricism is one fundamental part of Hume's programme, another equally 
well known and widely debated one is his secularism. Hume's treatment of 
religion was, for his contemporaries, the most radical part of his thought 
as he was well aware and it was also one of the closest to his heart. 
His most sustained, brilliant and subversive work in the philosophy of 
religion, The Dialogues concerning Natural Religion was worked on for 
over 25 ye~rs and published only after his death. 19 Y~t those wor~s 
he did publish on religion, the essay of ·Miracles·, the long essay on 
The Natural History of Religion and various peripheral works (like the 
essays of Suicide and On the Immortality of the Soul ) earned him the 
title of the ''Great Infidel" and made him the subject of attacks from 
all shades of religious opinion, from the Clerics of his native 
20 21 Edinburgh to Samuel Johnson. 
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By the time of his death his religious views were so notorious that 
Boswell presumed upon his moderate acquaintance with Hume, and visited 
St. David Street to probe the dying philosopher on the question of his 
fear - or lack of it of his approaching death - a questioning Hume 
responded to with his habitual calmness and gentle irony. 22 Yet he 
had chided the French philosophes for their dogmatic atheism and was 
content himself merely to question; "Divinity or theology'' he wrote 
"has a foundation in reason so far as it is supported by experience" 
(EHU. 165) - explicitly linking this aspect of his thought with that 
first fundamental principle, empiricism. 
It was, of course, the point of most of his work on religion to demonstrate 
that such supporting evidence was lacking. His dryly ironical conclusion 
of the appropriate section of the first Enquiry, (the conclusion of the 
essay on 'Miracles~) is that ''upon the whole, we may conclude, that the 
Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even 
at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one." 
( EHU 131 ; PW: 4 108) . 
Even in the parts of his works not dealing explicitly with religion, we 
find him commenting on the topic, usually remarking on the adverse effect 
of religious men or principles - see for example, his elegantly ironical 
demolition of the divine right theory of political obligation in the essay 
1 0f the Original Contract~ (PW~3 443-450) or again, the pointed comment 
in Book One of the Treatise that "Generally speaking, the errors in 
religion are dangerous, those in philosophy only ridiculous." (T.272). 
This conscious and thoroughgoing secularism was of equal import in Hume's 
method as his empiricism. According to Duncan Forbes, "(it) was what set 
Hume apart from the Newtonians: the discovery that a genuine experimental 
philosophy ruled out final causes and involved a conscious separation or 
bracketing off of the natural from the supernatural," 23 moreover, argues 
24 Forbes, "Hume's political philosophy is wholly and unambiguously secular." 
This latter assertion is one that I shall have to return to, but I agree 
with Forbes in general that Hume's secularism was the second aspect of his 
"new scene of thought". 
This brings me on to the third and for me most important methodological 
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tool of Hume's method -scepticism! That Hume was a sceptic of some 
sort, no-one has ever attempted to deny - least of all Hume himself 
but the precise nature of his scepticism has aroused considerable 
passion even (ironically) dogmatism in certain circles. It is said by 
25 some, indeed Hume said so himself, that he is a "mitigated sceptic" 
but from the very beginning his reputation as a sceptic has transcended 
this modest scepticism which he himself freely admitted. Reid's 
Inquiry into the principles of the human mind on the basis of common sense 
began the misinterpretation of Hume's thought that even today still 
26 persists in an astonishing number of ways, and one of the areas of 
radical distortion was his view of Hume as the arch-sceptic. 
"It seems to be a peculiar show of humour in this author (Hume)" writes 
Reid, in the introduction to his Inquiry to"set out his introduction, 
by promising, with agrave face, no less than a complete system of the 
sciences, upon a foundation entirely new, to wit, that of human nature, 
when the intention of the whole work is to show that there is neither 
human nature nor science in the world." 27 
Furthermore, aspects of Hume's scepticism have been used in ways that 
he would highly disapprove of. Isaiah Berlin, for example, has noticed 
the influence of Hume's theory of belief, one of the prime legacies of 
scepticism as regards reason, on the thought of the German Anti-
Rationalists, especially the man Kant called the "Magus of the North", 
Jacob Hammann - a thinker who in most other respects is diametrically 
28 
opposed to Hume. All of this is, in part, simply a result of 
thinkers taking what they wanted from Hume, and ignoring or belittling 
the rest, a fine old philosophical tradition - but it does raise the 
problem of just how far Hume intended to press his sceptical reasonings. 
In section XII of the first Enquiry, Hume asks precisely this question: 
"What is meant by sceptic?", and then adds "and how far is it possible 
to push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty." 
(EHU 149). In response to his own question, he argues, first that there 
,, 
is "a species of scepticism, antecedent to all study of philosophy 
(EHU 149) which he identifies with Descates. It recommends a universal 
" doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of 
our very faculties" (EHU 149). This, however, Hume considers foolish 
"were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature" he writes 
"(as plainly it is not) (it) would be entirely incurable." ( EHU 150). 
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"It must, however, be confessed" he adds "that this species of 
scepticism, when more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable 
sense and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by 
preserving a proper impartiality in our judgements. and weaning our 
mind from all those prejudices which we may have imbibed from education 
or rash opinion. To begin with clear and self-evident principles,to 
advance by timerous and sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions 
and examine accurately all their consequences, though by these means 
we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems, are the 
only methods by which we can ever hope to reach truth and attain a proper 
stability and certainty in our determinations" (EHU 150). 
Hume then goes on to describe another "species" of scepticism consequent 
to science and enquiry: but the conclusion he wants to draw from his 
consideration of these ''sceptical topics" is that "Those who have a 
propriety to philosophy, will still continue their researches; because 
they reflect that, besides the immediate pleasure attending such an 
occupation, philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of 
common life, methodized and corrected. But they will never be tempted 
to go beyond common life so long as they consider the imperfection of 
those faculties which they employ7 their narrow reach and their 
inaccurate operations." (EHU 162). 
Hume is here stating the guiding rule and principle of all his thought -
not really ''conservatism", (as it is so often called) but caution and 
humility in our attempts to understand and explain. He is not a 
"pyrrhon~an" sceptic but he is concerned to stress the dangers of 
believing that we understand too much. Amongst his essays are the series 
of inter-connected essays, entitled'The Stoic~ 'The Epicuread, 'The 
Platonist' and'The Sceptic~ Hume says in a footnote to the first of these 
essays (The Epicurean) that his intention is to "deliver the sentiments 
of sects that naturally form themselves in the world, and entertain 
different ideas of human life and happiness." (PN:3 197) He did not, 
therefore, intend that any of the four should represent his own thoughts 
to the exclusion of the others, but his opening sentence3in the Sceptic 
essay strikingly echo his comments in the first Enquiry, and it is 
difficult to believe that this is not Hume's own view: "I have long 
entertained a suspicion with regard to the decisions of philosophers 
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upon all subjects .......... there is one mistake to which they seem liable, 
almost without exception; they confine too much their principles, and 
make no account of that vast variety which nature has so much affected 
in all her operations." (PW:3 213). 
This sentiment expresses one of the most important aspects of Hume's 
''mitigated scepticism": an awareness of the huge variety of human customs, 
institutions and practices and an unwillingness to attempt to combine 
them all within a single 'system'. This insight is given specific 
illumination in A Dialogue, an important work for an understanding of 
Humean scepticism. Hume makes plain that like Montesquieu and Diderot he 
feels that,in general, "the principles upon which men reason in morals are 
always the same, though [significantly] the conclusions which they draw 
are often very different.'' (D 335.6). Hume's point in A Dialogue is, I 
think, both a philosophical and a polemical one. He recognises the 
variety in human life: when Palamedes asks "what rule shall we establish 
for the many different, very contrary sentiments of mankind?'1 (D 343) 
he is to say that "when men depart from the maxims of common reason and 
affect these artificial lives ....... no-one can answer for what will 
please or displease them." (D 343) and it is significant here that a 
little later on Hume refers to two such artificialities - he calls them 
illusions - both of which were high on his list of dangerous activities: 
religious superstition and philosophical enthusiasm. (D 343). To say 
this, however, is not to deny that such differences exist - "would you 
try a GreSk or Roman by the common law of England?" he asks, ''hear him 
defend himself by his own maxims and then pronounce." (D.330). It is 
this scepticism which I shall contend is the most interesting feature of 
his political philosophy and about which I shall have most to say in a 
moment. First, however, there is a problem with which I must deal. 
It has been said by a number of commentators. that, understandably, 
Hume had his own blind spots and that, naturally1 many of these were the 
common currency of his age. He was, it is alleged, unnecessarily 
optimistic about human progress, too convinced about the success of 
(Newtonian) 'Natural Science' and of the necessity for his science of 
man to follow it and too set in his own circumstances and situation to 
see the huge political and social problems developing around him ... It 
is said, in particular, that he fell in with the general failing of 
29 Enlightenment historiography, in accepting the ·'universal man' theory 
which asserts, in the now infamous words of the first Enquiry:-
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"Mankind i$ so much the same, in all times and places, that history 
informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use 
is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human 
nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, 
and furnishing us with materials from which we may find our observations 
and become acquainted with th~~regular springs of.human action and 
behaviour." (EQU 83). 
A long line of influential commentators, including Black, Collingwood and 
Meinecke, have used this passage to allegedly show that, for Hume, history 
was (in Black's words) "simply a repeating decimal.'' 30 Others, like 
Vlaches, interpreting the passage similarly, have argued that Hume's theory 
of the'universal man' leads only to confusion and incoherence in his 
31 political thought, and that his scepticism obviously did not stretch 
far enough to take in this presumption also. 
This, I think is a misreading of Hume's position. Duncan Forbes has 
suggested that there is no conflict in Hume's science of man as a result 
of his theory of history. First, because Hume's theory was nothing like 
as monolithic as traditional commentators have supposed - in evidence he 
quotes passages from the second Enquiry and A Dialogue -and secondly, in 
any case, Hume's universal principles "are to be regarded as abstractions 
32 from the concrete variety of human (= social) experience. 11 Hume does 
assume that by application of the proper empirical method, an historian 
can in some sense come to understand the motivating factors affecting men 
in the past since the essential "springs" of human action do not change, 
only their application. If this is what he means in that passage from the 
first Enquiry, then it is not in the least inconsistent with the 
application of individual and cultural diversity that Hume displays 
elsewhere. He is merely saying that for any explanation to be possible 
at all, there must be some constancy in the basic drives of human life. 33 
Moreover, his position on this is a striking anticipation of certain 
aspects of the philosophy of Collingwood (otherwise dissimilar a thinker) 
whovas I said, explicitly criticises him in this regard. I shall come 
back to the relationship of this unlikely pair in Chapter Six. 
In addition to this, those who accuse him of 'over-optimism' or laud him 
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as being the most 'modern' of the philosophes (as Gay does) appear to be 
discussing his character more than his philosophy. He did, it is true, 
have hope that ''progress" as he saw it would continue but he was under 
no illusions about the difficulties it would face. Adam Smith recalled, 
in his account of Hume's last illness, how the philosopher had diverted 
himself by imagining various excuses he might make to Charon to avoid 
entering the latter's boat, one of which was "I have been endeavouring to 
open the eyes of the public. If I live a few years longer I may have the 
satisfaction of seeing the downfall of some of the prevailing systems of 
superstition." Charon, however, would have none of it. ''You loitering 
rogue" Smith recalls Hume's Charon saying, ''Do you fancy I will give you 
34 lease for so long a term? " Hume had no doubt that many of the things 
he fought against had a good deal of life in them yet and was no easy 
optimist. 
He was, however, by nature, as the testimony of his friends amply show, an 
optimistic man and he did share many of the hopes common to the philosophic 
family. Wittgenstein once wrote that "It is sometimes said that a man's 
philosophy is a matter of temperament. and there is something in this." 35 
In this case it indicates simply that Hume's ''optimism" is more a personal 
trait than a theoretical construction. There is, after all, nothing in 
Hume's thought itself to justify that optimism and indeed Hume's 
philosophy easily lends itself to those who wish to stress the limits 
on human nature and human ambition (though Hume himself never decried 
it). It is for this reason, very largely, that he has been so often 
identified as a conservative when,in philosophical and theological terms, 
.he was amongst the most radical philosophes and also when his thought 
has very little in common with Conservatism after Burke (this is not the 
place to become embroiled in the argument over whether, and in what way, 
Hume was a Conservative - though I discuss it briefly later on in 
connection with David Miller's interpretation of Hume). 
This method, empirical, secular and most importantly, sceptical is 
carried over into his Essays and even the History of England. In his 
history, for example, Hume many times digresses with philosophical asides, 
discussing the advantages and disadvantages of certain actions. One of 
the best known examples is the execution of Charles the First of England, 
!18 -
an event which permits Hume to discuss the question of "whether the 
people, in any case, were entitled to judge and to punish their 
sovereign." (H.491) His conclusion is relatively simple and indeed 
unexceptionable "From the memorable revolutions which passed in England 
during this period, we may naturally deduce the same useful lesson which 
Charles himself in his latter years inferred of necessity, to assume 
more authority than the laws have allowed them." (H.492-3). He then 
adds a decidedly Humean rider, however, "It must be confessed that these 
events furnish us with another instruction ........... concerning the 
madness of the people, the fires of fanaticism and the danger of 
mercenary armies . 11 (H.493), 
III 
Now in general (like Montesquieu) Hume claimed to be a scientist of manJ 
explaining not recommending. These two remarks are not, however, 
simply explanation - although they arise out of Hume's explanations of 
the events leading up to the execution of Charles I - and it is 
precisely this relationship between explanation and activity (or the 
recommendation or condemnation of activity) that I shall want to turn to 
later on. For the moment it is enough to say that Hume's'History' 
attempts to explain the past and - certainly - to draw lessons from it, 
but the lessons are prudential ones. Hume may offer advice, but he 
does not preach; he does not make the mistake Schlick was warning against, 
and that I quoted in Chapter 1, yet he does prescribe (or so I shall argue) 
far more radically than Schlick was willing to allow was proper for a philosopher. 
These then, are the hallmarks of Hume's philosophical method. How 
exactly does he apply them to politics? To examine this I shall 
discuss in detail one famous aspect of his political thought - the 
critique of contract theory and his account of political allegiance. 
This topic constitutes a battle-field that has been fought over many 
times by scholars of varying allegiances and I do not intend to trace 
36 
all of the by-ways and alley-ways that the debate has followed. My 
intention is to demonstrate how Hume used the method described above. 
to address himself to one of the perennial subjects of debate among 
political philosophers - the problem of political obligation. 
Hume treated this problem most fully in the Treatise and his argument, 
in general 1 is so well known that I need do no more than sketch in the 
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essential element here. Having initially discussed the nature of morality, 
arguing that "morality is more properly felt than judged of'' (T.470) 37 
Hume alleges that "there are some virtues that produce pleasure and 
approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, which arise from the 
circumstances and necessities of mankind" (T.477). It is of this kind, 
that Hume takes justice to be. However, "though the rules of justice be 
artificial they are not arbitrary" (T.484). The priority that Hume 
accords justice, essentially treating it as the cornerstone of social 
life, suggests that in this, if in little else, he would agree with 
" Rawls that justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth 
38 is of systems of thought.'' He examines next how "the rules of justice 
are established by the artifice of men," (T.484) and also "the reasons 
which determine us to attribute to the observance or neglect of these on 
moral beauty and deformity" (T.484). For the first he argues that man 
needs certain things which he can never get by himself, and "·Tis by 
society alone he is able to supply his defects" (T.485). Society then 
binds men together through, Hume insists, mutual self-interest - a remedy 
not derived from nature but from artifice (see T.489) and can be done 
only "by a convention entered into by all the members of the society to 
bestow stability on the possession of these external goods, and leave 
everyone in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his 
fortune and industry" (T.489). 
Hume stresses, however, that "this convention is not in the nature of a 
promise. For even promises themselves ........... arise from human 
conventions " (T.490)- a point which is of great importance for his 
attack on contract theory - and he asserts that "after this convention, 
concerning abstinence from the possessions of others, is entered into, 
and everyone has acquired a stability in his possessions, there 
immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice; as also those of 
property, right and obligation." (T.490-1). 
There is a good deal more detailed argumentation about justice and 
property, including Hume's discussion of the obligation of promises 
(T. 516-525) before Hume turns, in Section VII of the Treatise to the 
origin of government and, in Section VIII, to the source of allegiance. 
"Nothing is more certain'' argues Hume in the opening paragraph of 
Section VII "than that men are, in a great measure, governed by interest, 
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and that even when they extend their concern beyond themselves, 'tis 
not to any great distance; nor is it usual for them, in common life, 
to look further than their nearest friends and acquaintance" (T.534): 
furthermore, "men are mightily governed by the imagination and 
proportion their affections more to the light under which any object 
appears to them, than to its real and intrinsic value. What strikes 
upon them with a strong and lively idea commonly prevails ~bove what 
lies in a more obscure light." (T. 534-4). 
This quality, Hume says, "not only is very dangerous to society, but 
also seems to be incapable of any variety (T.538) ...... ~ .. . 
(since) if it is to be impossible for us to prefer what is remote 'tis 
equally impossible for us to submit to any necessity which would 
oblige us to such a method of acting ............ " (T. 536). InHume's 
view, however, it is precisely this infirmity which gives us the 
remedy: "the provision we make against our negligence" he argues, 
"proceeds merely from our natural inclination to that negligence" 
(T. 536). Men cannot change their natures, but they can change their 
situation and "render the observance of justice the immediate interest 
of some particular persons and its violation the more remote " (T.537) 
and it is thus, argues Hume, that government arises. Now government, 
though very advantageous and usually necessary, is not always necessary. 
Although it is possible to maintain a small uncultivated society without 
government, says Hume, it cannot be maintained without the Laws 
concerning the stability of possession, its transference by consent and 
the performance of promises." These are, therefore, antecedent to 
government, and are supposed to impose an obligation p.r.ior to the 
obligation before "the duty of allegiance to civil magistrates had once 
been thought." (T. 542). It is after this that Hume notes the 
"fashionable system of politics" (T.542), which argues that "Government 
and superiority can only be established by consent: the consent of men 
in establishing government imposes on them a new obligation, unknown to 
the laws of nature. Men, therefore, are bound to obey their magistrates, 
only because they promise it.h (T.542) 
Hume concedes that this will (or may) be so at the first institution of 
government "yet it quickly takes root of itself and has an original 
obligation and authority, independent of all contracts." (T.542). 
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Hume's argument in support of this contention is founded on the fact, 
which he feels he has already proved, that natural justice itself (as 
well as civil) is dependent upon human conventions and, therefore, it 
is fruitless "to resolve the one into the other and seek, in the laws of 
nature, a stronger foundation for our political duties than interest and 
human conventions." (T.543). Hume's argument depends on his identifying 
the performance of promises - like the other laws of nature, - as "an 
effect of the institution of government, and not the obedience to 
government as an effect of the obligation to a promise." (T.543). The 
first motive of the intention of government, Hume continues, "as well as 
the performance of both, is nothing but self-interest, and since there is 
a separate interest in the obedience to government, from that in the 
performance of promises, we must allow of a separate obligation." (T.544). 
His final argument against consent is derived "from the universal consent 
of mankind." (T.546). First he points out that "there is a moral 
obligation to submit to government because everyone thinks so, it must 
be as certain, that this obligation arises not from a promise, since 
no-one whose judgement has not been led astray by too strict adherence 
to a system of philosophy, has ever yet dreamt of ascribing it to that 
origin." (T.547). 
Secondly, he argues that the only kind of "promise'' there could 
conceivably have been would be a tacit one, "where the will is signified 
by other more diffuse signs than those of speech; but a will there must 
certainly be in the case, and that can never escape the person's notice, 
who exerted it, however silent or tacit. But were you to ask the far 
greater part of the nation whether they had even consented to the 
authority of their rulers, or promised to obey them they would be intlined 
to think very strangely of you; and would certainly reply, that the affair 
depended not on their consent that that they were born to such an obedience." 
( T. 54 7-8) . 
Most of these arguments are repeated (with some deletions and alterations 
of style), in the relevant sections of the second Enquiry, (EPM. p.183-211), 
and inHume's various essays dealing with the same topics, "Of the First 
Principle of Government", "Of the Origin of Government", and especially 
"Of the Original Contract'', and "Of Passive Obedience:". In the original 
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contract essay he also dismisses almost contemptuously "divine-right" 
theories using an argument he was later to use to great effect in his 
essay on suicide, to the effect that "Whatever actually happens is 
comprehended in the general plan or intention of providence; nor has the 
greatest and most lawful prince any more reason, upon that account, to 
plead a peculiar sacredness or inviolable authority, than an inferior 
magistrate, or even an usurper, or even a robber and a pirate." 
39 (PW: 3: 444). 
In this brief outline of Hume's views on political obligation, we can 
see the practical application of his method sketched earlier. It is, a 
secular approach, most obviously in its dismissal of divine-right theory, 
but also in its attack on contract theory which, in the case of many 
writers - Locke, for example - had a religious basis. Hume grounds 
political obligation firmly in our nature and the conventions that arise 
from it, and his references to "providence'' only serve to explain it away 
and eliminate its influence. The approach is empirical - it appeals to 
facts about ourselves and our situations that are - Hume thinks -
testable. Have we consented to government? Well ask and see - and, of 
course, his answer is no. Finally, of course, it is sceptical. Hume is 
arguing that it is stretching reason, flying in the face of the 
observable facts and simply unnecessary to ascribe political allegiance 
specifically to Divine Authority or to an elaborate 'contract' between 
government and governed. 
Moreover, in attacking contract theory Hume is undercutting one of the 
influential strands in Enlightenment political thought. It is true, of 
course, that he was more in keeping with the Mainstream here that might 
at first be thought. The greatest propagators of contract theory in the 
Enlightenment were Rousseau and Kant - neither of whom were, in this 
respect representative of the Mainstream Enlightenment (for reasons I have 
already discussed). 
There is, however, a crucial difference between Hume and the mainstream 
Enlightenment. On this question Montesquieu, for example, in some 
respects so close to Hume, believed as strongly as Hume, that it was 
folly to "try a Greek or Roman by the Common Laws of England". But 
nonetheless. he enunciated (as Hume did not) the characteristic belief 
of the Mainstream Enlightenment, in an ultimate, universal standard 
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of some sort, and (as we saw in Chapterthue) he was followed in this by 
Diderot, Voltaire, Becceria, Condorcet and the other luminaries of 
the mainstream. It is this which allows Becker to charge that the 
Enlightenment constructs its own heavenly city 
argued in Chapter one, he is wrong to do so). 
(though , as I 
Hume's empiricism was, of course, to a large extent shared by these 
~0 
writers (as he freely acknowledged). It was part of the common 
Newtonian, Lockean inheritance of the Enlightenment. So too, by and large, 
was his secularism ~ though not necessarily in as radical or as 
uncompromising a way. However, what makes for the real difference in 
Hume is the character of his scepticism, and how that alters his approach 
to philosophy and to 'philosophical politics'. 
His critique of contract theory illustrates this very well. The argument 
as it is couched is generally 'sceptical' in tone in what we might call 
the 'weak' sense of 'sceptical' inHume. i.e. it is doubtful about, and 
destructive of' received wisdom' (in this case the idea that, to be 
legitimate a government must be based on consent). without (in any sense) 
being Pyrronhean. At the same time,to see Hume's critique in its full 
light, a number of other considerations must be borne in mind, 
specifically, his writings on religion, and his scepticism about Causation. 
It is in these works, essentially the long essay The Natural History of 
Religion, the essay on Miracles, the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 
(of which I shall have more to say later) and essays like On Suicide, that 
Hume's destructive scepticism is most openly on view. 
In the essay on suicide, for example, Hume argues that "if suicide be 
criminal it must be a transgression of our duty either to our neighbour, 
or ourselves." ( PW:4 407). Hume then takes on his clerically minded 
opponents on their own ground and argues that "All events in one sense, 
may be pronounced the action of the Almighty; they all proceed from these 
powers with which He has endowed His creatures." ( PW:4 408). Thus, he 
continues, "were the disposal of human life so much reserved as the 
peculiar province of the Almighty, that it were an encroachment on His right 
for men to dispose of their own lives, it would be equally criminal to act 
for the preservation of life as for its destruction. If I turn aside a 
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stone which is falling upon my head, I disturb the course of nature and I 
invade the peculiar of the Almighty", ( PW:4 410 ). Hume therefore 
concludes that, as "Providence guides all these causes and nothing happens 
in the universe without its consent and co-operation ....... then neither 
does my death, however voluntary, happen without its consent" ( PW:4 412). 
One can imagine, of course, the pleasure Hume would take in outlining this 
argument. David Hume, the 'Great Infidel' justifying suicide on 'religious' 
grounds! More germane to my purpose, however, is the parallel between this 
and that argument against 'passive obedience' and 'Divine-right' theories 
41 
of political obligation that I have already quoted. 
What these two arguments show is the method of Humean 'scepticism' turned 
on two distinct (albeit semi-related) areas. This scepticism is not 
p-yrrho·ni.an~it does not doubt the 'existence' of certain feelings, beliefs, 
or arguments; it merely suggests that we are not justified, even if we possess 
those beliefs, is arguing for certain conclusion contrary to 'natural 
reason'. 
Reason for Hume, of course, is not what it is for Kant, Rousseau, or even 
Montesquieu, but that famous phrase about reason being the slave of the 
passions has perhaps coloured subsequent interpretations of the role of 
Reason in Hume's thought. Hume, no less than the other philosophes 
believed that 'Reason' was vital for Enlightenment, a cause to which he 
was as much committedas they, though he was perhaps more realistic about 
its inevitable 'success'. 42 · But 'Reason' concerned not the ends but the 
means of achieving such enlightenment. 
There is another element to Hume's scepticism which must be remembered here, 
however, an aspect best brought out by his much trumpeted scepticism about 
Causatio.n. As has been said "No element of Hume 's philosophy has had a 
greater and more lasting influence than his theory of causality. It has 
been frequently attacked, and frequently misunderstood." 43 
Hume's general position here is well known and I need do no more than give 
a brief sketch of it. He first states that all reasonings concerning 
matters of fact are founded on the relation of cause and effect and that 
we can never infer the existence of one object from another, unles they be 
connected together either mediately or immediately." (T.649). Now Hume 
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takes causation to be a compound concept; that is to say it comprises more 
than one crucial idea: to be precise, of course, Hume's famous trinity -
priority, contiguity and necessary connexion. The arguments that have 
raged over this trinity are endless, but I want to concentrate on the last 
and most important - the idea of necessary connexion which leads to the 
'nerve' of his theory of causality (as Ayer has called it 44 ). It is the 
question which, according to Kemp Smith "Hume has been keeping in reserve 
th h t 11 th d . d. . II 45 "Wh t . . d f roug ou a e prece 1ng 1scuss1on ; a 1s our 1 ea o 
necessity when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together." 
(T.155 ). 
Hume's answer to this question involves first,denying that there is any 
logical relation between independant matters of fact (T.138-40) and 
secondly, that there is no such thing as natural (as opposed to logical) 
necessity either. It is this second point that Hume illustrates by 
recourse to his famous billiard-ball argument. As he says in the Abstract: 
When I see a billiard ball moving towards another, my mind is immediately 
carried by habit to the usual effect and anticipates my sight by conceiving 
the second ball in motion. But is this all? Do I nothing but conceive 
the motion of the second ball? No surely, I also believe ihat it will move. 
Where then, is this belief? ( Abstract: T. 655-657 ). 
So, given that we do have the idea of necessary connection and given also 
we have it as a belief, from what impression (Hume continues to ask) is it 
derived? He argues (T.139) that not only is there 'nothing in any object 
considered in itself' which affords us a reason for drawing a conclusion 
beyond it (my emphasis) but that "even after the observation of the frequent 
or constant conjunction of objects we have no reason to draw any inference 
concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experienceu(T.139). 
From this Hume ultimately concludes, however, that the 'impression' from 
which the idea of necessary connection is derived, is one of feeling and 
imagination. As he puts it in the first Enquiry "the mind is carried 
by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant 
and to believe that it will exist." (E.175. My emphasis). It is in this 
feeling that Hume locates the impression from which is derived the idea of 
necessary connection .. Thus causation, like morality (though not in the 
same way) is 'more properly felt, than judged of'. 
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Now this is only the flimsiest abbreviation of Hume's rich and complex 
argumentation in this section of the Treatise or the first Enquiry, but 
sufficient I hope for my my purpose. Remember that Hume's technique, on 
arguing against the idea of an original contract, or against the prohibition 
on suicide, is not to doubt the existence of certain 'feelings' or 'concepts' 
only to question their logical validity. Here in his theory of causation, 
we meet the same technique again. Hume never denies that events are caused, 
and suggestions that he did excited weary (if at times heated) rebuttals. 
~ John Stewarts suggestion that this is what Hume does, made in an essay, 
included in the first volume of the Essays and Observations, Physical & 
Literary, published by the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh in 1754, 
elicited from Hume a letter which makes his position on this quite clear. 
"I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise 
without a cause " Hume writes, "I only maintained that our certainty 
of the falsehood of that proposition proceeded neither from intuition nor 
demonstration, but from another source." (LI. p.185). This scepticism, then 
is informed by lack of other options for Hume, it does not produce (dare I 
say cause) his arguments. His further remark, in the same lette0 
amplifies this point: "There are many different kinds of certainty "he 
chides Stewart" and some of them ~s satisfactory to the mind, tho' perhaps 
not so regular as the demonstrative kind." 
Hume's scepticism is designed to show these'many kinds of certainty' at work 
in human knowledge, morality and politics ,not to deny that there is such a 
thing as certainty. In this regard, Hume stands outside both the 
mainstream and minor currents of Enlightenment thought who both, in 
different ways and for different reasons,believed in certainty not 
certainties; but he stands too,at the opposite position from Kant by not 
0 46 
attempting to synthesize these two strains and by deny~ng (as Kant accepted) 
an essential element in both. It is his 'scepticism' (as I have interpreted 
it here) which brings this about more than any other aspect of his 
philosophy. 
IV 
Critics and interpreters of Hume, from Stewart, Reid and Beattie in his own 
day to philosophers in our own, have often missed, or misinterpreted,this 
point andtas a result, have often missed or misinterpreted the requisite 
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conclusions to be drawn from it. I shall return to these conclusions in 
47 
a moment, but first I want to briefly digress on the subject of 
contemporary Humean exegesis. The point here is that commentators on Hume 
can be roughly divided into those who believe that Hume's philosophical 
method in some (ascertainable) way determines his political conclusions, 
and those who do not. 
As an example of the first school of thought let me take David Miller. 48 
Miller's argument is predicated upon an analysis of Hume's general philosophy 
which, he thinks, yields a theory of judgement which "has three main 
features which will prove to be of significance for his social and political 
thought. First ..... he has given an account of how judgements are made .. 
..... second, it has been shown that the judgements thus made are incapable 
of being rationally vindicated ....... third, it does not follow from these 
premises that our judgement cannot be improved ........ Mitigated scepticism 
shows how better judgement is possible but is suitably modest about the 
character of the improvement." 49 
Miller further argues that Hume's moral theory is dependent on his theory of 
the understanding in two respects: "First, processes in the understanding 
are referred to in order to explain how moral judgements are made ...... . 
second, the general thrust of Hume's moral theory may be described as 
mitigated scepticism and in this respect it closely parallels his theory of 
the understanding, the parallelism being not merely a formal similarity but 
a result of the connection just noted." 50 
Miller's conclusion is that "Hume's theory of moral and political judgement 
was intended to have practical implications ...... Hume assumes that men's 
actions are sometimes affected by their beliefs about what ought to be done 
in a given set of circumstances ....... if this is true, a theory of 
judgement - which examines the justification that may be offered for beliefs, 
separates the adequate from the inadequate and indicates the extent to which 
improvement in judgements are possible - will have practical consequences 
for anyone who embraces it. Such a theory forms the case of Hume's 
philosophy." 51 
I have chosen to present Miller's account in some detail because 
it is one of the most coherant and sophisticated attempts to trace some 
sort of necessary relation between Hume's general philosophy and his 
political philosophy and to argue that this political philosophy had practical 
implications for conduct. 52 On this view, then, Hume is in no sense an 
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'Under-labourer' , or a representative of the 'Humpty Dumpty' or 'Red 
Queen' schools of thought, as it has so frequently been alleged that he 
was, whilst at the same time it does not deny that his approach in 
philosophy is largely explanatory in mode. Against this, some very 
distinguished scholars of Hume - and Duncan Forbes is perhaps the best 
example here - have argued that this approach to Humean exegesis and 
analysis is largely a mistaken one. 53 Forbes is, for example, far less 
sanguine about attempts to isolate the "philosophical" influences on 
Hume's politics. from the "ideological" ones than Miller is: "the more 
of his [i.e. Hume's] writings one takes into account, the less confident 
one feels that one can ever break through. This is the 'general impression' 
that one ought to get but one will not get it by trying to get a general 
impression," 54 and he adds that,"obviously, if a past political thinker 
is to be made relevant to us, all sorts of adjustments have to be made and 
allowances for the times he lived in and the special needs of the circumstances 
as he saw them." 55 Forbes thinks that if one is to properly 
appreciate and understand Hume's science of politics, one must take one's 
bearings on the definition offered in the introduction to the Treatise: 
'politics consider men as united in society and dependant on each other'. 
"This is broad enough" Forbes suggests "to take one right across all 
Hume's writings from the Treatise to the History a perilous journey which 
philosophers,as such,are rarely called upon to face. They can confine 
themselves to the Treatise and the Enquiries, or even just the former, and 
quarrel over meanings and ~nterpretations without having to ~ this 
controversial material." 5 
Over and above this argument, more radical in one sense than either Forbes 
or Miller, is the view that Hume held speculative and practical philosophy 
as methodologically distinct enquiries, and that,therefore, (of course) his 
general philosophy in no sense paves the way for his moral philosophy. The 
I 
most recent such interpretation is David Fate Nortons. He has offered a 
detailed interpretation of Hume 57 in defence of three main theses:-
"(1) Hume's philosophy developed in response to two quite distinguishable 
philosophical crises, a speculative crisis and a moral crisis or, as may 
be preferable, in response to two kinds of scepticism, epistemological and 
moral. 
(2) Hume's responses to these dis.tinct scepticisms, his metaphysics and 
his theory of morals, respectively differed substantially in method and 
substance. 
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(3) Hume was fully cognizant of the differences between his sceptical 
speculative position and his common-sensical moral theory, and in fact 
gave reasonably clear ........... reasons for supposing metaphysics and 
moral theory to be distinct and (partially) different philosophical 
enterprises." 58 
Obviously, it will be said, these three interpretations, (and the many 
others that in certain senses are similar to them) cannot all be right - but 
I would like to offer a reason for supposing that they are all right in one 
very important sense. This revolves around two contentions: the first a 
conceptual confusion about the nature and role of "philosophy" ·and Hume 's 
view of it, and the second, a consequent re-evaluation of the nature of 
Hume's philosophical enterprise itself. 
First then, all serious scholars of Hume have taken to heart Selby-Bigge's 
words in the introduction to his edition of the Enquiries, "(Hume) says so 
many different things in so many different ways and different connections, 
and with so much indifference to what he has said before, that it is very 
hard to say positively that he has taught, or did not teach, this or that 
particular doctrine ....... This makes it easy to find all philosophies in 
Hume, or be setting up one statement against anotherornone at all." 59 
All the three scholars I have quoted above have said similar things, albeit 
in different ways, and yet seemed not to have realised that, as a result of 
this, Hume's writings, more than most philosophers, must be read as a 
general whole, rather than as specific parts of a wider whole. Forbes, to 
be sure, stresses this but seems to ignore its obvious philosophical 
application, perhaps because (as he continually remarks) his enquiry is 
historical, not philosophica1? 0 
The essential point is that Hume did not consider himself any the less a 
philosopher when writing his Essays, or even his History, as when writing 
the Treatise. The application of his method - empirical, secular and 
sceptical - is broadly the same across the whole field of his literary 
activity. Fate Norton is right in saying that Hume saw a difference 
between speculative and practical philosophy, but wrong in saying that 
therefore his method differed. What differed were the results Hume expected 
to ~from his method - though even here, the difference was chiefly in 
degree, rather than in kind, as my analysis of Hume's scepticism suggests. 
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When Norton says that, for Hume, the kind of truth available in morals is 
significantly different from that available in metaphysics" 61 he is only, 
I think, half-right. He feels that the difference lies in the fact that 
moral judgements or decisions are for Hume "a particular kind of reaction 
to a complete situation of a certain character ....... In such cases, our 
62 
sentiments serve to reveal the character of the situation to us." 
Speculative philosophy, however, "is characterised by its incompleteness, 
or by its attempts to expand our knowledge from the known to the unknown. 
In this case we must rely on reason, for it is reason that 'judges' the 
relations of ideas or matters of fact." 63 The implication here is that, 
for Hume certain situations will necessarily provide certain sentiments in 
us and this I think is a misunderstanding of Hume's main point in moral 
philosophy. 
As I suggested earlier, ( p p. 115 -116) Hume has a considerable appreciation 
of the variety of human social experience. Even if we concede that he 
believes (at least in certain parts of the Treatise) that human nature is 
always ultimately the same, the point is made largely irrelevant by his 
recognition of the almost infinite variety of the manifestations of "human 
nature". Hume is also very aware that much moral experience should be 
culturally defined in a particular social context - his discussion of the 
topic in ''A Dialogue" shows that, and it has even been plausibly suggested 
that Hume displayed a nee-evolutionary theory of man and society, 64 though 
65 I think that is perhaps reading over-much into a number of Hume's works. 
However, one does not have to go to this extreme in order to realise that 
Hume's view of morality and society are in many respects as "incomplete'' 
(I use Norton's own term) as his views on metaphysics and, although he 
certainly feels that in speculative reasoning, reason can make some 
difference whereas in moral reasoning it is far less likely to, our moral 
sentiments are not fixed save by convention (socially created) and so, 
although one must be suitably modest here, reason can have some effect in 
morals and politics by helping to 'guide' our 'bents of mind' and habits 
of behaviour (i.e. by showing to us 'dispositions' that our passions -
properly understood - desire). 
It is illuminating, I think, in this respect to consider Hume's last work -
the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. In a brilliant essay on the 
Dialogues 66 Mossner points out two things vital for any understanding of 
the Dialogues'rightful place in an appreciationof Hume's work. The 
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first is their importance to Hume personally - witnessed by his constant 
revision of them (even on his d~ath-bed) and the meticulous care he took 
to ensure their posthumous publication. The second is the role of irony 
in their construction. "Hume grew up during the hey-day of Satire" 
Mossner reminds us "and relished the writing of Swift, a master of ironic 
prose. It is not surprising then, though virtually unnoticed, that irony 
is an indispensible factor of the Dialogues and holds, in truth, the key 
to its basic teachings." 67 This irony is found in many things - in 
Cleanthes supposed "Victory'' in the debate, in Hume's artful use of 
Pamphilus (with the conscious echoes of Ciceo's de Natura Deorum) and if 
this irony is ignored the Dialogues cannot be properly understood. 
Mossner concludes that The Dialogues is the 11 final marriage of philosophy 
with art that had been Hume's ambition throughout a long career as a man 
of letters." 68 and something else that he makes clear (also emphasised 
by Kemp Smith in his introduction to the Dialogues) is their prevailing 
scepticism. Mossner comments that a sceptic is, "perpetually re-thinking 
his principles. Scepticism, first and last, is a frame of mind, neither 
a collection nor a system of doctrines and it frequently ends with 
suspense of judgement," 69 and notes, surely wisely, how perfect a setting 
the inevitable ambivalence of a dialogue is for a sceptical philosopher 
like Hume. This is undeniably true of Hume's presentation of his religious 
views, not only in the Dialogues, but in the essay on Miracles, and the 
posthumously published essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul, 
and it goes a long way to explaining the continued debate over who exactly 
is Hume's real spokesman in the Dialogues (though, that it is Philo seems 
to me impossible to deny). Furthermore (as Forbes continually points out) 
Hume's political thought is incomplete if consideration of his criticism 
of "the religious hypothesis" is excluded. While Forbes ts right in this, 
however, he seemingly ignores his own advice by trying continually to 
"down-grade" Hume's scepticism, which is the most important part of his 
attack on that "religious hypothesis". In Forbes' case, this is as much 
I suspect, a rhetorical point as.an historical one and is done in order 
to bolster the interpretation of Hume's political theory as "constructive, 
forward-looking, a programme of modernization, an education for backward 
looking men." 70 'Scepticism' is seen as a danger to this account because 
of its allegedly negative impact. It is this same fear that leads Norton 
to discuss five types of scepticisms that were not Hume's 71 (though he 
may have borrowed substantially from at least one of them - what Norton 
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calls "Academic Scepticism") in order to show that, however sceptical he 
may have been about reason's role in morals, he was not sceptical about 
its role in "speculative" thought- and that,therefore~Hume was not party 
to the "subordination'' thesis (of reason to passion) in the completely 
naturalistic manner ascribed to him by Kemp Smith, Stroud and others. 
Yet on the interpretation of Humean Scepticism offered in this Chapter, 
this no longer becomes a problem because (as Mossner says) scepticism is 
as much a 'frame of mind' as a set of doctrines and Hume's scepticism 
does not imply a denial of certainty, nor does it imply (as Hamann and 
Navalis seemed to think) 72 raising mere 'Belief' above fact or 
knowledge in determining or judging opinions. It simply means that, as 
Hume wrote in his letter to Stewart, there are many kinds of certainty, 
and a wise man adapts his mind (and habit) to the kind of certainty 
appropriate for the situation. In the Dialogues, Philo destroys the 
argument from design, again (as in the case of suicide and the original 
contract) largely by arguing on his opponents' 'own ground', as it were, 
showing the arguments to be vacuous&implies that men should adapt their 
'bent of mind' (as Hume puts it in his essay on The Sceptic) away from 
it, but the ironical ending of the Dialogue (i.e. Cleanthes 'victory') 
is Burne's way of indicating that the fires of passion may well be strong 
enough to prevent that and that anyway- "There are many kinds of certainty''· 
For himself, Hume has no doubt that to understand man, one must. be 
prepared to accept the great variety of human nature and that even though one 
pet~son's 'bent of mind' may be 'insensibly improved' by art and philosophy, 
others may not be. 
His attempted explanation of the various manifestations of human nature 
varies with subject and circumstance but the method he uses as the 
premiss for explanation and description is the same. "First to last, 
Treatise to Dialogues, Hume is ever the sceptic'', writes Mossner "true 
to his own premiss that human nature is the only science of man". 73 
v 
This leaves one question left to be answered - what, in the field of 
politics,did Hume truly expect of this method? Is Miller right, for 
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example, in thinking that in some sense Hume meant it to have practical 
applications for conduct - even though he may not be right about the 
exact manner in which these applications were manifested (i.e. a theory 
of judgement?). Is Harrison right in thinking that Hume considered 
explanation and recommendation as part of the same enquiry? 
The answer is characteristically Humean; both yes and no. In one sense, 
I think Miller is right - although it is conceding very little to say it, 
as even many commentators who generally do not accept that Hume's general 
philosophy was meant to have practical moral implications would agree with 
it. 74 That is that it is at least intended to have critical - negative 
if you like - implications. Even Forbes who, (rightly I think) emphasises 
Hume's continuity with much of the Natural Law theory he criticised, 
accepts that Hume's critical fire was directed at theories he wanted to show 
as false and that,therefore, he wanted- at the very least- people to stop 
thinking or acting on the l:Bsis of these false theories 5 or giving them as - in any 
sense - a premiss for an argument or a reason for their actions, (as 
Pnilo's arguments in the Dialogues are designed to do, for example). 
. . I 
In this sense, Hume shows up one error common to all Humpty Dumpty' and 
'Red Queen' theorists of whatever philosophical stamp - the belief that 
explanation and description do not, in some sense lead on to action · or 
the refraining from action; that they do not have, in themselves, a 
prescriptive effect. Even constructing a theory is action - of a sort -
and demolishing theories means, by implication, asking others to recognize 
their invalidity and refraining from their conceptual use. Hume certainly 
took this view and so would all 20th Century positivists and their fellow 
travellers with regard to "metaphysics" - so why part company over 'morals'? 
Not, I think, because Hume felt that the same did not apply in morality 
(which is essentially what Norton argues) but because he felt that his 
explanation of the nature of morality, if it was correct, .made it virtually 
impossible in most cases for even the most telling argument to actually 
affect our conduct or our moral choices, because - quite rightly, even 
necessarily - our sentiments are involved in morality in a way that they 
are not with purely speculative concerns~ indeed that it was this that 
characterised a specifically 'moral' choice. Yet even here, Hume wants to 
say, there was something that could be don·e, in that an understanding of 
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why we act as we do act and how we organise out society as we do, will 
help us to recognise hypocrisy and possible danger to our mutually 
connected social well-being and individual self-interest. Mistakes in 
philosophy are, for Hume, usually merely ridiculous but can,nevertheless, 
be pernicious (as for example, social contract theory). Yet Hume was 
sceptical enough to suspect that all his criticism would not be enough to 
'scotch the snake' once and for all. As the ambiguous ending of the 
Dialogues suggests and as Adam Smith's 'charon' anecdote 75 amplifies, 
Hume was fully conscious of the natural longevity of superstition. 
Johnathan Harrison expresses surprise that after Hume's devastating 
76 
critique, contract theory still survives (and indeed flourishes); Hume, 
I suspect, would not have been surprised in the least. 
The real significance of Hume's scepticism is that no_enquiry is to be 
taken as final - in metaphysics, epistemplogy, morals or politics. Hume 
believed that we could express some - though very few - general laws in 
politics, but his use of them makes them appear as rules of thumb, rather 
than "laws" in any scientific or quasi-legalistic sense. But even these, 
he suggests, are only provisional. The ''implications" of his method for 
practical activity are chiefly, though not exclusively, concerned with 
showing us that we can, by ingenuity, make our passions serve us when in 
their natural state they might harm us. Hume's discussion of the origin 
of government, where precisely this argumment is used, shows this. A 
first step, however, has to be a clear e~planation of Hhy He are 
motivated as we are, and this Hume offers. Thus, Hume's conception of the 
relationship between philosophy and politics is a much closer one than 
many of his modern followers would allow, without being "necessary" in a 
Hobbesean (or even Lockean) sense. Our explanations will inevitably have 
practical consequences of some sort, but they will not be fixed, or 
necessary and may be affected by a wide variety of other factors. This 
goes beyond Miller's claim that Hume's political theorY is linked to his 
general philosophy by a theory of 'judgement'. To be sure it is, but as 
Norman Kemp Smith said of Hume's ethics, Hume's political theory is 
integral to his general philosophical outlook and stands or falls together 
with it 77 and involves more than his theory of judgement because it 
embraces the whole of his philosophical enterprise that I would want to 
characterize by the word 'sceptical' (used as I have used the word here). 
At the same time 1 I do not wish to deny the substance of Forbes' argument 
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that the history of ideas and political theory more generally is messy and 
it is difficult to exactly pinpoint where philosophy ends and ideology begins 
(always assuming a sensible distinction between these two terms can be made). 
This point is itself a very Humean one. As Hume himself wrote in his essay 
the_Sceptic "the chief triumph of art and philosophy (is that) it insensibly 
refines the temper, .and it points out to us those dispositions which ~e should 
endeavour to attain, by a const~nt bent of mind, and by repeated habit " 
124. My emphasis). 
This last remark surely indicates, however, that Hume intends his science of 
man to have practical implications, just as did Montesquieu, Rousseau and 
Kant. 'Habit' is an important aspect of Hume's philosophy from his 
epistemplogy to his political theory. It is habit which creates the impression 
that leads to the idea of necessary connection; habit which creates the 
strongest ties of sympathy, and habit which can often bind together, ruler 
and ruled. Habit, however, ~be effected by thought; not def initely or 
necessarily, but it can and,suggests Hume, will do so, if philosophy is 
pursued. 
On this point Hume does, largely, agree with the rest of the Enlightenment. 
Art and philosophy, he suggests, work 'insensibly' on our minds and habits-
but chiefly, of course, if we pay some attention to art and philosophy. This 
is what Enlightenment is all about and, therefore, why the mainstream 
Enlightenment so deplored the arguments of Rousseau's first Discours but Hume, 
while sharing the distastE the philosophes felt for this, was far less 
sanguine than they about the prospects for such Enlightenment, (as Becker 
notes 78 ). The fact that this is so, however, does not mean that the project 
is a failure, or that Hume conceived it as such. Macintyre, like many others, 
seems to fear the 'suspension of judgement', the'many certainties: that Hume's 
scepticism leads to, but Hume does not. Nor does he regard it as reducing 
morality to a series of interminably clashing wills (though many of his 
professed admirers both in the Counter Enlightenment and in contemporary 
philosophy do believe this) 79 or have complete faith in what John Dunn has 
called the "socializing powers which can be imputed to all societies". 80 
To impute to Hume, as Dunn does, a "purely internal conception of rational 
human agency (that) has left human individuals .......... increasingly 
on their own and devoid of rational direction in social or political action"81 
is a misrepresentation of Hume's thought, as I hope this chapter has shown. 
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We are not 'devoid of rational direction'; indeed, on the contrary, Hume's 
thought is full of ways in which we can (and should) allow ourselves to be 
rationally directed through _our response to a whole range of issues and 
situations. Of course, it is also Hume's view that in many cases our'close 
and immediate' interest or passion will blind us to our long term interest 
and thus our reason will work towards the former and not the latter. This) 
for Hume,is an error but it is still, after a fashion, being 'rationally 
directed'. 
Interestingly, what appears to be behind Dunn's thought (as it is behind 
Macintyre's - more explicitly) is a cry for a unitary conception of Reason. 
A conception located outside ourselves but at the same time autonomous within 
us. In this regard his great exemplar is Locke (as Macintyre's is Aristotle). 
"Locke presumed" Durm argues "that there were strict theoretical implications 
between the abandonment of theocentrism the acceptance of a purely internal 
conception of human rational agency and the resting of all human rights and 
duties upon the contingencies of human opinion ...... If there is indeed 
nothing rationally to human existence, individually and socially, but opinion, 
82 it will certainly be bad news if opinion ever falters." 
As far as Locke is concerned, Dunn is, I think, quite right and more 
interestingly for my purpose, similar echoes can be found in some writers 
of the Enlightenment, especially Rousseau and Kant. My arguments for this 
contention will, I hope, be apparent from ChaptersThr.ee'·and- Fo..11r of the·pr:esent work 
It is true also that Hume (and Adam Smith, whom Dunn couples with Hume in 
his article) fails to share this view. It is not true, however, that Hume 
' was faciley optimistic about the 'socializing powers imputed to all 
societies;as I have shown, he was very well aware of the powers of 
'superstition' (as he would term it) to prevent that socialization. 
Moreover, (as Forbes has argued) Hume's political theory was(in part) 'an 
education for backward looking men' and although he abandoned theocentrism 
Hume did not mean by this simply' resting all human rights and duties upon 
the contingencies of opinion' except in the very general sense that all human 
'rights and duties' are ultimately contingent on their faults being recognized 
by the humans to whom they are meant to apply. Hume 's criticism of 
'religious hypothesis' removed (for him) any possibility of there being a 
theological base to these rights and duties, but it did not shoot him straight 
into emotivism. His arguments were meant to hold the ring between the views 
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of the ethical rationalists 83 and pyrrhon:ia.n sceptics and. thus not 
simply to reduce everything to opinion but to understand why we come to 
the sorts of opinions we do about morals and politics and therefore to 
find a securer base for those opinions than that provided by the'religious 
hypothesis'. Hume 's answer to Locke (and by extension to Dunn and i"hcintyre) is that, 
as the religious arguments cannot any longer provide an adequate external 
support for our opinions, then something else will have to be found and it 
is this question that his political theory - and his 'science of man' - sets 
out to answer. Hume is a naturalist because he finds this answer in our 
nature (and the nature of our situation); he is a sceptic because of the 
character and status of the arguments used to discover and probe this 
naturalism. 84 His theory is most emphatically not what the under-labourers, 
the emotivists, the partisans of Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen thought 
it was, because it has inescapable conclusions for our practical life; 
inescapable not because they 'morally' proclaim this way of life or 
that- not because they 'preach' (in Schlicks contemptuous word ) -but 
because they present a view of man's nature,and of his cognitive, rational 
and sentimental character. This inevitably leads to practical conclusions 
in our moral and political world , though the specific conclusions to which 
it leads are not necessary or determined. 
Hume presents a view of man radically different from Kant's, and also 
different (pace Gay) from his Enlightenment confreres in important respects. 
Yet like Kant (and like Rousseau), despite these differences, Hume is 
essentially of the Enlightenment in two key respects:- The problems he dealt 
with were located firmly in the matrix of Enlightenment thought (and thus, 
characteristically, the solutions were shaped by that matrix also) and, 
secondly, (just as important) Hume was temperamentally one of the 
philosophic family. He was as concerned as they were with the cause of 
Enlightenment and this gave polemical edge to many of his writings 
(particularly his political and religious writings). To this was added the 
whole matrix of Eighteenth Century British political culture (as Forbes' 
study has superbly illustrated) and his writings on that topic betray the 
Enlightenment mode in politics par excellence. 
In all of this two things are prominent. First, there is no sense in which 
Macintyre's claim about the 'failure of the Enlightenment project' is 
justified. Hume did not see it as a failure and (as the response to Dunn 
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suggested) only someone already convinced of a different view of human 
nature and/or philosophical method would consider it so in general (as 
opposed to rejecting specific arguments). Thus, on precisely those 
elements (method and the science of man)where Hume was in agreement vrith the 
Enlightenment in general terms (if not always on specifics), he (and by 
extension the philosophes) cannot be convicted of an inherent, inevitable 
failure to rationally justify morality. 
Secondly, all attempts to lay claim to Hume by Humpty Dumpty/Red Queen 
advocates, can now be seen to be greatly mistaken. As much as the 
mainstream Enlightenment, perhaps even as much as Rousseau or Kant, Hume's 
political theory has practical implications. even though the views of nature 
and man Kant and Hume adopt are radically opposed to one another. As Kemp 
Smith says "Hume's reflexions on the study have, in his view, been effectual, 
and on issuing from the study he is acting on the princip·les 
to which they have committed him. Have not these reflexions taught him that 
it is upon Nature's guidance, operating ...... not through reason but by 
way of feeling (inclusive of belief) that we have to reply?". 85 
One does not have to argue (I would not) that Hume's theory is without 
major flaws and failures,that in many respects it does not fully cohere, 
. . .. . :;. 86 
or that his political theory is ·not (in many .ways) one sided, to recognize 
that his approach, largely explanatory and non-'moral' (at least in the usual 
connotations of that much abused word) is tied into-necessarily tied into-
a whole series of assumptions, actions and events in the practical world of 
moral and political choice. Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen may:continue· 
snapping at the heels of those who would entwine philosophy with politics 
but they must do it without Hume. 
PART 3: BRINGING PHILOSOPHY BACK IN. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Sceptical Philosophy and Rational Politics 
"Enlightenment is the emergence of man from his self 
incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability 
to use one's own understanding without the guidance 
of another". 
Kant: 
Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklarung. 
"I .... should be sorry to think, that human affairs 
admit of no greater stability, than what they receive 
from the casual humours and characters of particular 
men". 
Hume: 
That Politics May Be Reduced To A Science. 
"Part of what is involved in having a better theory is 
being able more effectively to cope with the world". 
Charles Taylor: 
Social Theory as Practice 
"I do not blame anyone" Kant remarks in Der Streit der Fakultaten, 
"if political evils make him despair of the welfare and progress 
of mankind" (KPW 189/AA VII 93). Transparently, however, they 
did not make Kant himself despair. As is, I hope, apparent 
from the argument of chapter four, Kant was confident that mankind 
would progress towards the ideals the Enlightenment had sketched 
for it, however painful the pathway proved to be. This is not 
because Kant harboured any illusions about the character of his 
own era; "If it is now asked if we at present live in an 
Enlightened age, the answer is no" Kant asserts in his essay 
Was ist Aufklarung (KPW 58/AA VIII 40). Nonetheless, he did 
believe he was living in an age of Enlightenment (KPW 58/AA VIII 4~, 
and the nub of this Enlightenment was "Man's inclination and 
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vocation to think freely" (KPW 59/AA VIII 41). This inclination, 
however, is vital not only for itself but because "it gradually 
reacts upon the mentality of the people, who thus gradually 
become increasingly able to act freely" (KPW 59/AA VIII 41). 
Thus, again we see the linking of the theoretical and the 
practical in Kant. As I argued earlier, this project is the 
logical outcome of his synthesis of the two main elements in 
Enlightenment thought. Even in the philosophically most 
radical member of the Philosophic flock, we see a similar approach. 
Hume, too, for all his much vaunted division of philosophy 
into speculative and practical (T 457), is constantly concerned 
to demonstrate that the two are inextricably intertwined; as 
my arguments in chapter five show, his political thought is 
incomplete if we ignore his general epistemology and his critique 
of the 'religious hypothesis', and their relation to each other 
as well as to his moral and political thought. 
The three previous chapters, then, show both the general 
character of the Enlightenment project (at least as far as moral 
and political thought are concerned), and the specific arguments 
within it of perhaps its two most influential philosophical 
voices. It will be remembered, however, that this discussion 
was begun as a response to Macintyre's consideration of the 
'moral dilemma' that faces us today: I would like to open the 
concluding section of this study, by returning to my starting point 
and seeing where these arguments leave Macintyre's case, and what 
the implications of this are. 
I 
In chapter nine of After Virtue, and again in chapter eighteen, 
Macintyre announces the theoretical centrepiece of his thesis -
that the condition of our moral culture today leaves us with a 
stark conceptual choice - Neitzsche or Aristotle. Macintyre's 
own choice, of course, (as I have already remarked), is Aristotle, 
but more interesting for the moment is why the other 'genuine 
theoretical alternative' is said to be Neitzsche. 
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Macintyre's argument is that the reason for this is to be 
found, at least partly, in Neitzsche's perception of the fact 
that today, "morality has become generally available in a quite 
new way" (1). To understand what Macintyre is referring to 
here, it is important to see that his thesis about contemporary 
morality is essentially that it "can only be understood as a 
series of fragmented survivals from an older past and that the 
insoluble problems which they have generated for modern moral 
theorists will remain insoluble until this is well understood"(2). 
This philosophical fragmentation is what,in large part, the 
Enlightenment project is supposed to have brought about. 
According to Macintyre, therefore, we need to develop a 
philosophical acuteness and vision somewhat akin to the vision 
"which anthropologists at their best bring to the observation 
of other cultures, enabling them to identify survivals and 
unintelligibles unperceived by those who inhabit those 
cultures" (3). As an elucidation of this point, Macintyre 
discusses Cook's third voyage and the discovery of the polynesian 
word Taboo. Coupling Cook's experiences with the hypothesis 
advanced by the anthropologists Franz Steiner and Mary Douglas, 
Macintyre proposes both that the notion of Taboo was not fully 
understood by the Polynesians themselves, and that Taboo rules 
have a two stage history; the first of which embeds them in a 
context which confers intelligibility upon them, the second 
which is what occurs when this context is negated, ignored, or 
disappears. In this latter stage the rules become deprived of 
their authority and "if they do not acquire some new status 
quickly, both their interpretation and their justification 
become debatable. When the resources of a culture are too 
meagre to carry through the task of reinterpretation, the task 
of justification becomes impossible"(4). 
It is precisely this situation that we have now reached in 
our own culture, or so Macintyre wants to argue, and the fact 
has been most clearly perceived by Neitzsche. Jeering at any 
notion of basing morality on inner moral sentiments on the 
one hand and the categorical imperative on the other, he disposes, 
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argues Macintyre, "of both what I have called the Enlightenment 
project to discover rational foundations for an objective 
morality and the confidence of the everyday moral agent in 
post-Enlightenment culture that his moral practice and utterance 
are in good order"(S). 
For Macintyre, this leads to one overwhelmingly important 
conclusion; "It was because a moral tradition of which 
Aristotle's thought was the intellectual core was repudiated 
during the transition from the fifteenth to the seventeenth 
century that the Enlightenment project of discovering new, 
rational, secular foundations for morality had to be undertaken. 
And it was because that project failed, because the views advanced 
by its most intellectually powerful protagonists and more 
especially by Kant, could not be sustained in the face of 
rational criticism, that Neitzsche and all his existentialist 
and emotivist successors were able to mount their apparently 
successful critique of all previous morality. Hence the 
defensibility of the Neitzschean position turns in the end on 
the answer to the question, was it right in the first place to 
reject Aristotle?"(6). 
The latter part of this queition I shall return to briefly later 
in this chapter, but I want to suggest now that even the first 
part is, at best, misleading. To begin with, let me fill out 
a little Macintyre's picture of 'the Enlightenment project'. 
In his section entitled 'why the Enlightenment project had to 
fail', Macintyre argues that "any project of this form was 
bound to fail, because of an ineradicable discrepancy between 
their shared conception of moral rules and precepts on the one 
hand and what was shared - despite much larger divergences - in 
their conception of human nature on the other"(7). Macintyre 
claims that both these conceptions have a history and that their 
relationship can only be understood in the light of that history. 
The thrust of this argument is that a new - and fundamentally 
anti-teleological - view of Reason was brought into the 
mainstream of European thought with the Reformation and the 
movements that immediately prefigured and anticipated it, and 
that this conception of Reason, allowing for differences in 
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content and temper, was essentially that which dominated the 
Enlightenment, and consequently the Enlightenment's project to 
rationally justify morality. "Reason is calculative; it can 
assess truths of fact and mathematical relations but nothing 
more. In the realm of practice therefore it can speak only 
of means. About ends it must be silent .... Even Kant retains 
(this concept's) negative characteristics; reason for him as 
much as for Hume, discerns no essential natures and no teleological 
features in the objective universe, available for study by 
physics. Thus their disagreements on human nature coexist with 
striking and important agreements and what is true of them is 
true also of Diderot, of Smith and of Kierkegaard"(8). 
This view, however, conflicts with the contextual setting of 
the moral schema which was the historical ancestor of the 
framework of moral values within which they operated, which had, 
as its basic structure, that which Aristotle analysed in the 
Nichomachean Ethics, and w~ich required three main elements: 
"untutored human nature, man as he could be if he realized his 
telos and the moral precepts which enable him to pass from 
one state to the other"(9). The new- and Enlightenment 
adopted - conception of reason, however, did away with the 
middle element and, consequently, one is left with a view of 
untutored human nature as it is and a set of moral injunctions 
deprived of the context which gave them sense, and so, argues 
Macintyre, "the eighteenth century moral philosophers engaged 
to find a rational basis for their moral beliefs in a particular 
understanding of human nature, while inheriting a set of moral 
injunctions on the one hand, and a conception of human nature 
on the other which had been expressly designed to be discrepant 
with one another"(lO). 
It is at this point that Macintyre goes through his list of 
those Enlightenment theorists who came close to recognizing 
the failure of the project, Diderot and, most importantly, Kant. 
In chapter three of the present work I have already shown that 
Macintyre seriously misrepresents Diderot's position on a number 
of issues(ll), but his remarks about Kant at this point are, 
I submit, extremely damaging to the substance of his own case. 
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He notes that Kant introduces the notion of teleology in 
book II of the Second Critique, and that its appearance in 
Kant's moral theory surprised some of his friendly critics 
in the nineteenth century. In chapter four of this study, 
however, I showed that teleology did not simply 'appear' in 
Kant's philosophy, it was central to it(l2). Yet, if I am 
right, what then becomes of Macintyre's two most crucial claims 
at this juncture of his argument: First that the Enlightenment 
had no place for teleology because of its adoption and 
adaptation of what Macintyre calls 'the protestant-cum-Jansenist' 
conception of reason; and second that the whole of the 
Enlightenment shared this conceptual blind spot: that 'their 
disagreements on human nature co-exist with striking and 
important agreements'? 
Chapters four and five above, show that although there are 
some similarities of approach between Hume and Kant - they 
were both, after all members of the 'philosophic flock' - in 
temper and content they stood at opposite poles of Enlightenment 
thought; on my interpretation of the Enlightenment, Kant 
attempted a unification of the main themes of both the mainstream 
and minor currents ih Enlightenment thought, Hume was its 
subtlest and most perceptive internal critic, despite sharing 
some of its aims. Yet this is the reverse of the position 
adopted by Macintyre; for him, "the Scotsmen Hume and Smith 
are the least self questioning"(l3), whereas "if Diderot is far 
closer to recognition of the breakdown of the project than 
Hume, Kant is closer than either"(l4). My interpretation of 
the Enlightenment shows this to be completely at odds with how 
both Diderot and Kant themselves saw their thought(lS). 
Specifically, the conception of Reason that Kant works with 
and develops through the critical philosophy is nothing like 
Macintyre's 'protestant-cum-Jansenist' conception., and 
neither Diderot, Hume or Kant thought, or came close to 
thinking, that the Enlightenment had failed. (One important 
similarity between Hume and Kant that Macintyre ignores I 
discuss briefly later on). 
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Moreover, as I hope chapter three makes clear, it is far from 
obvious that there was an Enlightenment project, and more likely 
that there were only projects undertaken by various Enlightenment 
thinkers. To be sure, the projects often had a number of things 
in common, at least within the mainstream Enlightenment, but to 
simply describe them all as trying 'to rationally justify 
morality', is oversimplistic at best and deeply misleading at 
worst. Illuminating in this regard is the scant attention 
paid by Macintyre to Rousseau. He is mentioned only twice in 
After Virtue(16), and one of these is simply to identify a 
Rousseauean style of argument. Yet surely this is a curious 
omission for is not Rousseau the great critic of the philosophes? 
Surely, if anyone recognized the failure of the 'Enlightenment 
project' it would be him. The fact is that Rousseau's approach 
is so different from that which Macintyre wants to hang on the 
Enlightenment, it would be very difficult to bring him into 
the discussion in a way that does anything but harm Macintyre's 
case. If he is made of the Enlightenment, then, again, out 
must go the thesis that all the Enlightenment thinkers shared 
important similarities in their conception of human nature, 
whatever their differences, for (as I demonstrated in chapter 
three [17]) Rousseau's view of human nature is the arena of his 
greatest clash with the other philosophes, and it is also part 
of the aspect of his thought that appealed most strongly to 
Kant(18). However, there would be even greater difficulty in 
attempting to define Rousseau out of the collective term 'the 
Enlightenment project' (as it is perfectly possible to do in 
the case of another seminal thinker of the time, Vico, for 
example). Again as I showed in chapter three, Rousseau, even 
at his most critical, remains firmly embedded in the soil of 
the Enlightenment. It is therefore probably safest for 
Macintyre to pass over Rousseau in relative silence, and that 
is what he does. Thus, it seems to me that Macintyre's 
assertion that the 'Enlightenment project' was 'bound to fail' 
itself fails because the interpretation of the Enlightenment 
offered in After Virtue cannot be sustained. 
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II 
So far, I have been heavily critical of Macintyre's thesis 
in After Virtue, but as I remarked in chapter one(l9), there 
are also points of agreement between us. To a large extent 
I accept much of the analysis of the problems our contemporary 
culture seems to possess; I also accept the contention that 
conceptual shifts of great importance occurred during (roughly) 
the period of the Enlightenment, and that these shifts were 
instrumental in bringing about the 'climates of opinion' (I 
deliberately use Becker's phrase) which enabled Humpty Dumpty 
and the Red Queen (or 'emotivism', for Macintyre) to become 
so influential. 
What, then, are the implications of this when wedded to the 
fact that I have rejected the main plank in the conceptually 
causal sequence of events given by Macintyre, the 'inevitable 
failure of the Enlightenment project'? To grasp most 
effectively where this rejection takes us it is useful to note 
one of the criticisms of Macintyre made by Bernstein in his 
perceptive paper on After Virtue: "Macintyre's attack on the 
Enlightenment project" he says, "is itself part of what might 
be called 'the rage against the Enlightenment, or modernity' ... 
we find similar motifs in Heidegger, Adorno and Horkheimer, 
and Foucault ... (but) Macintyre himself appropriates from the 
very project that he tells us 'had to fail' "(20). In 
particular, according to Bernstein, Macintyre appropriates, 
without perhaps fully realizing it, the Kantian principle of 
'always acting so as to treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or that of another, as an end and not as a means'. 
This principle, says Bernstein, is fundamental for Macintyre's 
whole project, because a good deal of Macintyre's reconstruction 
of the Aristotelean Virtues consists in rejecting the idea of 
exclusion, that principle on which, historically, the tradition 
of the Virtues has been based (i.e., there is always some group 
or groups who are excluded - women, non-Greeks, non-Christians, 
slaves, barbarians etc.). Macintyre denies this principle, 
and says, in a kind of partial defence of Aristotle's subscription 
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to it, "This blindness of Aristotle's was not, of course, 
private to Aristotle; it was part of the general, although 
not universal, blindness of his culture"(21). For Macintyre, 
any adequate conception of the good life should not exclude 
in principle any member of the human species, and while 
Macintyre might claim to be simply strengthening the tradition 
of the Virtues,as Bernstein remarks "(he) Universalizes the 
tradition of the Virtues on the basis of principles which were 
hammered out in the Enlightenment"(22). 
This is where the full implications of the rejection of 
Macintyre's Enlightenment, and the substitution of mine begin 
to become apparent. Macintyre's reference to Aristotle's 
'blindness' points the way here, because, of course, Aristotle 
is only 'blind' by the lights of a culture that has already 
decided that a principle of exclusion is partly constituitive 
of moral or conceptual blindness; ours has, Aristotle's had 
not; Macintyre's own admission demonstrates more clearly than 
anything else that we are living in a culture created, in part, 
by the Enlightenment, and that we cannot escape it. We 
cannot do what Macintyre would have us do and simply go 'back' 
to a tradition of the Virtues, suitably amended and dressed 
up to avoid the kind of 'blindness' which afflicted poor 
Aristotle, because in so doing we are doing precisely what 
Macintyre is trying to break away from and combining together 
elements of vastly different cultures and attempting to impose 
a false cohesion upon them. 
In the final chapter of After Virtue, Macintyre anticipates 
three objections that he says are likely to be levelled at him. 
One, he thinks, will come from those who disagree with him on 
his interpretation of Aristotle, and I shall put this to one 
side; another will come from Marxists, who see themselves as 
the chief opposition to what Macintyre calls 'Liberal 
Individualism' - presumably the general consensus of Western 
values - and deny that a return to the Aristotelean tradition 
is a viable critique of Modernity. This too, I shall put to 
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one side (though I shall briefly return to it later). The 
third objection he gives, however, is worth a closer look. This 
objection, which will come, thinks Macintyre, from a motley 
collection of utilitarians, Kantians and others, will centre 
on "a different and incompatible evaluation of the arguments"(23) 
and to rebut them Macintyre recognizes he will have to deploy 
a systematic account of Rationality, which will enable disputes 
in moral philosophy to be 'settled'. This account, Macintyre 
says, will be given 'in a subsequent book'. 
This book, of course, has not yet appeared, but it is perhaps 
not beyond the limits of reason to see his argument against 
Incommensurability that I outlined in chapter two(24), as at 
least part of the performance of this task. Here, it will be 
remembered, Macintyre is addressing the problems of "how issues 
can be rationally resolved when they divide the adherants of 
large and comprehensive points of view whose systematic 
disagreements extend to disagreements as to how those 
disagreements are to be characterised"(25). Is this not 
attempting to outline "appropriate rational procedures 
for settling this kind of (moral) dispute"(26)? 
Macintyre's conclusion in his article on Incommensurability 
was that the rational superiority of 'one large scale 
philosophical standpoint' over another consisted in its ability 
to 'transcend the limitations of the other by providing from 
its own point of view a better explanation of the failures, 
frustrations and incoherancies of the other point of view (judged 
internally) than that other point of view can give of itself'(27). 
Thus, on Macintyre's thesis, for it to be judged rationally 
superior, the Aristotelean tradition must give a better account 
of the 'failures, frustrations and incoherancies' of the 
Neitzschean position, than the Neitzschean position can give 
of itself. It is, of course, precisely this that Macintyre 
attempts to do in After Virtue, but the project is fatally 
flawed. First, because Macintyre's presentation of the 
Neitzschean position as being the only genuine alternative to 
a revived Aristoteleanism, is dependant on his erroneous 
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interpretation of the Enlightenment and, secondly, because 
the reconstruction of Aristoteleanism is itself guilty of 
exactly the vice Macintyre constantly asserts is fatal for 
philosophy; trying to hold anachronistic theories together 
in a false unity. 
Macintyre is right, of course, that incommensurability is fatal 
for his case, or at least, for the whole of his case, and so 
he is right to make the attempt to try and meet it. The 
attempt fails, as I have said, because it falls at three 
hurdles: the interpretation of the enlightenment, the failure 
to perceive that he is not practising what he preaches, and, 
most important (as I shall argue later) because his argument 
is in any case internally incoherant. Nonetheless, he has, 
as Bernstein remarks, touched 'a sensitive moral nerve'(28), 
and his critique of much modern moral philosophy is valid, I 
think, as my introductory chapter indicated. Must we, then, 
leave the field to Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen, or is there 
a way out of the conceptual maze that escapes the problems we 
come across by following Macintyre's map? 
III 
We can, perhaps, first begin to see a glimmer of light if we 
return to the arguments of Rorty outlined in chapter two. 
Rorty's chosen metaphor of conversation is meant to illustrate 
his guiding concern in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 
to warn against taking 'philosophy' as the name of a natural 
kind, making it, in other words 'foundational'. His chosen 
three philosophical heroes of the twentieth century, 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey, all began by trying to 
make it foundational and then seeing the error of their ways: 
"thus their later work is theraputic rather than constructive, 
edifying rather than systematic, designed to make the reader 
question his own motives for philosophizing rather than to 
supply him with a new philosophical program"(29). The thrust 
of the critique of contemporary philosophy Rorty develops is 
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both similar and dissimilar to Macintyre's, as chapter two 
illustrates. The main difference, however - and it is best 
displayed in their differences over incommensurability - is 
the role each wishes to assign to philosophy. 
As I argued in section II above, and earlier in chapter two, 
Macintyre must dispose of incommensurability or his whole 
project of asserting that one hugely different moral system 
is rationally superior to another, is in jeopardy. As he 
thinks that the moral quandary that makes this task so vital 
was brought about by episodes in the history of philosophy(30), 
obviously philosophy has a pre-eminently important role in 
shaping our moril life; in this sense, then, it is 
foundational. For Rorty, on the other hand, it is merely 
one voice in the ceaseless cacophony that is the conversation 
of the West, and to insist on pride of place for philosophy 
(still less certain problems or methods within philosophy) in 
that conversation is an insupportable arrogance. 
Given this view of philosophy, and the account of the formation 
of the history of philosophy given both in Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature and in 'The Historiography of Philosophy: 
Four Genres', it is easy to see why Rorty can accept with 
equanimity the quite extreme position on incommensurability 
that he does. Let me examine in more detail, for a moment, 
just what the implications of this analysis are. If Rorty 
is right, a good deal of the history of philosophy comes about 
by chance; because of a certain set of historical accidents 
a certain way of looking at a certain problem or problems 
becomes pre-eminent at a certain time. This then sets the 
scene, as it were, for philosophy for a period until the next 
particularly powerful set of historical accidents comes about, 
and the whole procedure is nudged in a different direction(31). 
According to Rorty, this is what happened in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, with the 'creation' of epistemology. 
Nonetheless, however contingent the prevailing interests of 
philosophy may be, this does not mean to say that they are not 
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important. An important question for a particular culture 
does not become any the less important because it was stumbled 
on wholly or partly by chance. In discussing the issues that 
separated Galileo and Bellarmine, Rorty is insistent that there 
was no standard to which one might appeal to establish Galileo 
as 'true and rational' and Bellarmine as 'irrational'; "the 
'grid' that emerged in the later seventeenth and eighteenth 
century was not there to be appealed to in the early 
seventeenth century" he says, and thus, while conceding that 
we are the heirs of three hundred years of 'rhetoric' (Rorty's 
word) about the importance of distinguishing between science 
and art, science and religion, science and philosophy and so 
on, he repeats that "to proclaim our loyalty to these 
distinctions is not to say there are objective and rational 
standards for adopting them"(32). Perhaps not, but if we 
are in the position of Galileo or Bellarmine we cannot afford 
the luxury of judging by existing social practice for (as 
Bernstein remarks), it is precisely what is (or should) count 
as existing social practices that is at issue. 
In his essay on 'The Historiography of Philosophy' however, 
Rorty's analysis suggests a way out of this dilemma. Not, 
it should be said at the outset, that Rorty himself makes use 
of it for, of course, he does not accept that there is a dilemma 
to escape from. It will be remembered that in this essay 
Rorty distinguiahes three allowable methods of pursuing the 
history of ideas: historical reconstruction; rational 
reconstruction and Geistesgesichte, but that he adds, towards 
the end a 'large and diffuse' genre, called by him 'intellectual 
history', which, he says, embraces discussions of all those 
peripheral figures that he mentions and who "do the jobs which 
philosophers are popularly supposed to do - impelling social 
reform, supplying new vocabularies for moral deliberation, 
deflecting the course of scientific and literary disciplines 
into new channels"(33). 
This genre, Rorty says, provides the 'raw material' for the 
historiography of philosophy, yet surely it is more than that, 
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for philosophers do sometimes do the job they are supposed 
to do (i.e., sometimes it is philosophy which impells social 
reform, or supplies a new vocabulary for moral deliberation 
or shifts a discipline into a different channel). Rorty says 
that 'intellectual history' brackets the question of what it 
is these peripheral figures and their confr~res were doing 
but, nonetheless, studying intellectual history in this way 
will, almost certainly, do two things. First, it will 
emphasise the variable, though inevitable, inter-relations 
between not only different areas of intellectual activity, 
but also between those areas and the wider, practical world. 
This thesis is upheld both in a number of the essays in 
Philosophy in History(34), but also in both Macintyre(35) and 
in (perhaps the best extant example of this approach in 
practice) Quentin Skinner's magisterial The Foundations of 
Modern Political Thought(36). It is also, I suggest,observable 
in the currents of Enlightenment thought that I discuss above 
in chapters three to five. The Philosophes, some of them at 
least, were not only philosophers in the strict sense of the 
word, but also men of letters, novelists, essayists, 
aestheticians, legal reformers, economists and political actors. 
More to the point, although they were aware (and in Hume's 
case more than just aware) of the difference in kind between 
these multifarious activities, they were also convinced, as my 
interpretation above shows, that the activities were 
interdependant. 
There is, however, a second implication of Rorty's analysis. 
This is simply that such a history would also tend to show 
the leading intellectual trends of the age very clearly indeed. 
It is, of course, precisely for this reason that Rorty thinks 
that the genre can provide the raw material for the historiography 
of philosophy. If changes in the history of philosophy take 
place as Rorty says they do then any attempt to understand 
how changes in the philosophical atmosphere come about will need 
to consider the whole gamut of social and intellectual activity 
in that society; we have, in other words to study the 'grid' 
out of which the philosophic scene itself arises. 
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This, of course, is close to what Macintyre is attempting 
to do in After Virtue, but by concentrating (almost) exclusively 
on the history of philosophy only a distorted picture of the 
'grid' created in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
emerges and the subsequent analysis is inevitably seriously 
flawed. Thus, although Macintyre's presentation of the problem 
is acute and perceptive, his suggestion of the causes is heavily 
oversimplified; and, since his chosen solution is dependant on 
the excusivity of the choice he poses between the legacy of 
the Enlightenment 'truly' perceived by Neitzsche and a restructured 
Aristotelean tradition, and his account of the Neitzschean 
position (and thus the Enlightenment's legacy) is dependent 
on this oversimplification, it is not surprising the argument 
runs into problems. 
Moreover, since Macintyre himself is a creation of the 'grid' 
referred to by Rorty, it is also not surprising that his values 
are those that make sense to someone else whose experience is 
drawn from the same well, but are very dissimilar to those of 
someone like Aristotle who was formed by a very different 
'grid'. My saying this should not be taken to imply that I 
am subscribing to the incommensurability thesis; the fact that 
we are creations of our culture, society and history does not 
make us prisoners of them. It does mean, however, that a way 
out of the problems inherent in one 'grid' cannot be found 
by attempting to recreate one that has disappeared. 
Thus, if I am right on this, it seems likely that a solution 
to the problem I started out with in chapter one - the tortuous 
and much debated question of the relationship between philosophy 
and politics, theory and practice, in twentieth century thought -
is more likely to be apprehended by examining the 'grid' out of 
which twentieth century thought grew in a positive way, rather 
than trying to replace it with an almost completely 
anachronistic one. 
- 154 -
IV 
In a perceptive analysis of the current state of political 
philosophy, John Dunn has remarked that, "The idea of a 
secular authority grounded outside and above the beliefs of a 
particular population no longer make sense today"(37). One 
of the reasons why it no longer makes sense is, of course, the 
success of what I would say was the true 'Enlightenment project' 
(in so far as it had~ project, that is). This project was, 
as Kant famously put it, to make man emerge from his self-incurred 
immaturity, where immaturity was defined as the 'inability to 
use one's own understanding without the guidance of another'. 
Maturity, or at least our present pretence of it(38), however, 
poses its own problems, as Macintyre, Rorty and Williams all 
agree (they do not agree, of course, on what the problems are). 
It does seem fair to agree with Macintyre (as I did in my first 
chapter) that one of the most serious of the problems is what 
it implies for our moral consciousness. In Dunn's essay, 
referred to above, he makes the point that the clearest 
assertion of a specifically modern identity is precisely the 
recognition and acceptance of the fact of broad moral 
incommensurability; "The claim to know better .... can be 
vindicated only within identities .... the only authority which 
it can possess is a human authority, an authority for human 
beings not an external domination over them .... what it is to 
be modern ..•. is simply to face up to this knowledge"(39). 
Now, it is also Macintyre's case that the characteristic 
feature of the modern world is a recognition of moral 
incommensurability but Macintyre thinks that this is a mistake 
and one deeply damaging to our moral consciousness. For 
reasons that I have already outlined I think that his solution 
to this dilemma does not stand up, but, like Bernstein, I do 
think that he has touched a 'sensitive moral nerve'. There 
is something potentially worrying about the condition of our 
moral and political reflection that a simple acceptance of its 
seeming implications does nothing to allay. 
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I want to suggest that the reason, or at least the chief 
reason, why Macintyre's argument disturbs us is that the 
'sensitive moral nerve' that he has touched is the sundering 
of theory and practice characteristic of the advocates of what 
I have called Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen. However, as 
my study above has shown, that was not a disjunction that owed 
anything to the Enlightenment, indeed quite the contrary. 
Even David Hume, that thinker most often held to be the most 
rigorous proponent of separating the theoretical and the 
practical in the Enlightenment, has been seen, rather, to have 
strongly believed in the necessity for theoretical reflection 
on practical matters; though he was quite willing to believe 
that 'the casual humours and characters of particular men' 
would mean that, more often than not, they would place their 
near and immediate interest above their longer term interest(40). 
We saw, furthermore, the specific ways in which the 
Enlightenment itself attempted to bind together theory and 
practice. Why, for example a work like Diderot's Supplement 
au Voyage de Bougainville is a 'political' work with serious 
practical overtones, while being at the same time a 
revolutionary work of moral theory(41); or how Condorcet argues 
from theses about probability to conclusions in politics(42). 
The point here is not that these arguments themselves 
necessarily hold (many do not), or that the philosophes agreed 
among themselves about the specific way theory and practice 
were related (as we have seen they didn't). What is important 
is that at the specific point in our intellectual history when 
t~e 'grid' (to use the Foucaultian and Rortyesque term) that, 
in large part, helped to create 'modernity' was first emerging, 
its intellectual vanguard strived to link theory and practice, 
rather than separate them. 
The analysts of Modernity that I have discussed in this study, 
(Rorty, Williams, Macintyre, Dunn etc.) have not disagreed that 
there is a problem in our moral and social consciousness -
whether, like Macintyre they call it 'emotivism, or, like 
Rorty and Williams (and possibly Macintyre in a different sense) 
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they identify it as some version of the incommensurability 
thesis. Their disagreement comes, of course, in their proffered 
solutions to the problem. For Rorty that solution is to, 
as it were, become truly modern, to recognize that the 
conversation that forms any intellectual, political or cultural 
tradition is an endless clamouring of different voices and 
that one - philosophy - is no more (though no less) privileged 
than any of the others in determining our moral consciousness. 
Macintyre and Williams, in different and at times almost 
opposing ways, claim far more for philosophy than this; 
Macintyre, that as the mistakes that created the problems of 
modernity are largely to be found in the history of philosophy, 
then it is in the history and analysis of that subject that their 
solutions will also be found; Williams, that certain techniques 
and approaches within philosophy are permissable, whilst others 
are not, and that while this does not, perhaps, make philosophy 
a natural kind, it makes it far more than simply 'one voice' in 
the conversation of the West. 
In chapter two I ~uoted a remark of William James to the effect 
that at times of unrest in the philosophic atmosphere, philosophy 
is often characterised by 'a loosening of old landmarks a 
softening of oppositions, a mutual borrowing from systems 
anciently closed'. As I said such a period of unrest appears 
to be upon us at the moment, as is eloquently witnessed by the 
levels of mutual borrowing among the very disparate thinkers 
I have discussed here. The old landmarks - 'analytical 
philosophy', 'continental philosophy' and so on ~ do appear to 
have loosened considerably, and yet, as Macintyre says, the 
moral dilemma of the West is still acute. If, therefore, 
as I have, I ruled out the solution offered by Macintyre, and 
if further (as I showed in chapter two) the modifications to 
Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen proposed by Williams still 
leave the essentials of their position unchanged and finally 
if, further still, we are unable (as, earlier in this chapter 
I suggested we were) to accept without serious reservations 
Rorty's appeal that we simply continue taking part as best we 
can in the continuously changing, conceptually multifarious 
conversation of the West without saying that one part of the 
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conversation is truer than any other, or even that the 
conversation of the West is in any way demonsirably superior to 
any other, then what possible solution to the modern world's 
predeliction for separating theory and practice do we have?(43) 
The solution I want to proffer has several stages, but we must 
begin by recognizing the truth in the arguments of Macintyre, 
Williams, Rorty and the others, as well as their errors. 
I have argued that, first, Macintyre does touch a 'sensitive 
moral nerve', that there is, in fact, a moral dilemma; secondly 
that Rorty's approach, though deeply suggestive of some of the 
ways in which the history of philosophy is shaped does little 
to accommodate us to this dilemma, except by conceptually 
shrugging its shoulders and saying that the dilemma, if we 
choose to see it as such, is insoluble. 
Where does this leave us? I have said that, as is shown in 
Macintyre's own case, we cannot escape, in the sense of putting 
ourselves completely outside, the grid that has helped to shape 
our intellectual selves (this does not mean, of course, that 
we have to tamely accept that 'grid' without reservation or 
qualification). Thus we are forced, if we seek a solution 
to the dilemma that Macintyre has posed for us, to look for one 
in the 'grid' itself. Now it is, of course, quite true that 
each 'grid' leaves a residue of itself, as it were, imbedded 
in its successor. It is this that gives Macintyre's portrait 
of a moral vocabulary haunted by the ghosts of dead concepts, 
and incoherent as a result, some semblance of plausibility. 
The phenomenon has been discussed better, however, by a 
philosopher who Macintyre explicitly acknowledges as an influence 
on After Virtue, R.G.Collingwood(44). 
Collingwood argues that "any process involving an historical 
change from Pl to P2 leaves an unconverted residue of Pl 
encapsulated within an historical state of things which 
superficially is altogether P2"(45). Like Rorty, Collingwood 
thinks that philosophy is not a natural kind, and points out 
that "the alleged distinction between the historical question 
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and the philosophical must be false because it presupposes the 
permanence of philosophical problems"(46). On the contrary, 
according to Collingwood, philosophy must (like everything 
else) be located in a certain historical context, be part of a 
particular historical process, and processes "are things which 
do not begin and end but turn into one another; ... (and) ... if 
Pl has left traces of itself in P2 it follows that the 
traces of Pl in the present are not, so to speak, the corpse 
of a dead Pl, but the real Pl itself, living and active within 
the other form of itself P2"(47). 
It might be thought at this point that I am, to a certain 
extent, arguing against the very case I am trying to establish. 
Did I not say that we could not go back to a previous 'grid' 
to find our solution? and yet here I am saying that there will 
be living elements of past 'grids' in our present one. Does 
this not imply that there might be something in Macintyre's 
attempt to rejuvenate the Tradition of the Virtues after all? 
Something, yes, but not what Macintyre thinks. The point of 
Collingwood's argument is to show that history can remedy the 
mistakes of the present: in this sense Collingwood, like 
Macintyre, believes that the problems of the present can be 
d i s s,o 1 v e d b y a s c r u p u 1 o u s s t u d y o f the p a s t , b o t h a c t u a 1 an d 
intelPectual. However, for Collingwood, we are also, to a 
certain extent, governed by the here and now insofar as this 
aspect of the subject is concerned. For Collingwood, the 
philosophical historian is related to another as the trained 
woodsman is to the ignorant traveller: "Nothing but trees and 
grass' thinks the traveller, and marches on. 'Look', says the 
woodsman, 'There's a Tiger in that grass' what history 
can bring to the moral and political life is a trained eye for 
the situation in which one has to act"(48). 
Consider the implications of this, for a moment comparing it 
with how Macintyre, Rorty and Williams approach the issue. 
For Williams the historian of philosophy cannot be in a more 
privileged position than the analyst, essentially for the 
reason that philosophers (sub-specie aeterna) are none of them 
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more privileged than the rest of us when it comes to the 
central questions of morality(49); all an historian of 
philosophy might conceivably have greater expertise in is the 
history of philosophy, and this is, necessarily. limited to 
the philosophical; as I showed in chapter two, Williams adheres 
to the broad outlines of the Humpty Dumpty and Red Queen 
position regarding the essentially contingent nature of the 
relations of philosophy and practical life (cf. Graham's 
argument from chapter one). Yet this position in itself is 
one that is predicated on the assumptions mentioned in 
chapter one and criticised there, it does not meet Collingwood's 
challenge head on. 
Rorty, on the other hand, appears to take the Collingwoodian 
point on board and then carries it to an extreme. As we have 
seen, he agrees that philosophers must be historians in order 
to do their job effectively, moreover, in the last sections of 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, there are even indications 
that he agrees with the broad outlines of Collingwood's moral 
concern(SO), but his main concern is that it is what he has 
called (in his 'Historiography of Philosophy' paper) 
'intellectual history' and not merely the history of philosophy 
that is really to be employed here, and, furthermore, that 
the 'grid' within which we still labour (for all that it might 
be changing in various ways) is still essentially that 
established in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and 
that the next set of accidents that will propel philosophy in 
a different direction are (naturally) neither clear nor 
predictable. It seems extraordinarily unlikely, given the 
rest of Rorty's arguments, that the emerging 'grid' will in 
any way resemble the restructured Aristoteleanism of Macintyre. 
For Macintyre, on the surface, Collingwood's case mirrors his 
own; Macintyre does indeed want to point out a tiger in the 
grass- the tiger being emotivism, of course- and he wants 
to level the trees and grass of modernity with a scythe forged 
from the 'failure' of the Enlightenment the better to expose 
the tiger. Yet his own Aristotelean forest, with which he 
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hopes to seed the dead ground, is itself laden with problems, 
as I have shown above, and is crucially dependent on an 
elusive theory of rationality itself predicated upon a 
refutation of the incommensurability thesis based, as I show 
below, on the flimsiest of premisses. 
The true key to the importance of Collingwood's argument, as 
far as the theory and practice debate is concerned, is to 
recognize the fact that Collingwood intends his argument as a 
premiss for action in his own world; "In addition to the 
rapprochement between philosophy and history" he says, "I was 
also working at rapprochement between theory and practice"(Sl), 
and, as he reveals a little later on, the second rapprochement 
was very heavily dependant on the first; "I no longer thought 
of them as mutually independant; I saw the relation between 
them was one of intimate and mutual dependance"(52). 
Essentially this boiled down to a rapprochement between the 
two in his own life, and this, necessarily, means taking into 
account what Dunn called the 'view from here and now'. 
To delineate the true significance of this, I would like to 
point out that within the large and diverse group of thinkers 
I have (for convenience) referred to as the 'historical school', 
there are two views on the propriety of such a view. Opposing 
Collingwood (and, of course Macintyre, who also believes this) 
are a number of thinkers of whom perhaps the most prominent 
and disturbing is Foucault. I have already indicated that 
Foucault is an influence on Rorty (the significance of which 
I shall discuss in a moment), but he is a doubly interesting 
thinker to examine in the present context, because his final 
position is an explicitly Neitzschean one: neutrality. between 
the various power structures, relations and value systems he 
examines. In this sense his case is far more extreme than 
even Rorty or Williams. "Each society has its regime of truth, 
its general politics of truth; that is the type of discourse 
which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms 
and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the 
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techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition 
of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying 
what counts as true"(53). Foucault stresses again and again 
that there can be no such thing as a truth independent of its 
regime, and thus transformation of regimes never results in 
a gain of 'truth' or 'freedom', or whatever, because they are 
truly incommensurable, indeed completely incomparable. In 
fact, Foucault's position is yet more radical, because, as 
Charles Taylor has pointed out in a perceptive essay on him(54), 
"due to the Neitzschean notion of truth imposed by a regime 
of power[SS], Foucault cannot envisage liberating transformations 
within a regime. The regime is entirely identified with its 
imposed truth. Unmasking can only destabalise it; we cannot 
bring about a new, stable, freer, less mendacious form of it 
by this route"(56). 
Thus, for Foucault, we are trapped in the notions of truth 
forced on us by our regime of power, the two together helping 
to establish the 'grid' within which we have our being. He 
can, therefore, explain the problem that preoccupies Macintyre, 
but there is no way out of it, as any replacement system 
(Macintyre's rejuvenated Aristoteleanism as much as anything 
else) would be complete with its own (incommensurable) notions 
of freedom and truth. Aristotle was not 'blind', he was 
simply a Greek of the fourth century B.C., and there is no way 
that we can argue that our notions are 'truer' than his(S7), 
or, at least, so Foucault would argue. 
Even on his own terms, however, it seems unlikely that Foucault's 
Neitzschean position can be maintained. In the article cited 
above Charles Taylor suggests that Foucault is best interpreted 
"as having documented some of (the) losses .... that denizens 
of Western Christendom have undergone"(58), a certain amount 
of dehumanization, for example, inherent in modern systems of 
control in comparison with their predecessors, and "an inability 
to respond to key features of the human context, those which 
are suppressed in a stance of thoroughgoing instrumental 
reason"(59). Losses,. however, imply at least the possibility 
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of gains and Taylor thinks that there are also obvious things 
we have gained from the change of the 'grid'; but more important 
than either gains or losses for my present concern, is Taylor's 
claim (a just one, I think) that "We have become certain things 
in Western civilisation. Our humanitarianism, our notions 
of freedom - both personal independance and collective self 
rule - have helped to define a political identity we share 
and one which is deeply rooted in our more basic .... 
understandings .... ; of course, these elements of identity 
are contested .... but they all count for us"(60). 
Moreover, Taylor claims that one of the reasons~ this 
understanding is believed in preference to others, is the advance 
in the scientific comprehension of the natural world which, 
he says, we have every reason to believe represents a significant 
gain of truth. What all this implies, of course, is that, as 
opposed to Foucault's monolithic relativism, (which, as Taylor 
rightly judges, assumes the Olympian stance of a soul in Plato's 
myth of Er) we have already become something, "in short, we 
have a history. We live in time, not just self enclosed in the 
present, but essentially related to a past which has helped 
define our identity, and a future which puts it again in 
question"(61). 
Now this, of course, is essentially the position of Collingwood. 
For him the study of history (including, naturally, perhaps 
even crucially, the history of philosophy), helps to make 
our understanding of the various aspects of that identity 
(not always harmonious ones, as Taylor says) ever clearer. 
As far as his rapprochement between theory and practice is 
concerned, this implies surely that to spot the tiger in the 
grass (and therefore to avoid it) we must examine not only the 
sources of the forest (which, of course, is what Macintyre 
does) but must also bear in mind the perspective from which 
we are viewing it. To do what Macintyre would have us do, and 
return to a period before the forest was there at all, is 
impossible as Macintyre~ own hidden assumptions show; we 
cannot simply toss aside the influence of the 'grid' that has 
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helped to shape us however much we want to. Then again, as 
Taylor's criticism of Foucault shows, we cannot attempt to 
choose in a vacuum; we are none of us outsiders in the required 
sense, we are already somebody. 
A little earlier in this chapter I said that we must find a 
solution to Macintyre's dilemma in the 'grid' which has 
helped to shape us, and in the discussion of Collingwood, 
Foucault and Taylor I have attempted to amplify this claim; 
Collingwood's analysis explains the plausibility of Macintyre's 
account of the fragmented nature of our moral tradition but 
also indicates, particularly when taken with some of the 
arguments presented by Rorty, Dunn and Taylor, that the nature 
of this fragmentation precludes Macintyre's chosen solution 
and suggests further that it is in our own 'grid' (as it were) 
that we must search(62). 
v 
What, then, in general does the period in which this 'grid' 
emerged have to tell us? First of all I need to say a brief 
word in defence of my specific concentration on the Enlightenment. 
After all, the seventeenth century was the century in which 
the roots of modernity were laid, so why not concentrate on 
that? The answer, I want to suggest, lies in Collingwood's 
account of the historical process that I outlined above. 
Here, the process Pl to P2 is from, if you like, the 'pre-modern' 
world to the modern world. It will be recalled that 
Collingwood held "any process involving an historical change 
from Pl to P2 leaves an unconverted residue of Pl encapsulated 
within an historical state of things which superficially is 
altogether P2"(63). 'Encapsulated' here means that a former 
set of beliefs or habits is retained in residual form, but the 
results of such beliefs or habits is not the same as it was 
previously. In chapter three I tried to make the case that 
it was during the Enlightenment when a set of beliefs and 
habits emerged that was 'altogether P2' i.e., an obvious and 
unambiguous 'prelude to modernity' (to borrow Gay's phrase). 
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It contains, of course, a large residue of Pl in it, but prior 
to this point the elements of Pl were too prominent to be 
described as 'encapsulated'; many of them still held centre 
stage. Therefore, if it is the emergent 'grid' of modernity 
we need to examin~, it is to the Enlightenment that we must 
turn. 
I have said that the 'sensitive moral nerve' that Macintyre's 
argument touches is the sundering of theory and practice. 
This is shown most clearly in the tradition of modern thought 
that I have christened Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen, although 
it is not exclusively confined to them (Foucault, in some moods 
could be said to say similar things, but he is, of course, by 
no means a Humpty Dumpty or Red Queen theorist in the strict 
sense of the terms as I have deployed them here). These 
traditions, most especially what I called the underlabourer 
tradition, considered, in many cases, however, that they were 
continuing the work begun in the 'Enlightenment'. This, as 
we have seen, is certainly not the case, but, notwithstanding 
this, does the experience and thought of the Enlightenment 
have anything to offer us in a positive way that might help to 
resolve the problem that is the root of that sensitive moral 
nerve? 
I have shown above that the Enlightenment as a self-conscious 
movement, far from separating theory and practice, attempted 
above all to find a satisfactory way of reconciling the two 
that fitted with their changing conceptions of both what it 
is to be a human agent and what natural science had displayed 
the natural world to be. This is the task performed by Diderot 
in the Supplement au Voyage de Bougainville le neveau de 
Rameau and La Reve D'Alambert. It is part of what Montesquieu 
attempts in De L'esprit des Lois and what, from a very different 
perspective, Rousseau is reflecting on in his 'great trilogy' 
in the late seventeen fifties and early seventeen sixties. 
Without question, however, the two most searching and consistently 
rigerous examinations of these questions comes in the work of 
Hume and Kant. 
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Let us return, then, briefly to the examination of Kant's 
thought offered in chapter four. Here the link between theory 
and practice is very clear; "A collection of rules is termed 
a theory" according to Kant, "if the rules concerned are 
envisaged as principles of a fairly general nature .... which, 
nonetheless, necessarily influence their practical application" 
(64- my emphasis). Thus, as analysed above, Kant's philosophy 
affects this link between thory and practice through the 
internal structure of the critical philosophy, resting initially 
on the third antinomy, and the consequent dualism between the 
noumenal and phenomenal worlds and, more generally, on the 
notions of teleology Kant develops in some of his essays and 
the Kritik der Urteilskraft. 
In chapter three I showed that, in Gay's words, "the philosophy 
of the Enlightenment insisted on man's essential autonomy"(65). 
In chapter four I showed that one of the most important elements 
in Kant's attempt to reconcile and combine the mainstream and 
minor currents in Enlightenment thought centred on his concept 
of freedom and autonomy. Moreover, I argued that it was Kant's 
notion of freedom which was the conduit through which his 
teleolgy linked theory and practice, and that, properly 
understood, his teleology was neither inconsistant with the rest 
of the critical philosophy nor an admission (tacit or otherwise) 
of the 'failure of the Enlightenment project', as Macintyre 
argued; nor was it internally incoherent in the manner suggested 
by Strawson. What his notions enable us to do, is to 
legislate for ourselves (to use explicitly Kantian terminology). 
For Kant, as Taylor points out, rationality imposes 
obligations on us as rational agents(66), and one of the chief 
of these obligations is to dictate our own moral law, that 
apprehended by our reason. 
It will be remembered that Taylor claims that Kant is one of 
the most important thinkers in the development of modern culture 
largely because of the importance he attaches to this notion 
of freedom. In many ways, as chapter three makes clear, the 
insistence on autonomy was one of the Enlightenment's most 
important conceptual shifts, as I remarked earlier in this 
chapter, it is partly that which led to the fact, noticed by 
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John Dunn, that the idea of a secular authority grounded over 
and above a particular population no longer makes sense today. 
It is also one of the chief points at which Macintyre's 
inconsistancy over the values of the Enlightenment is at its 
clearest. In many ways it is the Enlightenment's views on 
this point that he casts as the chief villain in the drama 
of the decline of the tradition of the virtues that he is 
attempting to salvage, and yet the denial of that tradition's 
customary emphasis on exclusion, which is a key element in 
that salvage operation, is dependent on that self-same notion 
of freedom, which is one of the essential premises for the 
idea that it is a mistake to exclude this or that group. 
It is important to remember too, what Kant felt followed from 
his theory. First that it meant that practical reasoning 
was, in a sense, prior to theoretical reasoning(67), but also 
that it must always acknowledge what theoretical reasoning 
can do in this sphere, particularly, as he emphasises in his 
'Theory and Practice' essay, in the arena of politics: "Reason 
provides a concept which we express by the words political 
right. And this concept has binding force for human beings 
who co-exist in a state of antagonism produced by their 
natural freedom, so that it has an objective practical 
reality"(68). In other words, concepts of political right, 
law etc. are necessarily prior to practice in the political 
realm, although it is only through practical reasoning that 
they can 'impose order on the chaos of our experience' (in 
Beck's words) and therefore 'follow our demands for 
unconditional conditions of motivation', which is what places 
practical reasoning above theoretical reasoning(69). 
What does all this imply? First, it must surely mean that our 
moral and political life, the actions we take in the moral and 
political world, cannot be divorced from our intellectual life, 
from our conceptions of the moral and political world. For 
Kant, we need the latter to buttress the former and the former 
to complete and actualize the latter; they are two arms of the 
same project and each, without the other, is a failure. 
- 167 -
Far from suggesting that the Enlightenment's alleged failure 
leads to the sundering of theory and practice, and thus opens 
the door to today's quagmire of moral impressionism, Kant's 
argument is the clearest possible indication that it is the 
departure from Enlightenment projects that is most likely to 
do this, given the premiss, for which I argued earlier, that 
the attempts of Macintyre and others to substitute an 
'intellectual grid' at variance with that of 'modernity' 
founders on the condition of modernity itself. 
At this point it might be thought that I am putting forward 
a version of Kantianism as a solution to our problem, but that 
is not what I am doing and, furthermore, I do not even need 
to defend or elaborate (after the manner of Macintyre on 
Aristotle) Kant's substantive arguments. In chapter four 
I defended those parts of Kant's argumentation that are 
necessary for my own case, but my main task was to present an 
account of Kant's thought which showed how he viewed the 
relationship of philosophy to politics, theory to ~ractice, 
in the context already developed (in chapter three) of 
the mainstream and minor currents of Enlightenment thought. 
For what this reveals is that, first, virtually all the 
philosophes, in one way or another, were attempting what Kant 
was attempting, (though, naturally, not all in the same way) 
and that, secondly, Kant's reconciliation of the mainstream and 
minor currents bound the Enlightenment's general philosophy, 
moral and political philosophy and the notion of political and 
moral action into a Gordian knot which could be cut, but never 
untied. 
Yet if there was one member of the philosophic flock of whom 
this could surely not be said, it was Hume, and so it was 
important for me to look at how Hume saw the relationship. 
Here too, however, we found that despite all his divisions 
of philosophy into speculative and practical, Hume's was a 
philosophy which had severe and radical implications for those 
who accepted it, and that he could be just as critical of his 
fellow philosophes as he was of the clerical party in his 
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native Edinburgh. Despite all the differences of style, 
content and temper that separated them, there were several 
interesting and suggestive points on which Hume and Kant held 
broadly similar positions, and nowhere is this truer than in 
the fact that both are insistent that it is in our own minds 
that the source of our political and moral actions are to be 
found and that we ignore this at our peril. For Hume "the 
chief triumph of art and philosophy (is that) it insensibly 
refines the temper and it points out to us those dispositions 
which we should endeavour to attain, by a constant bent of mind 
and by repeated habit"(70). For Kant, philosophy discusses 
the limits of reason, and Reason "is given to us as a practical 
faculty one which is meant to have an influence on the will"(71). 
Taylor is quite right that Kant is one of the most important 
figures in the development of modern culture, and largely correct 
about the reason. Kant divined the nature of the Enlightenment 
better than any other philosophe; he could see the true 
importance of the emphasis on autonomy, see, moreover, the 
possible dangers in the approach (he thought he had divined 
those inHume), and moved to head them off. In Kant we see 
the finest statement of the structure of a theory which can 
accommodate the stresses and tensions inherent in the conceptual 
framework of modernity (stresses and tensions which ~ system 
of thought is liable to, as Collingwood, Foucault and Rorty 
have all demonstrated). Naturally this does not mean that all 
the content of Kant's theory must be accepted, just that in 
his striking perceptions of the way his age was developing, he 
put his finger on many of the crisis points that would emerge 
long after the Enlightenment proper had waned, though, of course, 
he did not always succeed in bridging or even in papering over, 
all those emerging cracks. 
It is not by chance then, that for many of the critics of the 
Enlightenment, it is Kant who is the great opponent. One 
of the earliest and most formidable critics of all, Kant's 
former pupil Hamann, saw his former patron and friend as the 
fountainhead of all that was worst in the Enlightenment. He 
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bitterly flayed Kant's "Gnostic hatred of matter" (72), and 
attempted, in the words of Isaiah Berlin, "no less than a 
total reversal of the values of the Enlightenment" (73), of 
which Kant was held to be the most formidable representative. 
More interesting still, Hamann exerted a powerful influence 
on Kierkegaard (who called him the 'emperor')(74) who, 
according to Macintyre (it will be recalled),was the first 
person to really expose the 'inevitable' failure of the 
Enlightenment. Hamann was, in fact, a far more thoroughgoing 
critic of the Enlightenment than Macintyre ever can be. For 
Hamann, the modern 'grid' was not in place (as of course, it 
is for Macintyre, and for us); it was still emerging and so 
the critique of the Enlightenment he advances is full of echoes 
of a still very much alive (for him) past, as well as acute, 
if only partial, perceptions of the new problems to which the 
Enlightenment would give rise. Even so, as Berlin's paper 
makes plain, Hamann misconstrues and distorts the Enlightenment 
(beginning a tradition which its critics haye continued to this 
very day) and nowhere is this truer than in his treatment of 
Hume. 
Hamann's Hume is an attenuated, partial and corrupted figure 
because Hamann's exercise is a very poor attempt at what Rorty 
called 'rational reconstruction'. Leaving aside obvious 
incongruities such as assuming identity between Hume's doctrine 
of belief and what Berlin calls 'the full doctrine of Pauline 
faith in things unseen', Hamann misconstrues the nature of 
Hume's philosophical project. This is not to say that he does 
not recognize that Hume is a 'champion in the enemies camp'-
he knows that, of course. Nonetheless, like other contemporaries 
(Reid, Beattie and so on), and indeed like many others since 
the eighteenth century, lack of aquaintance with the mass of 
Humean writings produced distortion when one doctrine was 
concentrated on out of context. As Berlin points out, Hamann 
"systematically ignores everything in Hume which is antipathetic 
to him, that is almost all that is most characteristic of the 
Scottish philosopher"(75). Despite this distortion, however, 
Hamann's treatment of Hume has one interesting aspect from my 
point of view. By attacking the Enlightenment with weapons 
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borrowed and adapted from one of its leading protagonists, he 
unintentionally displays very clearly one of the key areas 
where Hume's thought, explicitly critical of his fellow 
philosophes on this point, can act as a corrective to parts 
of the structure that is seen at its most rigorous in Kant. 
As Berlin makes clear, Hamann's admiration of Hume was due 
entirely to his certainty that Hume's doctrine of belief 
completely nullified any possible rationalist view of the 
world, and especially any rationalist ontology. This doctrine, 
however, is not anything like as simple as Hamann seemed to 
have supposed. In an exchange with Kant, Hamann argues that 
'if you want a proof for everything you cannot act at all -
Hume realizes this'(76). What Hamann fails to realize, however, 
is that what Hume derives from (amongst other things) his 
doctrine of belief is not a denial of the efficacy of proof, 
but an idea of its limits in practical life. 'Proof' is an 
idea that is constrained to operate in the realm of speculative 
philosophy, and yet as such will have a greater impact on the 
practical world than otherwise, because its limits are properly 
understood. 
This impact can only be correctly assessed when one considers 
the Humean project more widely, and, of course, it is this that 
I undertook in chapter five. Here the real significance of 
that famous scepticism was found to lie in the idea that all 
inquiries are to be taken as provisional(77) and that even 
sceptical conclusions in general philosophical topics 
(epistemology, say, or religion) will have effects in the 
practical world. My argument is that it is precisely this 
scepticism which can remedy the deficiancies in the grand 
structure of the conjoined Enlightenment which was Kant's 
legacy to emerging modernity. Hume's political writings 
are markedly different from those of the rest of the Enlightenment, 
largely because of this scepticism. Different, that is to say, 
in tone, temper and sometimes even content - but not really 
different in aim. As Gay has written "the general and 
particular nourished one another inHume's mind"(78), a belief 
borne out if one considers writings like A Dialogue, the second 
- 171 -
Enquiry and a number of the Essays(79), but notwithstanding 
all this, he remained a member of the philosophic flock, hopeful 
(though perhaps less hopeful than most) of spreading 
Enlightenment. 
In chapter four I mentioned Cassirers opinion that Kant's 
philosophy represented the 'final glorification' of the 
Enlightenment, whilst at the same time overshadowing it, and 
suggested that it overshadowed it only in the sense that by 
combining the two elements of Enlightenment thought together, 
the two parts became greater than the whole and provided a 
structure through which the emerging age could be conceived. 
However, that structure had many weak points as most of Kant's 
critics from Hegel to Strawson have pointed out. It is, however, 
significant that, increasingly, attempts to heal the breach 
between philosophy and politics and to rebuild the edifice of 
modernity, are being undertaken by avowed Kantians (like Rawls) 
or modified Utilitarians (like Parfit), the inevitable result 
of which is that the remaining protagonists of Humpty Dumpty and 
the Red Queen are left holding an increasingly narrow strip 
of the philosophical field (though they are holding on with 
their customary tenacity). For they are squeezed between these 
thinkers and those (like Foucault, and Macintyre) who, in 
certain ways, reject the edifice, and want to pull it down. 
It is also significant that these attempts are being undertaken 
partly because it is another indication that Macintyre (with 
others) is right in diagnosing a problem in modernity's 
conceptual 'self image', as it were, and partly because it 
points to a way forward for the project of re-building the 
Kantian edifice. In chapter two I discussed one of the key 
problems that the modernist dilemma rests on; incommensurability. 
In various ways this is a central issue for virtually all of the 
thinkers I have discussed, and there are essentially three 
responses to it. Some, Foucault and Rorty for example, welcome 
the notion of incommensurability as being powerful evidence in 
support of their case. Others, of whom the most relevant here 
is, of course, Macintyre, reject incommensurability and attempt 
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to find a way round it. Finally, there are those who 
essentially ignore it as being irrelevant to their concerns 
and, where they had one, this was the position adopted by many 
of the classical 'Humpty Dumpty and Red Queen' theorists 
that I discussed in Chapter One. 
It seems to me that the last of these is no longer tenable. 
The challenge that the Humpty Dumpty and Red Queen thesis now 
faces from, for example, what I called in Chapter Two the 
'historical school' (in all its varied guises) has brought the 
question of incommensurability firmly into a central place in 
considerations over the relationship of inquiry to action(SO). 
The more acute and perceptive allies of the Humpty Dumpty and 
Red Queen approach, like Williams, recognize this and have 
adapted their arguments accordingly, usually adopting a variant 
of the response that welcomes incommensurability(Sl). As I 
said earlier, I think it is also apparent that Macintyre's 
attempt to get round the problem (which as he rightly says 
is crucial for his project) also fails. Along with the two 
causes I mentioned before, this failure is due to the fact 
that in adopting a benchmark by which to judge competing 
standards and traditions, Macintyre chooses a philosopher who, 
while certainly a fountainhead of Western - and even Middle 
Eastern - thought is still a figure located within a particular 
tradition. It would be futile to judge - say - Asoka or the 
Buddha, by the standards established by Plato, a thinker from 
a completely different tradition, and yet this is exactly 
what Macintyre counsels: "Nobody is to count as a philosopher" 
he says "who does not have to be judged, in the end against 
standards set by Plato"(82). It does no good to argue for 
a standard to defeat incommensurability, when that very standard 
is predicated on a concept of philosophy locked within even 
a very large collation of individual intellectual traditions; 
to provide adequate grounds to reject incommensurability in 
the manner that Macintyre wants to, the standard must apply 
to all traditions and this Macintyre's does not do. 
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We appear, then, to have abandoned the ground to, on the 
one hand, the protagonists of Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen 
and their allies, and, on the other, to those champions of 
the historical school (like Rorty and Foucault) who 
triumphantly announce that the inevitability of incommensurability 
means that judgement is always relative, and therefore projects 
like those of Rawls, Nagel and Parfit within (as it were) the 
tradition of Modernity, and Macintyre, who would be outside 
its walls, are all equally doomed to failure. 
In fact, there is another option and, moreover, one that is, 
I submit, considerably more helpful (given the already remarked 
fact that Macintyre's question is a real one for us, and not 
one we can easily or happily duck). Consider the position 
that we have now arrived at. Macintyre's problem is a serious 
and acute one, but his solution is neither possible nor, even 
if it were, would it be desirable. No solution, however, 
can be adopted by a straight Humpty Dumpty/Red Queen theorist, 
for them the problem (even if it is perceived as such, as it 
is, for example, by Williams) is an irresolveable one. This 
will not do, however, as the arguments of Rorty and others 
have graphically shown. We must pay more attention to the 
history of philosophy - indeed to the whole idea of the 
'history' of ideas -than any 'analytical' philosopher will 
do. Even Michael Oakeshott, the solitary thinker who adopts 
a recognizably Red Queen stance, without owing anything to 
analytical orthodoxy, and who is as aware as anybody of the 
importance of the history of ideas for political theory, is 
curiously myopic on this point. In his thoughtful and 
characteristically elegant essay, 'On the Character of a 
Modern European State'(83), Oakeshott gives a brilliant, if 
maverick,view of the development of the modern European 
political consciousness since the high middle ages, and 
concludes that "modern European reflection about the character 
of a state and the office of its government has explored two 
diverse analogies, each denoting a distinct mode of expression 
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with a logic of its own, in terms of which to understand it; 
that of civil association and that of 'enterprise' or 
'purposive' association What these two understandings 
have in common is the recognition of a state as an exclusive 
association;no man can be a member of two such associations"(84). 
Now thus far, of course, there is nothing problematic about 
I Oakeshotts case; in fact, it is simply a form of what Rorty 
calls Geistesgesichte; Oakeshott is, after all, basing his 
case on an analysis of the history and development of the 
modern European State, and deriving his two analogies from 
two concepts much used by medieval jurists - 'societas' and 
'universitas' giving birth to civil association and enterprise 
association respectively. However, Oakeshott~ conclusion 
is that the modern European consciousness is a polarised 
consciousness, and that "these are its poles and that all 
other tensions such as those indicated in the words 'right' 
and 'left' are insignificant compared with this"(85). 
Oakeshott considers this polarization both inevitable and 
unending, with, at certain times, one analogy being in the 
ascendant, and at other times the other. Nonetheless, Oakeshott 
has his own preference and it is undeniably for the civil 
association model. This is brought out in a later essay, 
where the 'civil association model' (under the guise of the 
phrase the 'rule of law'), is elaborated more fully(86) and 
where Oakeshott claims that its pioneers in the modern world 
were Bodin and Hobbes(87). 
Now the details of this Oakeshottian argument do not concern 
me here (though I have discussed them in detail elsewhere[88]), 
but observe what the structure of his argument implies in 
the present context. Here is an argument generated by 
philosophical reflection about history (that kind of reflection 
which Macintyre claims is 'sovereign over the rest of the 
discipline', and which Collingwood and Rorty insist is essential 
if historical anachronisms of the worst sort are not to creep 
in to the argument) from which Oakeshott derives, at least 
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in part, a set of evaluations which help to structure his 
own commendations or criticisms which he makes in other essays(89). 
He cannot, in all fairness, here say that it is merely a 
contingent relation; either his philosophical views have in 
some sense informed his judgement or his political judgements 
have influenced (perhaps even dictated) his philosophical ideas. 
It seems charitable (and, it must be said, for a scholar as 
stimulating and provoking as Oakeshott, likely) to assume 
that the former is the case, and this implies, not that 
Oakeshot2s opinions are in any sense necessitated by his 
philosophical views, but that they are inevitably shaped to 
a certain extent by them. The error of those like Graham 
and, in a way, Oakeshott himself, has been to assume that the 
only choice that exists is between those who (like Oakeshott~ 
'Rationalist') believe that theories are simply (or perhaps not 
so simply) applied 'in practice', and those who say in response 
that the relation is entirely and always a 'contingent one'. 
As Charles Taylor remarks in his essay 'Social Theory as 
Practice', "Most theories are not of the kind that can simply 
be applied .... they affect practice only in shaping or 
informing it"(90). 
This shaping and forming, however, is the kind of thing that 
is best understood, at least in general terms, in the light 
of the discussion of Rorty, Collingwood and Foucault that I 
undertook earlier on, although, as was indicated then, none 
of these accounts is completely satisfactory. What they 
collectively imply, however, is that, to adequately compass 
a theory which attempts to explain and elaborate the fissures 
in modernity, it simply will not do to analyse just the 
symptoms of strain that manifest themselves at a particular 
point, we must look also at the process of development within 
which the cracks originated, which in our present case (as 
virtually everybody agrees) is the traditions of thought which 
originated in, and grew out of, the Enlightenment. 
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Thus Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen are ultimately false, 
not merely because nobody can ever consistently adhere to 
their claims (though indeed they cannot; vide Oakeshott), 
nor because there are philosophical quirks and distortions 
of a very high order within them (as indeed there are, 
especially in the 'harder' theorists discussed in Chapter One). 
They are false principally because no idea which so rigorously 
separates out 'philosophy' from 'politics' (The Red Queen) or 
accepts only an internal definition (after the manner of 
Humpty Dumpty) can develop the kind of understanding necessary 
to produce an adequate account of ~ aspect of our 
(inextricably intertwined) moral, intellectual, theoretical, 
practical, political life. 
Nonetheless, as I said above(91) the accounts offered by 
Rorty, Foucault, Collingwood and so on neither cohere in their 
entirety nor are free from serious flaws of their own(92). 
In the closing part of this essay I first want to suggest a 
way in which these differences, while not being resolved 
might be seen, in a certain sense, to dissolve, and, secondly, 
given this first step, what my analysis of the Enlightenment 
suggests regarding the problem that Macintyre isolated and 
with which I have been concerned in this work, the sundering 
of theory and practice in the 'modern world' and its 
implications. 
VI 
It is surely true that part of our most basic assumptions are 
historically located in a very strong sense. It is this fact 
which gives the arguments of Rorty, Collingwood, Foucault and 
others their plausability. I have said that on the basis of 
these arguments we cannot escape that historical and cultural 
location and, therefore, cannot do what Macintyre would have 
us do. I want now to examine this and its implications 
in a little more detail. 
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In a sense, what Macintyre is asking us to do is to adopt 
a different self-definition, a different identity, for he 
thinks we have lost the notion of teleology and with it, in 
a metaphysical as well as a literal sense, our purpose. 
The nuance of the notion of identity here is, however, surely 
the same as when we talk of 'finding one's identity' or 
'going through an identity crisis' but, as Charles Taylor has 
persuasively argued, "Our identity is defined by our 
fundamental evaluations"(93). These fundamental evaluations 
will, in part, be nourished and fed by our background and 
by the nature of our self-description. 
In his important essay 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept 
of a Person' (94), Harry Frankfurt makes a distinction between 
first order and second order desires; a second order desire 
being a condition in which I have a desire whose object is 
my having a certain (first order) desire. "It seems to be 
peculiarly characteristic of humans", Frankfurt argues, 
"that they are able to form .... second-order desires .... "(95). 
Part of the point of Frankfurt's argument here is, of course, 
to stress that our second-order desires are 'motivating' desires 
in a special way - they are at least part of what motivates 
action X rather than action Y in order to achieve first-order 
desire Z. The nuances of this discussion do not concern me(96) 
but as Taylor rightly insists(97), it is not just the capacity 
for second-order desires that is important it is also the 
capacity to evaluate them. The character of this evaluation 
is, in itself, difficult and yet of the utmost importance,for 
if our evaluations, our self-descriptions, are (as I have 
already hinted) dependent on, without being determined by, 
an identity created in part by a matrix or grid which 
establishes a whole culture, then to turn against them would 
be to repudiate oneself and, consequently, to be incapable of 
what Taylor calls "fully authentic evaluation"(98). 
As Taylor insists, however, such 'fully authentic evaluations' 
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must strive to be faithful !.2_ something "But what they strive 
to be faithful to is not an independent object with a fixed 
degree and manner of evidence, but rather a largely 
inarticulate sense of what is of decisive importance"(99). 
This 'sense of what is of decisive importance' is what we 
articulate when we give elaborations of that which is of 
value to us, but such articulation will inevitably change 
our sense of what is of value as well as express it; in 
Taylor's words "It makes it accessible and/or inaccessible 
in new ways"(lOO). The way in which this might occur is 
obvious enough. In pinning down and articulating our sense 
of what is important, we become aware of it in ways we perhaps 
were not before and if we have to defend it, rather than just 
articulate it, any number of different interpretations, senses 
and usages may become relevant to it. 
This judgement is important because it recalls something to 
which Gallie refers that I mentioned in Chapter One(lOl). 
It will be remembered that when discussing the essential 
contestability of some concepts 9 Gallie talks of a 'logic of 
conversion'. I criticised this on the grounds that, given 
the presentation of essential contestability Gallie makes, 
we could not expect people to see the possible validity of 
an opponents point of view. However, if the above arguments 
are accepted 9 I think it possible to revise Gallie's case such 
that it proves illuminating in the present context. 
If my interpretation of the Frankfurt/Taylor argument holds, 
such a recognition implies that a degree of 'openness' in 
our arguments and understandings is essential for our own 
better self-understanding. In a different essay Taylor 
remarks that "Part of what is involved in having a better 
theory is being able more effectively to cope with the world"(l02). 
To do this we must naturally understand ourselves better and 
for this we need to recognise the character of our articulations, 
what they represent and how they evolve and develop. 
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This means there will be a kind of 'elastic limit' beyond which 
our articulations cannot be stretched but within that limit 
we have a responsibility to open ourselves to alternative 
interpretations and understandings. We cannot, of course, 
completely step outside the 'Sense of what is of decisive 
importance' (which is what Macintyre would have us do) without 
serious conceptual rifts, but neither can we adopt the 
Neitzschean/Foucaultian stance of Olympian neutrality and 
detachment, a stance to which Rorty is also prone, without 
equally severe problems. 
Thus any use of various concepts whose meanings are located 
within a particular intellectual tradition can never be 
essentially contested, in the sense Gallie means (i.e., totally 
incommensurable) because they must be predicated on this stance 
of 'openness'. Whilst this says nothing, of course, about 
relations between widely disparate cultures and value-systems 
with completely different traditions,it seems eminently reasonable 
within one tradition or 'family' of traditions. 
It is in this way that the real significance of Hume, Kant and 
the Enlightenment more generally lies for the question of the 
relationship of theory to practice, philosophy to politics in 
the Western tradition. We have seen that the Humpty Dumpty 
and Red Queen approaches fail to yield a coherent position on 
what that relationship should be, yet one of the most powerful 
explanations of why this should be so -Macintyre's - itself 
fails. This failure is due, first and foremost, to an incorrect 
interpretation of the Enlightenment and its significance. The 
re-interpretation of the Enlightenment offered in Part II of 
this work remedies this and links it with certain concerns that 
can be seen activating both Humpty Dumpty and Red Queen theorists 
and critics like Macintyre and Rorty. The emphasis on the 
importance of historical reflection in Philosophy (and theory 
I I 
generally), the notions of intellectual and cultural grids and 
'matrices: make plain the importance for our own culture of the 
period where most of its characteristic stances were beginning 
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to be first articulated. 
It was my thesis in Part II that in Kant's articulation of the 
relationship of philosophy and politics we have the most 
suggestive and fruitful of Enlightenment analyses. It is 
not simply that the content of his ideas are interesting 
and important (though both are true even when they cannot be 
sustained). More important is the intellectual vision which 
prompts them for, as Williams rightly suggests, he sees man 
as perpetually standing at a crossroads(l03) and that the 
task of choosing which path to take means an inevitable 
linkage of action and theory, politics and philosophy. For 
we cannot move without understanding ourselves as independent 
agents - the recognition of which, according to his famous 
remark in the essay Was ist Aufklarung, is the surest sign 
of our maturity - and we cannot possess this understanding 
without the link between the theoretical and practical parts 
of our nature that it was the aim of his philosophy to 
articulate and give form and substance to. 
In this endeavour he combined the aims and intentions of both 
mainstream and minor currents of Enlightenment thought and 
thus, in the period in which the characteristic problems of 
0 
modernity were first emerging, sounded the clearest possible 
warning of what would follow if the attempt to link theory 
and practice together was forgotten. For Kant, as all his 
writings manifest, the only rational politics is one that 
recognises both theoretical and practical arenas and is 
clear on the linkage and priority between the two. 
On one aspect, however, Kant's thought is particularly 
vulnerable. Hegel,and since Hegel's time many others (as 
I documented in Chapter Four) have had no difficulty in 
ridiculing the lengths Kant is forced to go in justifying 
a unifying absolute standard of rationality and morality for 
his system. The arguments I have put forward in Chapters Two 
and Six, however, have shown that a complete project of 
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commensuration is unnecessary for the problem of reconciling 
theory to practice - at least in our own tradition - whatever 
Kant may have thought. Yet the point was made, in essentials, 
in Kant's own time, by Hume who, because he represented the 
sceptical and critical face of the Enlightenment to an 
unprecedented degree (and in a particular way as I argued 
in Chapter Five), is much closer than Kant to the realization 
of the need for a stance of 'openness' in our philosophical, 
moral and political enquiries. 
I cannot forbear from additionally pointing out that it is 
not, perhaps, entirely coincidental that the thinker (Kant) who 
built most fruitfully on the foundations laid by the 
Enlightenment was from both its geographical and conceptual 
fringe - Germany - and that the thinker who was at once its 
most sceptical and far-seeing internal critic (Hume) showed 
a similar remoteness - at least geographically. 
This is another bond that links them and, for all its 
contingency, is perhaps suggestive. Coming from outside 
the societies which gave vent to the Enlightenment's classic 
problems and approaches, they were, perhaps, able to see more 
clearly than those embedded within those societies the 
direction and shape ~ and the problems inherent in the 
conceptual framework they all shared - at least in the sense 
discussed earlier in Chapters Three to Five. 
This too, of course, makes plain that our theorising and 
our practice cannot be made completely distinct. Our actions 
in the moral and political world will very largely be 
determined by what we consider to be of 'decisive importance' 
and this, as I have discussed in Chapter Six, will be a product 
of historical and cultural location and our own reflection 
and articulations (perhaps inchoate) of this historical and 
cultural sense. Thus what (in Humean terms) is a sceptical 
approach to philosophy must go hand in hand with what is 
(in Kantian terms) a rational approach to politics and in both 
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the links between theory and practice, philosophy and politics, 
are firm, necessary and unbreakable. 
VII 
Although in this work I have travelled a long and,at times, 
diffuse and seemingly remotely connected road, I now hope 
the connections are plain and the arguments clear. 
In conclusion .I want to make a few comments as to just what 
I take to be some of the implications. 
Primarily, it establishes that political theory must concern 
itself with both theory and practice. In other words it 
must be substantive as well as methodological, but it must 
do this in a particular way and that way is concerned with 
history and how a particular issue, concept, tradition or 
thinker is located within it. One of the chief virtues 
(if I may be pardoned the pun) of After Virtue is its,at 
least partial1 recognition of this fact. 
This does not mean, however, that all works of political 
theory must also inevitably be works of history. The writings 
of Rawls, Nozick and others are major contributions to an 
ongoing tradition - articulations of it, if you like - and 
the 'historical' content in either is minimal. This is, 
however, fully consistent with what I have been saying 
provided always the stance of 'openness' I have attributed 
to Hume is borne in mind and as long as it is not supposed 
that the positions are universalist (Rawls never supposes 
this but Nozick certainly seems to in Anarchy State and 
Utopia [104]). 
Moreover, or so I would submit, it points to one of the 
most important issues for political theory to address today. 
In certain respects Kant's suggestio~ implicit in Zum Eiwigen 
Frieden and explicit in the Idee zu einer Allegemeinen 
Geschichte, ihat states would become ever more interdependent, 
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has proved correct (although what he thought followed from 
it, of course, has not). Nonetheless, the world that has 
arisen from this growing interdependence is one of huge 
cultural and evaluative differences. Like Dunn, I think 
that the starting point for political theory must, in a 
certain sense, be the here and now of our situation and this 
must mean reflecting on the impact on our political 
institutions, culture and values of growing political, 
economic and legal interdependence on the one hand and wide 
cultural and value independence (and, indeed, incommensurability) 
on the other. 
Here again, Macintyre shows himself to be sensitive to the 
problem, even though his diagnosis is flawed and solution 
unacceptable. There is a yawning gap between the two parts 
of this conceptual dichotomy and it must be the task of 
political theory to attempt some bridge building (105). 
I make no claim that this is the only task for modern political 
theory but the analysis I have offered here suggests why it 
is one of the most important. If theory and practice are 
bound together in the way I have suggested and if our various 
societies are now becoming interdependent to an unprecedented 
degree, the 'level' (as it were) of incommensurability is 
bound to increase; our articulations of what is of 'decisive 
importance' will, therefore, become less homogeneous and more 
inwardly riven and, consequently, our evaluations (and hence 
our actions) more problematic. 
This is an inherently unsatisfactory situation and,for both 
coherent theoretical understanding and sensible practical 
action, political theory needs to face up to it and discuss 
the problems involved more often and more deeply than it has 
done in this century up to the present. In whatever form 
they continue to exert influence in modern political theory, 
the true legacy of Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen will be 
to condemn it to increasing parochialism and irrelevance. 
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Over the past few years philosophers have come to recognize 
the truth of this, at least in part. It accounts for the 
revival of substantive moral theory (of which Rawls' book 
was not only one of the first but also still, perhaps, the 
loudest opening shots), the launch of journals explicitly 
concerned to link together philosophy and practice (Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, for example) and the formation of groups 
such as the Society for Applied Philosophy. 
The ground, however, still requires a lot of clearing; as I 
have tried to suggest it needs an awareness of the historical 
dimensions of our present situation and what, as a consequence, 
follows from such an awareness. As I argued earlier in this 
Chapter, given the significance of Kant's theory, it is 
scarcely surprising that so much recent work designed to 
'rebuild' or 'reconstruct' the edifice of modernity is, 
directly or indirectly, Kantian in its inspiration (106). 
I have tried to amend this, however, by pointing to the 
additional relevance of a Humean position and by suggesting 
that this leads inevitably to a concern with the possibility 
or otherwise of cultural commensuration. 
It is no part of my purpose to embark on this here (107). 
Like Hume, however, "I should be sorry to think that 
human affairs admit of no greater stability than what they 
receive from the casual humours and characters of particular 
men" (PW3: ) . My argument in this monograph has shown, 
I hope, that the marriage of a sceptical Humean approach to 
philosophy to the rational structure of Kantian politics 
produces at least the embryo of a 'better theory .... able more 
efficiently to cope with the world'; one, moreover, which 
admits of perhaps slightly greater stability than that 
provided by either the 'casual humours and characters of 
particular men' or the stark conceptual choice supplied by 
Macintyre; and, finally, one which enshrines the link between 
theory and practice, philosophy and politics as a cornerstone 
of our social life. "As a human being" wrote Kant, "each of 
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us is a man of affairs; and since, as human beings, we 
never grow out of the school of wisdom, we cannot arrogantly 
and scornfully relegate the adherent of theory to the class-
-room and set ourselves up as better trained by experience in 
all that a man is .... For all this experience will not in 
any way help us to escape the precepts of theory, but at most 
to learn how to apply it .... after we have assimilated it into 
our principles" (KPW 72/ AA VIII 285 ) . The assimilation 
involved is, perhaps , considerably more complicated than 
Kant envisaged ., but that does not invalidate. his point; our 
theories and our practice are not, and cannot be, completely 
distinct. The attempt to separate them was no project of 
the Enlightenment as both Humpty Dumpty and the Red Queen 
and Macintyre, from their opposing positions, seem to have 
supposed. Indeed, within Enlightenment thought is both 
a realization of the folly of so doing and clear illuminating 
attempts to meet the problems created by the assumption of 
a new set of conceptual understandings. Whatever the cracks 
that have appeared in the matrix since then- the 'grid' of 
which the Enlightenment was the harbinger - no solution is 
yet available for us outside it and so the Enlightenment's 
own solutions, however much they must now be revised, are 
still the best guide from which to start looking. 
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(available in English as The Philosophy of the Enlightenment 
Translated by Fritz Koellen and James Pettegrove 
(Princeton University Press: 1951). 
3. Gay The Enlightenment Vol II. pp. 398 
4. Roy Porter and Miklaus Teich The Enlightenment in National Context 
(Cambridge University Press: 1981). 
see, for Porter's view, 'The Enlightenment in England' p.4. 
5. Cassirer Philosophy of the Enlightenment pp.235 
6. Montesquieu Ceuvres Completes ed. Andre Masson (3 Vols) 
Vol I, Part 1 1c - 1xi - The preface to De l'esprit des lois 
7. Gay The Enlightenment: Vol II pp. 325 
8. For Becceria's praise see the introduction to Dei Delitti e delle Pene: 
for Hamilton's, the Federalist paper and for Hume's relations with 
Montesquieu see E.Mossner's Life of David Hume 
(Oxford 1954) pp. 218, 229, 232, 267, 423 
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and finally for Catherine the GreatJsee Gay The Enlightenment 
Vol II, pp.325 
(Chaps. VII- X in the same volume trace Montesquieu's influence admirably). 
9. For a pioneering study of the political importance of Lettres Persanes 
in the thought of the Enlightenment see Marshall Berman's The Politics 
of Authenticity (Allen & Unwin 1970) esp. Ch.1 'The Subjected Self in 
Revolt, .. 
10. See Neuman's introduction to his edition of 'The Spirit of the Laws' 
(1949) p. XXXIV. 
see also Gay The Enlightenment V ol II. p.326 
This view is, to a certain extent, challenged by Cassirer (see The 
Philosophy of the Enlightenment p. 243), but my reasons for accepting 
it will, I hope, become apparent as my argument progresses. 
11. See Gay The Enlightenment Vol II. p.410-423. 
and for much fuller treatments of the problem of slavery in the 
Enlightenment, see Shelby T. McCloy The Humanitarian Movement in 
Eighteenth Century France (1957) and David Brian Davis The Problem 
of Slavery in Western Culture (1966). 
12. Neuman 'Introduction' p.1-IX 
13. Montesquieu De l'esprit des lois Ch.II, Book II; Ceuvres 1,1251. 
14. For Voltaire as 'l'homme aux Calas' see David Briens 
The Calas Affair : Persecution, Toleration and Heresy in Eighteenth 
Century Toulouse (1960) and also Peter Gay's Voltaire's Politics 
(Princeton University Press 1959) 
15. Owen Chadwick 'The Italian Enlightenment' in Porter and Teich 
The Enlightenment in National Context p.96 
16. Quoted in Michael Walzer's book Regicide and Revolution: Speeches at 
the trial of Louis XVI (Cambridge University Press 1974) p.58 
17. Walzer Regicide and Revolution p. 58. 
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18. Walzer's Regicide and Revolution has a full account of Condorcet's and 
Paine's arguments at the trial (including an edited transcript) and 
also gives those of Jacobins like Robespierre and St. Just, which give 
a good indication of the extent to which their views were alien to 
those of WiJat I have called the mainstream Enlightenment. Robespierre' s 
relation to Rousseau - which is more problematic - is one which I 
discuss briefly later on (p. 71-73 in the present chapter). 
For the general effect of Becceria's writings see:-
Coleman Phillipson's Three Criminal Law Reformers (1923) 
The other two are Romilzy and Bentham. 
Gay The Enlightenment I, p~. 437-47 
Paul Spurlen 'Becceria's Essay on Crimes and Punishments in Eighteenth 
Century America' in Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 
(ed. Theodore Besterman) XVIII. (1963). 
For Becceria's Dei Delitti, as I have little Italian, I have used 
Henry Paolucci's excellent translation On Crimes and Punishments (1963) 
19. Gay The Enlightenment II. p.196 
20. Diderot's most ambiguous works - in particular La R~ve D'Alambert and 
Le Neveu de Rameau (neither published during Diderot's lifetime) show, 
it is true, some doubts creeping in. Yet these doubts are not really 
about the idea of the Enlightenment project itself (which is what 
Macintyre alleges) but about what Cassirer has called the 'centre of 
gravity' of the concept of 'Nature' in the Enlightenment (Cassirer 
Philosophy of the Enlightenment pp. 246). Diderot's radical materialism 
in La R3ve D'Alambert shifts this firmly to a thorough-going empiricism 
from the earlier mixture of a priori reasoning and empiricism found in 
(say) Montesquieu. I shall deal with this in more detail a little later 
on (p. 67 in the present chapter). 
21. Gay The Enlightenment II. p.450. 
22. Bentham Works X, 282 
This should not be taken to deny that occasionally there were real 
differences over forms of government between the philosophes (Voltaire, 
after all ~a Royalist in Paris) - merely that their differences 
were minor in comparison to the unity of their aims. 
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23. See Gay The Enlightenment II. pp.131 and 174-187 
24. D'Alambert 'Elements de Philosophie' quoted by Cassirer 
Philosophy of the Enlightenment: p.4 
25. Montesquieu De l'esprit des lois Book 1, Ch.1. quoted by Cassirer in 
Philosophy of the Enlightenment p.245 
26. See Cassirer Philosophy of the Enlightenment 
Gay The Enlightenment II. p.211 
PP-33-5 
27. See Cassirer Philosophy of the Enlightenment Ch. III 'Psychology and 
Epistemology'. 
28. Cassirer Philosophy of the Enlightenment. p.13 
29. Cassirer Philosophy of the Enlightenment. p.14 
30. As I argue later. See Chapter 5 
31. Correspondence ed. Georges Roth (1955) Vol. IV. p.81 
letter dated 31st July 1762. 
32. See Gay The Enlightenment II p.167 
My emphasis. 
33. Again Cassirer's Chapter III in The Philosophy of the Enlightenment 
is excellent on this. 
34. For a good discussion of Condorcet's Esquisse see Gay The Enlightenment 
Vol. II, pp. 12-122. For an excellent (and all too rare) discussion of 
Condorcet by a professional philosopher see Ian White's 'Condorcet : 
Politics and Reason', 
in S.C. Brown~(ed) Philosophers of the Enlightenment 
(Harvester Press 1979) 
35. Gay The Enlightenment Vol 4. p. 122 
36. Condorcet Esquisse in Oevres (ed A.C. O'Connor and M.F. Arogo) 
(12 Vols. 1847) p. 244 
I have followed Gay in abbreviating Condorcet's essay as Esguisse and 
have borrowed this translation from him. ( p.120). 
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37. I owe this point to Ian White 'Condorcet: Politics and Reason' He 
quotes this passage from Condorcet's Essay on the application of 
analysis to the probability of decisions taken by a majority of votes. 
on p. 128. 
38. Gay The Enlightenment Vol II, p. 529. 
39. Gay The Enlightenment Vol. 4 p. 531. 
40. J.J. Rousseau Oevres Completes eds.Bernard Gagnebin Marcel Raymond et al. 
(Paris, Gallinard, 1959-60) 5 Vols. (to date) Vo .. III p.6. 
41. Marshall Berman Politics of Authenticity p. 81 
42. Ronald Grimsby's essay 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau Philosopher of Nature' 
in S.C. Brown (ed) Philosophers of the Enlightenment discusses 
this. pp. 184-5. 
43. Oevres Completes Vol 3. ,p.936 
44. Gay The Enlightenment II p. 538 
45. He argues this in the third Dialogue Rousseau juge de Jean Jacques 
(see J.J. Rousseau Oevres Vol 3 934-5 
46. I owe this point to Ronald Grimsby's discussion in Jean Jacques Rousseau, 
philosopher of Nature. 
47. J.J. Rousseau Emile (in Oevres Vol.I pp.5-6) 
48. 
Berman also discusses the tree analogy. See The Politics of Authenticity 
Part III, 'A New Morality : The Authentic Man'. 
Gay The Enlightenment II p.548 
49. See, for a discussion of this:-
Gay The Enlightenment II, Chapter IX 448-496 
and Porter and Teich The Enlightenment in National Context 
50. See Roy Porter The Enlightenment in England 
in Porter and Teich The Enlightenment in National Context 
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51. Again Gay discusses this well. See The Enlightenment II. 517-528 
52. 
53. 
Berman The Politics of Authenticity p.115 
See J.J. Rousseau Oevres Vol IV. p.602 
This is an obviously Platonic point, and it scarcely needs saying that 
Plato was Rousseau's favourite 'ancient philosopher~ (See the discussion 
in Gay The Enlightenment Vol. II p. 529 See also Grimsby's 
presentation of Rousseau as the 'philosopher of Nature' in S.C. Brown (ed) 
Philosophers of the Enlightenment.) 
54. J.J. Rousseau Oevres Vol I. p. 1021 
55. J.J. Rousseau Oevres Vol. III p.364 (from Du Contrat Social of course. 
Book 1 Chapter VIII). A startling example of the moral thrust of 
Rousseau's political theory, and which helped to influence the direction 
of Kant's; but more of that in Chapter Four. 
56. J.J. Rousseau Oevres Vol III p.364 emphasis added. 
57. Gay The Enlightenment Vol II. p. 50 
58. Gay The Enlightenment Vol II. p. 552 
59. J.J. Rousseau Oevres Vol I. p. 7 
60. John Plamenatz Man and Society 2 Vols (Longmans 1963) Vol I. p. 435. 
61. Gay The Enlightenment Vol II. p. 52 
62. Cassirer The Philosophy of the Enlightenment p. 273-4 
63. Alisdair Macintyre After Virtue p.35 
64. Macintyre After Virtue p. 45 
65. Macintyre After Virtue p. 45 
66. Diderot Letter to Sophie Volland (31 July 1762) in Correspondence 
ed. Georges Roth (1955- Vol IV. p. 87 
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67. Both quoted by Gay The Enlightenment II p. 202 
Diderot's remark actually referred to sexual intercourse but Gay is 
surely right that "This callous medical tone is surely Chamf~t's 
ancestor." 
68. Macintyre After Virtue p. 46. 
69. Macintyre After Virtue p.45 
70. See Gay's discussion in The Enlightenment I. p. 173-6. 
71. See Isaiah Berlin's 'The originality of Machiavelli' in 
Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas (Oxford, 1978) 
72. Cassirer Philosophy of the Enlightenment p. 246 
73. Cassirer PhilOSOEh:t: of the Enlightenment p. 247 
74. May or June 1758. Correspondence II. 56. 
75. For this see, of course, A.J. Ayers Language, Truth and Logic (1936), 
which conjoins British philosophical analysis (a la Moore, Russell and 
Ryle) with the Vienna Circle. Also, his The Foundations of Empirical 
Knowledge. ( 1940). 
For the Vienna Circle themselves, representative writings would be 
'Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassurg der Weiner Kreis' (1929) (The original 
statement of the circle's programme); Moritz Schlick's 'Positivismus und 
Realismus' in Erkenntnis (1932) (The 'house journal' as it were, renamed 
in 1939-40 The Journal of Unified Science) and papers gathered together 
by Ayer in Logical Positivism (1959). 
There is a good discussion of the relationship between analysis and 
positivism in Susan Stebbings 'logical positivism and analysis' in 
The Proceedings of the British Academy (1933) and in John Passmore 
100 Years of PhilosoEh:t: (1957) (Penguin 1968, pp. 386-8). 
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76. For America see:-
Henry May's The Enlightenment in America (New York, 1976). 
Henry Commager's The Empire of Reason (New York, 1977) 
Donald Mayer's The Democratic Enlightenment (New York, 1976) 
Morton White's The Philosophy of the American Revolution (New York, 1978) 
Gerry Wills' Inventing America (New York, 1978). 
Gay The Enlightenment II p~.555-568 
J.R. Pole's 'Enlightenment and the Politics of American Nature' in 
Porter and Teich 'The Enlightenment in National Context, and 
Bernard Bailyn The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967). 
For France:-
Norman Hampson's The Enlightenment (Penguin 1968) has an excellent chapter 
(Ch.8. 'The Revolutionary Climacteric') on the Enlightenment's role in the 
1789 revolution. Also, his article 'The Enlightenment in France' in 
Porter and Teich is valuable. 
D. Mornet's Origines Intellectuelles de la Revolution Francais (Paris 1933) 
is still a standard, if difficult, work. 
Cassirer The Philosophy of the Enlightenment Ch. VI. 
M.S. Anderson's Historians and Eighteenth Century Europe (Oxford, 1979), 
has a lot of valuable information on how historians have seen the 
relationship between the Enlightenment and the Revolution. 
77. Pole's 'Enlightenment and the Politics of American Nature' in 
Porter and Teich. p. 194. Pole's emphasis. 
78. Quoted in Pole's 'Enlightenment and the Politics of American Nature' in 
Porter and Teich. p. 196. 
See also Gay The Enlightenment ILpp.559-60. 
79. See, for example 
Alfred Aldridge's 'Benjamin Franklin and the Philosophes' in 
Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, XXIV (1963) pp.43-65 
Gay The Enlightenment II 558-563 
Adrienne Koch (ed.) The American Enlightenment: The Shaping of the American 
Experiment and a Free Society. (1965). 
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80. See Douglass Adair's 'That politics may be reduced to a science'. 
David Hume, James Madison and 'The Tenth Federalist' in 
The Huntington Library Quarterly XX, 44 (August 1957) 
Also, Gay The Enlightenment II. p. 560 
Pole, 'Enlightenment and the politics of American Nature'. p. 194 
81. Madison, Hamilton, Jay ('Publius') The Federalist Papers 
Mentor Books 1961. ed. (Clinton Rossiter) No. 14. p. 104 
82. quoted in Douglass Adair 'That politics may be reduced to a sciencer.p.343. 
Also by Gay The Enlightenment II. p.560. 
83. Gay The Enlightenment p. 561 
84. May The Enlightenment in America. 
85. Pole 'Enlightenment and the politics of American Nature'. p. 198. 
86. The Philosophy of the American Revolution 
87. See White Philosophy of the American Revolution and 
Pole 'Enlightenment and the politics of the American Nature'. p. 204-5 
88. Jacob Viner The Role of Providence in the Social Order 
(Philadelphia 1972) p.59 
89. Norman Hampson The Enlightenment p. 251. 
90. Quoted by Alfred Cobban in Aspects of the French Revolution 
(Cape 1968) p.18 
91. See Hampson The Enlightenment pp. 256-7 
92. Cobban Aspects of the French Revolution p. 446 
93. Iris Murdoch The Sovereignty of Good 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970) SR}~ even goes so far 
as to call Hume arid Kant.the-Patron Saints of Modern Thought. 
94. There are, of co{rrse, many examples of this: Of modern ph1losopners· 
influenced by them, I have already mentioned Rawls whose A Theory 
of Justice is, he says, an explicitly Kantian work; logical 
positivists like Schlick and Carnap (who virtually canonized Hume) and 
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philosophers like Ayer and Russell who have attempted to restate what 
they see as Classical Humean Empiricism, with 20th Century logical tools. 
In addition, one might mention moral philosophers like Hare, whose attempted 
synthesis of Kantian and utilitarian systems owes a great deal to Kant, and 
attempts like Peter Strawsons The Bounds of Sense, to 'rescue' Kant from 
the awkward (for an analytical philosopher) implications of his 
transcendentalism. 
Then again there are philosophers like Anthony Kenny and, to a certain 
extent, David Pears, who see Wittgenstein, in some respects, as a 20th 
Century Kant, arguing about the true limits on Reason. There are many 
other examples :-
See (as a selection): John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Oxford 1972) 
Ayers The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940) 
R.M. Hare The Language of Morals (Oxford 1952). 
Freedom and Reason (Oxford 1963) 
and Moral Thinking (Oxford 1981) 
Peter Strawson's The Bounds of Sense (Methuen 1966) 
(which I shall discuss in more detail in the next chapter). 
David Pears Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy (Fontana 1967) 
Anthony Kenny Wittgenstein (Penguin 1973) 
95. Barry Stroud Hume (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1977) p.X. 
96. See F.C. Copleston (S.J.) A History of Philosophy (Image Books 1946-77) 
Vol. 6, Part II 'Kant' especially pp. 184-229 
97. For Forbes' views see his Hume's Philosophical Politics 
(Cambridge 1975) 
and also an article 'Linking the Philosophical and the Political' in 
Political Studies 25 (1977) pp.272-3 
For Dunn's comment that "Kant's domestic politics seem merely archaic 
and fusty" see Chapter 2 ('Liberalism') of his Western Political Theory 
in the Face of the Future (Cambridge, 1979) and for Walker's similar 
remarks see his Kant (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). 
Certainly in the case of Dunn and Forbes this is part of a more general 
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(and understandable) reaction against philosophers treating social or 
political theorists as though they were contemporaries whose 
departmental offices were just down the corridor; a reaction shared, and to 
a certain extent pioneered by, their Cambridge Confrere, Quentin Skinner, 
who,in his turn1 was influenced by Collingwood. 
I shall return to this in Chapter Six. 
98. Cassirer Philosophy of the Enlightenment p. 274. 
99. Gay The Enlightenment I. p. 401 and p. 418 
100. Gay is, of course, not the only theorist to view Hume in this light. A 
number of other writers will be discussed in ChapterFive. 
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Notes for Chapter Four 
(1) Cassirer Philosophy of the Enlightenment p.274 
In this and following chapters, reference will be made to a 
specific English translation of Kants works, and to the standard 
German edition, the Gesammelte Schriften (ed. Preussiche akadamie 
der Wissenschaften: Berlin and Leipzig, 1902-68). I abbreviate 
the latter, following custom as AA, and follow the abbreviation 
with a volume and a page number. 
In most cases, the English translation is quoted direct 
from the translation that I have used, but occasionally I have 
substituted my own. Where this is the case,I have indicated it 
in the text. 
The English translations I have used are as follows:-
Kritik der Reinen Vernunft(l781 and 1787) 
The Critique of Pure Reason (trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillans 
1933) abbreviated(abr.) as CPR- A orB indicating, respectively 
1781 and 1787 editions. 
Prolegomena zu einer jeden Kunftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft 
wird Auftreten Konnen (1783) 
Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic that has a Right to 
be Judged a Science (trans. L.W. Beck,Bobbs-Merril, 1970) 
abr. as Pr 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) 
The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (trans. L.W.Beck 
Bobbs-Merrill,l969). abr. as FMM 
Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft (1788) 
The Critique of Practical Reason (trans L.W. Beck, Bobbs-Merrill 
1956) abr. as CPrR. 
Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790) 
The Critique of Judgement (trans J.H.Bernard, Hafner Press, 1951) 
abr. as CJ. 
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Die Religion Innerhalb der Grenzen der Blossen Vernunft (1793) 
Religion within the limits of Reason alone (trans. T.M.Greene 
and H.M.Hudson,Open Court Chicago, 1934) abr. as !A_. 
Metaphysik Angfangsgrunde des Rechts (1797) 
The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (part 1 of the Metaphysic 
der Sitten; trans John Ladd, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) abr. as MJ 
' A number of Kants specifically political writings have been 
collected together by Hans Reiss in Kants Political Writings 
( trans. Nisbett, Cambridge University Press,1970) abr. as KPW. 
Those relavant to the presant study are as follows:-
Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltburgerlicher Absich 
'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitian Purpose' 
Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklarung? 
'An answer to the Question :What is Enlightenment?' 
Uber dem Gemeinspruch:Das Mag in der Theorie Richtig Sein,taugt 
aber nicht fur die Praxis 
'On the common saying, 'this may be true in theory, but it 
does not apply in practice'' 
Zum Ewigen Frieden:Ein Philosophicher entwurf 
'Perpetual peace: A philosophical sketch' 
Also relevant are the essays collected in L.W.Beck(ed) Kant on History 
(Bobbs-Merrill, 1963); abr~ as KH: see especially:-
Das Ende aller Dinge (trans R.E.Anchor) 
'The end of all things' 
Mussmasslicher Anfang das Menschengesechts 
The conjectural beginning of human history transE.L.Fackenheim. 
Then there is also Der Streit der Facultaten 
translated as the Conflict of the Faculties by M.J.Gregor(Abaris Books, 
1979) abr. as CF 
There is also the Opus Postumum published in the 1920 supplementary 
volume of Kant-Studien ( Ed. Erich Adickes) abr. as OP 
Finally there is Kant~ Anthropologie in Pragmatiker Hinsicht 
Translated as Anthropology from a Practical Point of View 
by M.J.Gregor (The Hague;Ninjhoff,1974) abr. asAP 
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(2) Stages in the rehabilitation of Kant's Political thought 
include the Reiss and Nisbett collection, a number of Journal 
Articles many of which are referred to in the text of this 
Chapter (see, for example, notes 10, 18, 34), 
and a growing number of book length studies of which a good 
example is Howard Williams' Kant's Political Philosophy 
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1 1983) 
(3) Williams Kant's Political Philosophy p.37 
(4) See his Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason 
(University of Chicago Press, 1960) 
(5) Beck Commentary p.48 
(6) See Reiss' introduction to~. Williams Kant's Political 
Philosophy (passim but especially the preface) and Hans 
Saner Kants Political Thought (University of Chicago Press 
1973. Trans.E.B.Ashton). 
(7) Saner Kant's Political Thought p.3. Williams shares this 
view. See Kant's Political Philosophy p.vii 
(8) See John Dunn Western Political Theory in the face of the 
Future (Cambridge University Press, 1979) p.45 and 
Ralph C.S.Walker Kant (Routledge and Kegan Paul,1978) 
(9) ' A good account is H.J.Patons The Categorical Imperative 
(Hutchinson,1947); for a more recent discussion see Bruce 
Aune Kant's Theory of Morals (Princeton University Press,1979) 
(10) Peter Nicholson 'Kant on the Duty Never to Resist the 
Sovereign' in Ethics Vol.86, 1975 - 76. 
(11) Gay The Enlightenment Vol.II p.398. See above, Chapter 
Three. 
(12) George A.Schrader 'Autonomy, Heteronomy and Moral 
Imperatives' in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 
(text with critical Essays) Ed. R.P.Wolff (Bobbs-Merrill, 
1969) pp.118 - 9 
Bernard Williams also believes this, though he also believes 
it to be largely mistaken. See Chapter Two of the present 
work. 
(13) Schrader 'Autonomy' p.120 
(14) Herbert Marcuse Studies in Critical Philosophy (London, 
1972) p.82 
(15) See Williams Kant's Political Philosophy Ch.2 especially 
pp 59 - 63 for an elaboration. 
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(16) Williams Kant's Political Philosophy p.69 
(17) It should not be necessary, of course, to repeat or 
emphasize how indebted to Rousseau Kant was, in his moral 
theory. As Williams argues (p.162) "Kant approaches 
the state from a point of view similar to Rousseau", but in 
working through the general implications of his political 
theory, he moves away from so distinctively Rousseauist a 
position. His account of governmental forms, for example, 
bears the stamp of Montesquieu, not Rousseau, and his 
rejection of 'pure' democracy is an echo of the Federalist 
Papers (as Williams notes, p.188). In the terms of my 
argument in Chapter Three, although heavily indebted to 
Rousseau for many of his characteristic moral opinions, 
Kant remained far more firmly wedded to the ideals of the 
Mainstream Enlightenment than ever Rousseau was. 
(18) Charles Taylor 'Kant's Theory of Freedom' in Philosophy 
(19) 
(20) 
and the Human Sciences (Philosophical Papers Vol.II, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985) 
Taylor 'Kant's Theory of Freedom' 
Taylor 'Kant's Theory of Freedom' 
pp 318 - 37 
p.320 - 321 
p.321 
(21) See above Chapter Three. 
(22) 
(23) 
Williams 
Taylor 
Kant's Political Philosophy p.37 
'Kant's Theory of Freedom' p.325 
(24) Saner~ work was originally published as Widerstreit und 
Einheit: Kant's Politischem Denken. For the English 
Translation see note 6 of the present Chapter, the 
quotation is from p.3 
(25) Saner Kant's Political Thought p.4 
(26) Saner Kant's Political Thought p.73 
(27) Saner Kant's Political Thought p.73 
He is quoting Kant's Reflexionan zur Logik (AA XIV 34,7 3) 
(28) Saner Kant's Political Thought pp.73 - 74 
(29) Saner Kant's Political Thought pp 79 - 103 
(30) Saner Kant's· Political Thought p.103 
(31) This is, it must be admitted a highly simplified account 
a .. 
of Saners argument which displays a grasp of the Kantian 
corpus that can only be described as encyclopedic. It is, 
however, sufficient for my purpose. 
(32) This is Saner's rendering 
(33) Saner Kant's Political Thought p.107 
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(34) P.Riley 'A Possible Explanation of Rousseau's General Will' 
in The American Political Science Review (1970) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
Riley 'A Possible Explanation' 
Riley 'A Possible Explanation' 
' Taylor Kant's Theory of Freedom' 
(38) See above Ch.l. 
p.91 
p.96 
pp.336 - 337 
(39) J.N.Findlay Kant and the Transcendental Object (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1981) 
(40) See above Chapter Four. 
(41) Findlay Kant and the Transcendental Object p.282 
(42) John Dunn 'From Applied Theology to Social Analysis: the 
break between John Locke and the Scottish Enlightenment' 
in Rethinking Modern Political Theory (Cambridge University 
Press~ 1985) p.SS 
(43) Dunn Rethinking Modern Political Theory p.66 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(SO) 
(51) 
(52) 
Findlay Kant and the Transcendental Object 
Findlay Kant and the Transcendental Object 
pp. 348 - 349 
p.370 
For example by Anthony Kenny in his Wittgenstein (Pelican, 1970 
Peter Strawson The Bounds of Sense (Methuen, 1966) 
See Findlay Kant and The Transcendental Object P.ix 
Strawson The Bounds of Sense p.241 
Strawson The Bounds of Sense p.247 
Strawson The Bounds of Sense p.249 
Strawson The Bounds of Sense p.248 
(53) Findlay Kant and The Transcendental Object p.382 
(54) Strawson The Bounds of Sense pp.248 - 249 
(55) Strawson The Bounds of Sense pp.248 - 249 
(56) A good summary is found in W.H.Walsh's article 'Self-Knowledge' 
in Kant On Pure Reason (Oxford University Press, 1982) 
Ed. R.C.S.Walker. See especially pp.l58 - 174 
(57) Gay The Enlightenment Vol.II p.313 
1. 
2. 
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Notes for Chapter Five 
All references to Hume's works in this and the subsequent Chapter 
will be to the u.:.x1.0mOtP.d editions, abbreviated as given below, 
followed by a page number or numbers:-
A Treatise of Human Nature (T) 
(ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford Clarendon Press 1978) 
revised by P.H. Nidditch. 
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (EHU) 
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (EPM) 
A Dialogue (D) 
All from the Selby-Bigge edition of the Enquiries (ed. and introduced 
by L.A. Selby-Bigge. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1975) also revised by 
P.H. Nidditch. 
The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (DNR) 
(ed. N.K. Smith. Thames Nelson & Sons 1947) 
The History of England (H) (Parker & Coates, Philadelphia) 
There is no standard edition of the history, so I have used the one 
to which I had the most direct access. 
The Letters of David Hume (ed,J.Y.T.Greis- Oxford University Press 1932)(L1) 
The New Letters of David Htune ( e:i. R3.ymond Kliliansky andE. C. Mosaner. O.U.P . 1 9 54) ( L2) 
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